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The main task was therefore to assess the regional impact of  the Commission's budget.  Which expenditure reduces 
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How should this influence future policy decisions at Community, Member State and regional level? 
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8 Summary 
1.  The  European  Community  is  marked  by  regional 
disparities.  Since the mid-1970s,  it has made efforts to 
boost  regional  policy  measures  taken  by  individual 
countries  by  granting  additional  financial  aids  from  a 
regional  Fund  set  up  for  this  purpose.  This  has  not 
resulted  in  rapid  progress,  even  though  the  resources 
available  have  been  substantially  increased  and 
concentrated. This is  partly due to the fact  that neither 
national nor Community economic and financial policies 
are exclusively devoted to regional policy aims. What we 
shall  be  considering  here  is  the  general  trend  of 
Community  farming  policy,  regional  policy,  the 
operations of the European Social Fund and competition 
policy  in  terms  of their  effects.  We  then  present  an 
overall assessment. 
2.  The most important instruments of farming  policy 
are:  the purchase  and  storage  (intervention)  of certain 
agricultural  products  by  the  European  Agricultural 
Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGGF)  Guarantee 
Section;  variable import duties  (levies);  export refunds; 
processing  grants;  grants  from  the  EAGGF  Guidance 
Section;  direct  aids  to  producers.  Regional  policy  is 
dominated  by  grants  towards  public  and  private 
investment; loans from the EIB and the Commission; the 
monitoring of national regional policy; and coordination 
between the European Regional Development Fund and 
other  Community  policies.  The  operations  of  the 
European Social Fund focus on: funding, education and 
training, particularly for young people and the long-term 
unemployed;  grants  to  enhance  regional  mobility; 
financial  aid  in  creating  long-term  employment  and 
setting  up  new  businesses.  Lastly,  the  instruments  of 
competition  policy  are:  better  mutual  market  access, 
including public contracts; the monitoring of cartels and 
malpractice among companies that dominate the market; 
advance  control  of  mergers;  curbs  on  subsidies  to 
companies; the approximation or reciprocal recognition 
of national laws. 
These instruments differ in tangibility, the nature of their 
effects  (direct  or  indirect)  and  magnitude.  The  most 
tangible are measures that affect the budget. The bulk of 
the  spending  continues  to  be  directed  towards  farm 
guarantee payments: in 1990 they accounted for roughly 
600Jo  of  the  Community  budget,  whereas  structural 
spending (excluding loans) accounted for only 200Jo  (see 
Tables  1 and 2).  The sharpest jump was  in  European 
regional Fund expenditure, which reached 8.40Jo in 1989. 
Spending  on  agricultural  policy,  on  the  other  hand, 
showed  only  a  moderate  rise.  The  regionalized 
Community  expenditure  examined  in  this  study 
accounted for  840Jo  of the Community budget in  1989. 
On top of this there are bonded loans.  The proportion 
considered  here  is  something  of the  same  order.  The 
effects  on  competition  must  be  largely  measured 
separately from budgetary categories. 
3.  The  usual  standard  for  measuring  a  country's  or 
region's  state  of  development  is  per  capita  income. 
Within  the  scope  of this  study  it  is  not  possible  to 
pinpoint the ways in which various Community policies 
influence  regional  economic  development.  But  we 
explore  how  the  regional  incidence  of  political 
intervention  works  out  in  practice.  In  doing  so,  our 
prime concern is to see which region is directly favoured 
by  the  measure  in  question  and  to  what  extent.  The 
following assumptions are made: 
(i)  Community expenditure has an effect on incomes. 
If regions  that are lagging behind are helped with 
grants, this counteracts the regional income gap. 
(ii)  The extent to which particular policy objectives are 
likely  to  be  achieved  may  be  gauged  from  the 
importance assigned to it in the budget. 
(iii)  The  revenue  side  of  the  Community  financing 
system does  not exacerbate disparities. 
The  major  drawback  in  examining  the  problems 
involved here is  that it is  analytically extremely difficult 
to trace the effects of revenue on incomes. Ultimately it 
is only possible to measure the financial impact in terms 
of its regional distribution. 
4.  Much more difficult than measuring the impact of 
structural assistance is the question of how to assess the 
net  advantage  accruing  from  agricultural  guarantee 
payments. The total sum of all these advantages for EEC 
farmers is not simply identical with the sum spent by the 
EAGGF  on  intervention  and  refunds.  The  bulk  of 
output  goes  direct  on  to  the  Community's  internal 
market and is thus subsidized by the consumer. In terms 
of safeguarding  incomes  under  the  market  regulation 
system,  it  does  not  matter  in  which  region  of  the 
Community the products on which guarantee funds are 
spent originate. Accordingly, it is not merely reasonable 
to  allot  the  income-boosting  effects  of this  guarantee 
expenditure  on agriculture  to  the  individual  regions  in 
proportion to their share in the output of the product in 
question as  a makeshift solution in the absence of data 
on  the  direct  regional  incidence  of  guarantee 
expenditure; it is  logically necessary, too. 
9 5.  A  substantial  proportion of payments  go  to trade 
and industry. But the guarantee payments cannot simply 
be described as  inherently excessive to the extent of the 
amount  spent  on  trade.  If this  part  was  removed, 
farmers'  incomes would fall.  The problem as  far as  we 
are concerned is that the guarantee payments allocated to 
trade and industry cannot strictly speaking be assigned to 
the  regions  in  accordance  with  their  agricultural 
production.  There  is  no evidence  that farm  trade as  a 
whole  is  distributed  equally  or  similarly  across  the 
regions. 
6.  The method used here for measuring the effects of 
the EAGGF Guarantee on regional incomes does ignore 
the dynamic changes that would occur in the system as a 
whole  if  the  Community's  price  support  system  was 
simply  scrapped.  The  final  outcome would  be  a  world 
market price level  that would be virtually impossible to 
predict. There would be a sharp drop in EC agricultural 
production  and  an  even  more  dramatic  fall  in  the 
number  of  farms.  There  would  be  greater  regional 
concentration  of production.  The  Community  budget 
spending pattern would change completely, as  would its 
regional  distribution.  Given  the  effects  of dismantling 
farm  price  supports  on  the  sectoral  and  regional 
economic  structure  as  a  whole,  regional  income 
distribution  would  also  differ  unpredictably  from  the 
current position. This analysis is unable to take account 
of potential developments of this kind.  All  it can do is 
engage in  'comparative statistics'. 
7.  The tendency to even out - or reinforce - regional 
divergences may be illustrated in compressed form by a 
concentration curve,  using  the  Lorenz  Curve.  For this 
purpose,  Community regions  defined  at NUTS  Level  2 
are ranked according to their  pro capita incomes  (as  a 
measure  of  their  standard  of  development).  The 
aggregate  payments  are  then  compared  with  the 
aggregate  populations  of the  regions  in  question.  A 
search  of  regional  databanks,  from  which  the  most 
important statistical data are available, does show that in 
individual  cases  aggregation  must  be  stepped  up.  This 
analysis  is,  in  fact,  impossible  without  a  considerable 
amount  of  guesswork.  Only  where  the  subordinate 
regional level  (NUTS Level 2)  receives the EC payment 
directly  can the  desired  regional  classification be  made 
free of any element of doubt. 
In  view  of these  problems,  a  two-stage  approach  has 
been  selected  here  for  looking  at  the  Community's 
structural  policy  operations.  Only  Community 
expenditure that has flowed direct to the NUTS Level 2 
regions  is  covered  by  the  study.  This  expenditure as  a 
10 
proportion of overall spending varies from fund to fund 
and  from  country  to  country.  In  the  second  stage, 
spending in the higher ranking regions was  allocated to 
the regions corresponding to NUTS Level 2 with the aid 
of appropriate indicators. In the case of agriculture, the 
majority of those who  benefit are not in receipt,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  of Community  payments.  This 
means  that  the  bulk  of  EEC  expenditure,  roughly 
three-fifths, can only be regionalized in a makeshift way 
by means of model calculations.  In this case the notion 
of impact  must  disregard  regionalized  payment  flows. 
Instead,  we  attempted  to trace  regional  effects  on the 
basis  of  production  in  respect  of  each  group  of 
intervention products. 
The  calculations  cover  the  period  from  1985  onwards. 
For  a  number  of  intervention  areas,  data  was  only 
available  from  the  Eurostat's regional  databank  up  to 
1987. Data for the regional Fund, social Fund, guarantee 
payments and the ECSC subsidies for the period up to 
1989/90 were supplied by the Commission. A complete 
overview  was  thus  only  possible  for  the  brief  period 
1985-87. In 1985, Portugal and Spain had not yet joined 
the Community. Consequently the calculations were first 
carried out for the  10  original Member States over the 
entire period covered, and then again from  1980 on for 
the Community of Twelve. 
8.  The question of whether a category of payments has 
a harmonizing effect on regional income distribution or 
not should be decided on the basis of whether it is more 
or  less  equally  distributed  across  the  regions  ranked 
according to per capita income than the income itself. If 
the regional  distribution of payments  is  to the right of 
the income distribution curve,  it  is  reinforcing regional 
imbalances. If  it lies between the 45° line and the income 
distribution  curve,  it  might  mitigate  these  imbalances. 
Only when the payment curves run to the left of the 45° 
line  is  it  quite  clear  that they  are  being  more  or less 
effective in evening out imbalances. 
The regional income distribution curve is relatively stable 
in  the  medium  term.  Payment  flows  from  the 
Community budget and the EIB, on the other hand, are 
largely subject to discretionary decisions and are thus far 
more liable  to breaks in continuity.  Differences  in the 
territory covered may be clearly reflected in the curves. 
This  is  seen,  for  example,  in  a  comparison of income 
distribution curves between EC 10 and EC 12.  The EC 
10  curve (Appendix B)  is  much  flatter than the EC  12 
curve,  showing  that  the  income  gap  between  the  EC 
regions  was  much  less  pronounced  before  the 
Community's enlargement than it was afterwards. Some 
sections of the payment distribution curves are severely disrupted.  In general it is  true to say that the payments 
curve  is  steadier  when  payments  are  made  more 
frequently,  the  annual  payments  are  larger  and  the 
period under consideration longer. 
9.  Investment  grants  from  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund do a great deal to even out regional 
disparities in the European Community. With the reform 
of the structural Funds these effects have become even 
stronger.  In  1987  and  1990  some  800Jo  of investment 
support  granted  went  to  the  200Jo  of the  Community 
population living  in  the  poorest  regions.  Even  so,  the 
effects  of  financial  levelling  in  favour  of  backward 
regions  were  somewhat stronger under the Community 
of Ten  than  for  the  present  Community.  Spain  and 
Portugal  evidently  required  an  initial  period  of 
adjustment  before  making  full  use  of  the  regional 
Fund. 
In the backward regions of Spain and Portugal, which 
are among the economically weakest in the Community, 
the main thrust of regional assistance - even more than 
in the other regions - has been directed at infrastructure 
measures.  A  poor infrastructure has  always  been  (and 
still  is)  a  major  obstacle  to  private  investment.  The 
Community  of Ten,  in  which  regional  assistance  was 
already well  established and flaws  in  the infrastructure 
were anyway not so pronounced, enjoyed a much higher 
concentration  of  subsidies  to  promote  private 
investment. 
The regional concentration of aid is not quite so marked 
in the case of the European Social Fund, though it has 
increased somewhat over the years. It may be seen from 
the gentler curve for aid from the social Fund, compared 
with  the  regional  Fund,  that  long-term  and  youth 
unemployment  in  the  Community  are  not  simply  the 
problems  of a  few  under-developed  regions.  Since  the 
date of their accession, the Community has directed aid 
to  Spain  and  Portugal  from  the  social  Fund  more 
purposefully than in the case of the regional Fund. 
The  EAGGF Guarantee  Section  focuses  its  investment 
grants  on  the  poorer  regions.  Funds  were  relatively 
evenly  distributed  between  the  poorer  regions  of the 
newly acceded countries and those of the older Member 
States. 
ECSC  credits  exacerbate  regional  inequality.  In  a 
number of regions, including some of the poorest, there 
is  simply no material basis for such payments. 
The same applies to ECSC re-adaptation aid.  In fact,  it 
is  even  more  unevenly  distributed.  Between  1986  and 
1989  the  trend  was  towards  a  lessening  of these  -
adverse - regional effects. Even so, in 1989 the poorest 
regions  of the Community of Twelve,  with 40%  of the 
population,  did  not even  receive  50Jo  of the  ECSC  aid 
granted. The regional concentration is less marked if we 
confine  our  analysis  to  the  regions  of  the  original 
Community. 
Unlike  ECSC  aid,  EIB  loans  have  much  more  of an 
equalizing  effect.  It is  plain  that  the  rectification  of 
regional imbalances  is  one of the BIB's declared  aims, 
though this is a truer reflection of the position under the 
Community  of Ten  than  under  the  present  expanded 
Community.  The  problem  here  is  presumably  one  of 
absorption;  1986  was  the  first  year  of  Spanish  and 
Portuguese membership.  Until then the EIB policy had 
been  geared  towards  regional  equalization  in  the 
Community of Ten.  The  Iberian countries  first  had to 
develop  projects  eligible  for  EIB  funding.  In  this 
connection, spending on infrastructure carries far greater 
weight than industrial investment. In the Community of 
Twelve as currently constituted, industrial credits clearly 
help to combat regional income  disparities,  despite less 
importance being attached to them. This shows that it is 
much harder to draw up infrastructure projects that will 
swiftly  bear  fruit  than  it  is  to  provide  support  to 
industry. 
10.  With  regard  to  agricultural  guarantee  payments, 
the  study  looks  at  the  periods  1986-89  (EC  12)  and 
1985-89  (EC  10).  The most important products subject 
to market organization are included; taken together, they 
account  for  more than nine-tenths of all  price support 
payments, or 560Jo  of the Community budget. Many of 
the  curves  are  extraordinarily  stable  over  time,  while 
others  fluctuate  slightly  or  sharply.  Unlike  other 
comparisons over time, the curves  for the two  different 
Communities  differ  considerably  in  places,  with  their 
effects  on  income  distribution  in  terms  of  equality 
sometimes going into reverse. The distribution curves for 
specific  products  occasionally  diverge  quite 
extraordinarily. 
Taking all  the products subject to market organization 
considered here, the guarantee payments made under the 
old Community of Ten appeared to have  had a  fairly 
consistent  equalizing  effect  on  regional  income 
distribution, if not a substantial one, whereas under the 
Community of Twelve, no such effect is discernible. It is 
primarily  regions  with  average  per  capita  income  that 
benefit  from  guarantee  payments.  These  regions  were 
among the poorer regions of the Community of Ten. EC 
agricultural policy is thus, on the whole, tailored more to 
the needs of the richer regions of the North. In the case 
of cereals,  sugar, oilseed,  milk,  beef and veal  - which 
accounted for  some  700Jo  of all  guarantee payments in 
11 the period 1986-89 - the poorer half of the Community 
of Twelve is  disadvantaged by the regional distribution 
effects of the price support mechanism (see Table 3). The 
reform of agricultural price support in 1988 did trigger a 
clear  change  of  course,  though.  Owing  to  the 
introduction of price stabilizers, 'northern' products are 
no  longer  so  strongly  supported,  while  'southern' 
products  are  now  receiving  much  more  preferential 
treatment. 
In  respect  of  individual  products,  the  regional 
distribution effects vary: for sugar, the richer regions of 
the Community (EC 12)  are more favoured; in cereals, 
milk, oilseed, beef and veal, the poorer regions are at a 
disadvantage, and it is only in the economically stronger 
northern  regions  that  there  is  any  regional  equalizing 
effect. Thus 700Jo of guarantee expenditure, or fully 400Jo 
of the entire Community budget,  is  in effect  working 
against  the  Community's  regional  policy  objectives. 
Only in tobacco, olive oil, sheep and goatmeat and- to 
a  lesser  extent  - wine,  fruit  and  vegetables,  are  the 
poorer regions of the Community favoured on any scale. 
These  products  account  for  less  than  20%  of  all 
guarantee expenditure. 
For certain product groups, the price support situation 
changed  between  1986  and  1989.  The  distribution  of 
expenditure on milk, beef and veal and tobacco has to all 
intents  and  purposes  remained  unchanged,  though 
undesirable from a  regional policy angle.  In respect of 
most other products, guarantee expenditure was more in 
line with the objective of reducing regional disparities by 
the end of the period covered than it had been to begin 
with.  The  boost  to  incomes  linked  to  guarantee 
expenditure in respect of wine, sheep and goatmeat, fruit 
and  vegetables,  has  increasingly  come  to  benefit  the 
poorer regions, while the richer regions are no longer so 
heavily  favoured  with  regard  to  cereals,  oilseed  and 
sugar as before. 
11.  To  arrive  at  an  overall  judgment,  the  measures 
taken and their  financial  impact must be assessed  and 
summarized.  Strictly  speaking,  the  Community's 
payments or commitments cannot be simply added up. 
The value of each individual measure as a subsidy varies 
too widely.  Consequently the method adopted here can 
only  provide  a  number  of  fairly  rough-and-ready 
indicators. 
Looking at the regional concentration of aid from the 
structural Funds (the regional Fund, the social Fund and 
the EAGGF Guarantee Section) - amounting to more 
than one-fifth of the Community's budget in  1990  -
one  detects  a  clear  trend  towards  the  dismantling  of 
regional imbalances. In 1986 and 1987 half the funds on 
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average went to the regions with the poorest 20% of the 
Community's population, whereas the 40% living in the 
economically strong areas received little more than 10% 
of the structural Funds.  Regional  concentration in the 
current Community is thus somewhat less than it was for 
the  10  original  Member  States.  Looking  at  the 
development of the individual measures over the years, 
however, we find that this fact is  largely attributable to 
the transitional problems of the new Member States. 
If,  in addition to the structural Funds,  one takes  into 
account EIB credits and credits and aids from the ECSC 
- equivalent to roughly 25 to 30% of the EC budget -
the  equalization  effects  are  noticeably  diluted.  These 
credits  are  less  geared  to regional  policy  than the  aid 
available  from  the  structural  Funds.  Taking  into 
consideration  guarantee  payments  under  the  common 
agricultural policy - approximately three-fifths  of the 
Community budget - we find a marked levelling-off in 
the  financial  incentives  for  rectifying  regional 
imbalances. Agricultural policy as a whole does little to 
support  regional  policy  objectives  and  hence  runs 
counter to the structural Funds' equalizing effect. This is 
particularly true of the Community as a whole. For the 
10 original Member States the equalizing effect remains 
somewhat stronger. 
12.  If  one  wishes  to  draw  conclusions  from  these 
findings  as  regards the adaptation of the Community's 
structural and agricultural  measures  from the point of 
view  of  regional  policy,  it  must  be  subject  to 
reservations.  The  Community  financial  policy 
inducements influencing regional imbalances outlined in 
this study describe no more than a tendency; they cannot 
be used  to gauge the actual impact of each individual 
measure. 
Even  in  measuring  these  inducements  a  number  of 
caveats  are  necessary.  Of the  commitments  made  for 
specific Community measures in the period 1981-87 Gust 
under ECU 0.5  million)  only some  600Jo  were  actually 
paid  out  over  the  same  period,  with  substantial 
differences from one country to another. 
This  gap  between  commitments  and  payments  is 
probably  chiefly  due  to  the  slow  rate  at  which 
programmes  are  developed  and  delays  by  national 
bureaucracies  in  processing  applications  and  providing 
supplementary  national  funding.  The  possibility  of 
drawing on Community funds more quickly in the form 
of advances does not always prove to be an automatic 
remedy. 
The  question  of  how  far  European  financial 
contributions  are  merely  a  substitute  for  national 
expenditure  is  a  question  that  is  as  old  as  European structural  policy  itself,  as  a  complement  to  national 
action. Community measures can only be said to have an 
effect in terms of regional equalization if they trigger off 
additional economic activity that would not have arisen 
under  national  policy  alone.  For  several  reasons  this 
question is virtually unanswerable. 
The question of the efficient use of funds has a number 
of aspects.  First, there is  the basic question of regional 
and  structural  policy,  that  is,  whether  the  active  or 
passive  reorganization  of  regions  and  sectors  is 
economically more efficient in the long run. If  one opts 
for greater geographical balance instead,  at the cost of 
purely  economic  efficiency,  the  question  of  the 
effectiveness  of the  means  employed  remains.  Where 
there is  doubt, case studies must be  conducted in order 
to establish the facts. 
Finally, the ability to absorb support must be taken into 
account.  With  the  doubling  in  size  of the  structural 
Funds,  fears  are  being  voiced  that  the  most 
disadvantaged  regions,  particularly  in  Greece  and  the 
Mezzogiorno,  will  not  be  sufficiently  able  to  benefit 
from them. 
As far as the overall trend is concerned, there can be no 
doubt that the structural Funds clearly  help  to narrow 
the gap between the regions, and that agricultural policy 
- if it is to be placed more squarely in the service of the 
Community's  regional  policy  - is  in  need  of 
adjustment.  This,  of  course,  does  not  relieve  the 
Community  of its  responsibility  for  monitoring  more 
closely  than before  the  effectiveness  of a  policy  more 
attuned to regional equalization. 
13.  As an alternative to the approach outlined here, an 
attempt  could  be  made  to  track  EAGGF  Guarantee 
payment flows.  An analysis  of this type would have to 
cover revenue and expenditure,  identify the payers  and 
recipients  in  question and finally  outline their  regional 
structure.  It  would  have  to be  extended  to  include  at 
least  the  achievements  made  possible  indirectly  by  the 
payments,  revealing  who,  apart  from  the  producers, 
derives  any  gain  from  agricultural  policy  and to  what 
extent. 
14.  Preliminary classification  of individual  Guarantee 
Fund  payments  to  the  various  parties  involved  shows 
that in  1989  less  than one-third of EAGGF payments 
went  direct  to producers,  two-fifths  to the distributive 
trade and one-tenth each to the processing industry and 
to  intervention  agencies  (see  Table  6).  As  a  rule,  the 
funds  disbursed  by the Community do  not, of course, 
remain in  the hands of the initial  recipients.  It is  not, 
however,  possible to identify these  sums  on a regional 
basis. 
15.  In the final analysis, it is the producers who benefit 
from payments in the form of export refunds, processing 
aids and compensation for price falls, while the levies are 
a  burden  on the  Community's  consumers.  'Irregular' 
profit margins  and leakage  in  conjunction  with  illegal 
transactions  make  it  difficult  to  put  a  figure  on such 
things. 
An in-depth incidence study is therefore bound to yield a 
different picture of the recipients of the payments when 
broken  down  by  groups  from  that resulting  from  the 
preliminary listing of recipients. Although the full extent 
of the effects described cannot be gauged, it is clear that 
the  producers  receive  a  higher  percentage  of  the 
payments than is evident at first glance. The importance 
of  the  processors  dwindles,  as  does  that  of  the 
Community's consumers.  The  distributive trades  profit 
less from export refunds, but benefit from their position 
as  middlemen  between  producers  and  intervention 
agencies when it comes to public storage. 
Adopting  this  broader  approach  makes  it  even  more 
difficult,  though  not  quite  impossible,  to  explore  the 
regional  impact of the EAGGF Guarantee by  tracking 
payments. The attempt to pin down the regional impact 
of Community farming policy via payment flows  comes 
up  against  the  difficulty  of acquiring  data,  requiring 
estimates to be made on a very shaky basis. 
16.  In short,  the  method described  above  - that of 
distributing  guarantee  payments  in  proportion  to 
production  in  individual  regions  - better  reflects  the 
regional  incentives  provided by EC farm  policy than a 
superficial  and  inevitably  incomplete  attempt  to  track 
actual payment flows.  This does  not, however,  rule out 
the  possibility  of identifying  those  who  benefit  on  a 
regional  basis  - and  the  ensuing  effects  on  regional 
incomes - in respect of a substantial proportion of EC 
expenditure,  comprising as  it  does  some three-fifths of 
the total. Calculations based on models are only able to 
outline general trends. 
17.  Expenditure  under  the  Community  budget  on 
competition policy is a poor guide to its regional effects. 
For  this  reason,  the  essential  macroeconomic  and 
regional economic tendencies are outlined here with the 
help of theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. 
In a broader sense, the objective of genuine, out-and-out 
competition pervades all the Community's Treaties. The 
general effects may be reduced in macroeconomic terms 
to  welfare,  growth  and  structural  components.  All 
regions benefit, in principle, from welfare gains, but the 
developed  regions'  share of the supra-regional trade in 
goods  is  far  larger  than  that  of  the  less-developed 
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only be distributed more evenly in the longer term. 
Gains in growth result  from welfare gains,  as  domestic 
and  foreign  demand  respond  positively  to  price 
reductions. There is considerable empirical evidence that 
the  creation  of  trade  in  the  1960s  linked  with 
intra-Community  liberalization  boosted  economic 
growth throughout the Community. At the same time it 
is  repeatedly stressed that it was (only) in these years of 
strong growth that regional development gaps narrowed. 
This would seem to indicate that the completion of the 
internal  market  will  further  help  to  even  out regional 
disparities.  True,  the  evidence  is  not unambiguous.  In 
the 1960s, the Community's centres of economic activity 
absorbed  part of the  labour  surplus  from  the  regions 
whose development was lagging behind. The reduction in 
disparities  was  thus  due  to  wealth  creation  being 
distributed  amongst  more people in  the  urban centres, 
and fewer  on the periphery of the Community. 
The  internal  market  is,  however,  already  having  an 
advance  effect  on the  will  to  invest  and  the  regional 
allocation  of investment.  These  effects  may  achieve  a 
magnitude many times greater than that of the Cecchini 
effects.  This  will  stimulate  regional  equalization,  not 
least  in  Spain  and  Portugal,  countries  which  are 
considered  to  be  favourable  locations.  Empirical 
estimates  have  shown  that the  Mediterranean  Member 
States,  in  particular,  will  profit  from  the  continuing 
international division of labour within the Community. 
In  addition  to  the  equalizing  effects  expected  to stem 
from the economy, aid may also come in the form of the 
'policy of cohesion'.  The higher  Community growth is 
by  1993,  the higher the tax yield  and the Community's 
own  resources,  which  will  provide the right conditions 
for replenishing the funds. 
The  welfare  and  growth  effects  of  intensified 
competition go hand-in-hand with changes in production 
structure. If  the static advantages were fully exploited in 
each  case,  the  Mediterranean  countries  would  be  in 
danger  of opting  for  obsolete structures  from the very 
outset of the internal market.  Given the dominance of 
infrastructure  assistance,  they  should  make  themselves 
more appealing to technology-based firms by promoting 
the  formation  of  human  resources  and  by  not 
discriminating in their investment premiums against the 
sectors where their true advantages (still) lie. 
How  do  structural  processes  related  to  company  size 
effect  regional  distribution?  World-wide  concerns  tend 
to  concentrate their main areas  of operations in  urban 
centres,  spreading  to the  surrounding  region  when  the 
problems of urban concentration get too bad. The high 
degree  of  organizational  flexibility  shown  by  these 
companies makes it, however, likely that they will exploit 
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regional  cost  differentials,  for  example  in  wages,  by 
relocating cost-intensive parts of their operations to the 
periphery. 
18.  The second  way  in  which  competition  policy  can 
influence the regional distribution of economic activity is 
by monitoring national regional policies. Until 1975 this 
job was  mostly  neglected.  In 1985  EC  regional  policy 
was  reviewed.  The new  regulation provided  for  tighter 
policing  of  Community-wide  conformity  and  better 
coordination of national schemes for providing regional 
aid. The Commission was given a greater say in defining 
areas eligible for assistance. 
Alongside activities specifically related to regional policy, 
since 1987 the Commission has been attempting to bring 
more transparency to the Member States' entire subsidy 
set-up.  In  1989  the  ERDF  had  more  than  ECU  4.6 
billion to spend, while national regional aids are tending 
to  decline.  This  increases  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Community's  policy  of cohesion.  None  the  less,  the 
problematic situation in  Italy,  a comparatively wealthy 
country  with  a  large,  underdeveloped,  though  highly 
subsidized  region,  shows  that  even  a  high  level  of 
support can be ineffective. The problem here is evidently 
not  a  financial  one.  In  view  of  such  cases,  the 
Community would  be  well  advised  to  build  additional 
criteria governing 'soft factors' into its fund involvement 
policy. 
19.  The  third  aspect  of EC  competition  policy  that 
affects  the  regional  developmental  divide  is  the 
monitoring of non-regional aids against the backdrop of 
their regional  incidence.  Only  for  subsidies  to the coal 
and  steel  industry  and  shipbuilding  is  there  any 
reasonable  justification  for  crediting  them  to  specific 
regions - or at least to a specific type of disadvantaged 
region,  support category  II.  In  West  Germany,  Spain 
and Belgium no less than a third of all aid to enterprises 
goes  to  these  three  sectors,  in  the  United  Kingdom 
roughly a quarter, and in  France just under a fifth.  In 
other countries they are of little or no significance. The 
Commission  has  been  endeavouring  to  limit  the 
permissibility of subsidies, making them time-limited and 
tying  them  to  reorganization  plans.  With  the  help  of 
special crisis powers under the ECSC Treaty, it helped to 
ensure  that  the  burden  of readaption  was  shared  out 
evenly  across  all  the  crisis-hit  areas.  In  this  way  it 
managed  to  prevent  regions  from  gaining  unfair 
advantages at the expense of others by offering excessive 
subsidies. 
But it  also  prevented the  relatively  efficient companies 
(and regions) from asserting their position in the market. 
In the steel industry the result of Commission policy was to even  out the regional  divide  within the Community, 
but  by  preventing  the  sector  from  developing  its  full 
potential. 
In  Germany  the  subsidizing  of  coal  plays  quite  an 
exceptional role,  but in Belgium, France, Spain and the 
United  Kingdom,  too,  the  sector  attracts  a  major 
proportion  of subsidies.  The  Commission  used  to  be 
generous in authorizing the support of coal  production 
for  reasons  connected  with  security  of supply.  In the 
Federal Republic,  in particular,  coal policy did a great 
deal to narrow the regional income gap by safeguarding 
large numbers of jobs in disadvantaged regions. 
For  some  years  now,  the  subject  of  German  coal 
subsidies has  no longer been taboo in the Community. 
The  dismantling  of subsidies  will  lead  to  a  temporary 
increase  in  regional  disparities  in  Germany.  But 
increased  competition  between  the  regions  will  help 
speed up the process of modernization in the old mining 
areas. 
20.  The  studies  presented  in  this  report  may  be 
continued  or  supplemented  in  a  number  of  ways. 
Expenditure flows  could be scrutinized, for example, in 
order to ascertain their effect on income.  In respect  of 
grants  from  the  structural  Funds,  the  static  income 
effects approximate quite nicely with actual expenditure. 
In  the  case  of loans,  it  would  of course  be  necessary 
when  performing  an  'income'  analysis  to  take  the 
interest advantage into account. 
The  major  problems  would  revolve  around  the 
agricultural  guarantee  payments.  Three  points  would 
require particular consideration. 
Firstly,  farmers'  incomes  benefit  from  the  difference 
between the EC-supported price level and the low world 
price  level.  An attempt  could  be  made  to  explore  the 
implications  of  trends  in  world  prices  for  products 
subject to market organization. 
Secondly,  the  price-related  loss  of  income  affecting 
private consumers is balanced by price-related growth in 
farmers' incomes. This could be dealt with by: 
(a)  coming up with quantitative estimates of the extent 
to  which  EC  agriculture  is  subsidized  by  the  EC 
consumer; 
(b)  by  assigning  the  amount  of the  subsidy  to  the 
regions in line with their population and a plausible 
differentiation of consumer patterns, and offsetting 
the regional values of the guarantee payments thus 
allocated  against  the  regional  values  of consumer 
subsidies. 
Thirdly,  the  fund-raising  aspect  might  be  brought into 
the  analysis.  The  Community's  additional  financial 
requirements are largely met out of VAT.  The regional 
assessment  basis  for  this  should  be  estimated with  the 
help  of  population  statistics,  per  capita  income  and 
assumptions about patterns of consumption. 
15 1.  Introduction 
The  European  Community  is  marked  by  regional 
disparities. In the Community's more central areas there 
are prosperous regions with high per capita incomes and 
a  highly  developed  socio-cultural  environment,  while 
other,  chiefly  peripheral regions,  often in the southern 
Member  States,  are  economically  backward,  with  low 
standards of public services and communications. Since 
the mid-1970s, the Community has made efforts to boost 
regional policy measures taken by individual countries by 
granting additional financial  aid from  a  regional  Fund 
set  up  for  this  purpose.  This  has  not resulted  in rapid 
progress, even though the resources deployed have been 
substantially increased over the early years and support 
measures have meanwhile been concentrated on a much 
smaller group of regions. 
This is partly because regional economic development, as 
a  dynamic  process,  is  subject  to many  influences  that 
may  run  counter  to  the  levelling  out of disparities  in 
economic  power  and  living  conditions  sought  by 
politicians.  For  one  thing,  there  are  autonomous, 
centripetal forces at work. For another, it must be taken 
into  account  that  national  and  Community  economic 
and financial policies are not devoted solely to regional 
policy aims  but may in  fact  contradict them.  What we 
shall  be  considering  here  is  the  dominant trend  where 
major areas of Community policy are concerned. 
The  theory  underpinning  this  survey  is  that  the 
Community's regions  are affected in different ways  by 
the  policy  of  integration.  But  integration  is  a 
conglomeration of individual trends arising from the use 
of specific  instruments.  As  these  instruments  interact 
and,  sometimes,  counteract  each  other,  an  overall 
assessment must be made in addition to the analysis  of 
individual effects.  In principle,  there are  no  theoretical 
limits to the scope of an analysis of this kind. The data 
available  and the  amount of work  involved,  however, 
oblige us to stick to essentials. 
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In  defining  the  subject  of this  survey,  three  questions 
must first be asked: 
(i)  Which policy areas are to be analysed? 
(ii)  Which  are  the  crucial  instruments  of  these 
policies? 
(iii)  On what type of effect should the survey focus? 
2.1.  Policy areas 
The question of policy areas must be decided against the 
background  of the  Community  treaties  and  the  key 
aspects of secondary Community law. As the analysis is 
only concerned with integration to date - and not the 
future of the process - new  developments such as  the 
Single European Act and, to a large extent, the 'Delors 
package'  decisions  of  1988  cannot  be  properly 
considered,  since  the  statistics  anyway  only  cover  the 
years up to 1989. 
The  policy  areas  that  come  under  consideration  are, 
firstly,  those affecting the EEC budget:  farming policy, 
regional policy, social affairs, research and development, 
the environment and energy.  But we  must also include 
the  Community's  major regulatory  fields,  such  as  the 
customs union, freedom of establishment and to provide 
services,  the liberalization of capital markets, transport 
policy  and  competition  policy.  It is  not  possible  to 
consider all  these  policies  in detail within  the scope of 
this study. A selection has to be made. 
One approach is to exclude all areas in which the Treaty 
calls  for  a  joint policy  but little  has  been achieved,  at 
least until recently.  This applies to transport policy and 
freedom  to  provide  services.  We  may  also  exclude 
policies in which developments within the Community -
despite  progress  towards  integration  - have  differed 
little  from  the  general  trend  in  other  Western 
industrialized nations. This applies to tariff cuts (except 
in  agriculture)  and  freedom  of  capital  movements, 
including  freedom  of  establishment.  Environmental 
policy is largely covered by the principle of subsidiarity, 
that  is,  the  bulk  of the  Community's  environmental 
measures are laid down nationally. For this reason, this 
policy area will  also be excluded from the survey. 
As  for  social  policy,  the Community has  hitherto only 
taken action in certain areas: the principle of subsidiarity 
applies  here,  too.  The  Single  European  Act  provided 
new  impulses  and  triggered  a  series  of  Commission 
initiatives.  For the  rest,  the  Community has  confined 
itself to developing and improving the European Social 
Fund, already provided for under the terms of the EEC 
Treaty. 
The joint energy policy has been limited to setting up a 
joint market in nuclear fuel (on paper but not in practice 
in terms of joint supply) and may thus be dealt with in 
the same  way  as  other internal and external aspects  of 
trade  policy.  Furthermore,  the  Commission,  as  the 
monitoring authority, tolerated national subsidies to the 
coal and steel industry within certain limits. The markets 
in  energy  raw  materials  and particularly electricity  are 
still  regulated  and  structured  nationally.  Only  in  the 
run-up  to  the  internal  market  are  there  any  signs  of 
change on this score. 
Then  there  is  research  and  development  (R&D). 
Following the conversion of the Joint Nuclear Research 
Centre into an institute for other energy-related research, 
it makes sense to view it in this broader context. Current 
spending on R&D in the Community is currently running 
at ECU 1.5 billion annually. Compared with other areas 
this  is  not  much:  its  proportion  of  the  Community 
budget was a mere 40Jo  in 1990. But the analysis of R&D 
expenditure  from  a  regional  point  of  view  is  an 
interesting undertaking. It would be reasonable to expect 
support for R&D to benefit the more developed regions. 
Of course,  contributions  to  contract  research  covered 
here, which totalled a mere ECU 1.4 billion from 1983 to 
1990, accounts for only a tiny part of all R&D spending. 
It is analysed here from the point of view of its regional 
distribution. 
The  following  essential  policy  areas  must  remain  for 
more intensive analysis: farm policy, regional policy, the 
work of the European Social  Fund,  R&D  policy,  EIB 
and ECSC loans and competition policy. 
2.2.  Instruments of Community policy 
The  Community employs  the  following  instruments  in 
these key areas. 
Farming policy 
To maintain a set, product-specific producer price level, 
certain farm products are bought into intervention by the 
EAGGF  Guarantee  Section,  with  subsequent  action 
depending  on  the  market  regulation  in  force  (sale, 
welfare operations and, in some cases, destruction). 
Maintenance of guaranteed producer price levels against 
foreign competition by means of variable import duties 
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market  price  and  the  internal  Community  producer 
price. 
Export refunds equivalent to the difference between the 
Community  and  world  prices,  in  order  to  ensure 
competitiveness in third-country markets, resulting in the 
fall in prices for sales from stock (losses). 
Processing grants to the food and related industries, also 
designed  to give  preference  to  domestic  products  over 
imports from third countries. 
Grants  from  the  Guidance Section of the EAGGF for 
improving the structure of agriculture within the scope 
of existing Directives. 
Direct  aid  to  the  producers  of certain  products  in  the 
form of income support. 
The Community's price guarantee policy is 'disturbed' in 
the case of certain products by the special conditions set 
out in trade and cooperation agreements allowing certain 
groups of developing countries access to the Community 
market. This applies, for example, to textiles, sugar and 
beef. 
Regional policy 
Grants allocated on the basis of regional problem centres 
to  public  and  private  investment  under  regional 
programmes  designed  to  reduce  backwardness,  exploit 
local  potential,  improve  the  structure  of the  economy 
and combat unemployment (in existence since  1975  and 
reformed  several  times;  the  ERDF  resources,  which 
come  out  of  the  Community  budget,  were  greatly 
increased in  1988). 
These grants are backed up by loans from the EIB and 
the  Commission,  financed  by  Community  credits  (the 
EIC, NCI, ECSC and Euratom). These loans are partly 
used  for  other  purposes,  too  (for  example,  energy 
policy). 
Monitoring  of  national  regional  policy  through 
involvement in defining development areas, deciding on 
regional  support  programmes,  adjudging  the 
admissibility of national regional aids (transparency) and 
maximum  aid  intensity  (by  size  of  investment  in 
individual types of regions and by investment type). 
Coordination  of  Community  regional  policy,  in 
particular  ERDF  operations,  with  other  Community 
policies  (in  particular  to  other  structural  Funds)  to 
reduce clashes to a minimum and help them complement 
each other as far as possible. 
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The activities of  the European Social Fund 
Funding the training and retraining of certain groups of 
workers,  particularly  the  young  and  the  long-term 
unemployed. 
Removal  subsidies  to  encourage  the  regional  mobility 
of  the  unemployed  and  those  threatened  by 
unemployment. 
Aid  in  creating  long-term  jobs  and  setting  up  new 
firms. 
R&D policy 
Part-funding  of  research  projects  under  the  R&D 
framework programme. 
Concerted  projects,  for  which  the  EC  finances 
coordination only. 
Direct  research  carried  out  by  the  Joint  Research 
Centre. 
Research scholarships. 
Competition policy 
Improved  mutual  market  access  through  free  trade 
internally - including liberalization of public contracts 
and  the  elimination  of  State-trading  monopolies  -
combined  with  basically  uniform  and  relatively  liberal 
import conditions in trade with third countries. 
Restrictions  on cartels  and monitoring malpractices  by 
companies in a dominant position. Advanced control of 
mergers. 
Restricting  corporate  subsidies  to  a  small  number  of 
cases and monitoring the practice of national subsidies. 
Approximation or mutual recognition of national laws. 
The use of these instruments in the various policy areas 
differs in many respects.  The following  distinctions are 
of interest for the purposes of the current survey: 
Size,  particularly their effect on the budget. 
Type  of effect  (direct  or indirect)  with  regard  to  the 
targets in question, which are of relevance to a particular 
region's position relative to the others. 
The importance of the measure in relation to the others, 
or in  relation to the size  of the problem. This criterion 
can only be employed within the group of quantitative 
instruments. 
A look at the EC budget (cj. Tables 1 and 2) shows the 
financial  importance of the policy areas  to be  studied. 
Excluding  administrative  costs  and  the  European Regional Development Fund, the Community spent just 
over ECU 46.8  billion in 1990.  Although this is  a large 
sum,  it  is  equivalent  to  only  2.5%  of  government 
spending  in  the  12  Member  States.  The  proportion  is 
rising,  however - in 1975  it amounted to only 1  OJo  -
which is a logical corollary of the integration process, as 
more  and  more  duties  are  transferred  to  Community 
level. 
This transfer of duties emerges clearly from a scrutiny of 
the structure and dynamics of Community expenditure. 
Farm  guarantee  payments  continue  to  account  for 
the  bulk  of  spending;  in  1990  they  accounted  for 
approximately 600Jo  of the EEC budget, while structural 
expenditure (excluding loans) accounted for  only 200Jo. 
There has, admittedly, been some fall in the relative size 
of guarantee payments. On the other hand, spending on 
structural policy, and also on research and development, 
has  risen.  The  European Regional  Development  Fund 
recorded the sharpest jump in spending, leaving all  the 
other categories a long way  behind.  Spending on farm 
policy increased only modestly. While regional spending 
in  the  Fund's  first  year  was  only  2.4%  of  total 
expenditure,  in  1990  it  was  1  OOJo.  The other structural 
Funds  and  R&D  policy  also  increased  their  share  of 
expenditure.  Regional  EC expenditure  relevant  to  this 
study altogether accounted for  840Jo  of the Community 
budget in 1989.  In addition there are bonded loans. The 
proportion  considered  here  is  roughly  of  the  same 
order. 
2.3.  Nature of the effect to be investigated 
The usual standard for measuring a country's or region's 
state of development is per capita income, defined as the 
gross  national  product  per  inhabitant.  It  has  the 
advantage  that  its  various  components  can  be  broken 
down in terms of a homogeneous unit of measurement, 
viz.  money.  On the  other  hand,  it  is  a  very  complex 
indicator, subject to a wide variety of determinants. To 
pin  down  the  influence  of  various  EC  policies  on 
regional development, a highly differentiated database is 
required  as  well  as  a  sophisticated econometric model. 
Table 1 - Size, dynamics and structure of expenditures from EC budget by policy fields, 1975-90 
EC Budgetl  Loans 
Year  Industry,  of which: 
Total  EAGGF  ESF  ERDF  energy,  Other  Total 
I  R&D  EIB  ECSC 
Mio ECU  Mio ECU 
1975  6 213.6  4 586.6  360.2  150.0  99.0  1 017.8  1 545.0  814.0  731.0 
1980  16 057.5  11  596.1  502.0  751.8  212.8  2 994.8  3 874.0  2 384.0  1 004.0 
1985  28 223.0  20 546.4  1 413.0  1 624.3  706.9  3 932.4  8 168.0  5 699.0  1 265.0 
1990  46 808.7  30 204.9  3 321.9  4 704.5  1 787.5  6 789.9  - - -
% increase per year (average)  % increase per year (average) 
1985/75  16.3  16.2  14.6  26.9  21.7  14.5  18.1  21.5  5.6 
1990/75  14.4  13.4  16.0  25.8  21.3  13.5  - ·- -
OJo  share  %share 
1975  100.0  73.8  5.8  2.4  1.6  16.4  100.0  52.7  47.3 
1980  100.0  72.2  3.1  4.7  1.3  18.7  100.0  61.5  25.9 
1985  100.0  72.8  5.0  5.8  2.5  13.9  100.0  69.8  15.5 
1990  100.0  64.5  7.1  10.1  3.8  14.5  - - -
I  ECSC Administrative Budget and European Development Fund excluded. 
Source: Kommission der Europaischen Gemeinschaft (Hrsg.), Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1989-90, Statistischer Anhang. Europiiische Wirtschaft, 
No 42, Nov.  1989. 
21 The former is  not available:  the latter was  not feasible 
within  the  scope  of  this  study,  even  with  the 
differentiated statistical information available. 
In analysing the financial flows to the regions stimulated 
by  EC  expenditure,  the  following  assumptions  are 
made: 
Though a  precise analysis of effects is  thus impossible, 
we should at least explore the regional impact of political 
intervention. The chief factor here is to see which region 
is  directly favoured  by each particular measure and to 
what  extent,  whether  directly  (through  discretionary 
action)  or  indirectly  (in  line  with  the  purpose  of the 
operation). 
(i)  the  Community's  regional  policy  objective  is  to 
lessen regional disparities in development. 
(ii)  Per capita income  is  the yardstick  for  measuring 
regional disparities in development. 
(iii)  Community  expenditure  has  a  direct  or  indirect 
effect  on incomes.  If regions  lagging  behind  are 
helped  with  grants from  public  funds  - whether 
Table 2  - Use of EC budget for payments by policy sectors, 1986-90 
Policy sector  1986  I  1987  I  1988  I  1989  I  1990  1986  I  1990 
Mio.  ECU  OJo 
Agricultural policy  23 002.2  24 002.1  27 845.9  26 082.2  27  315.7  67.3  64.2 
EAGGF-Guarantee (title 1 and 2)  22 120.0  22 963.0  26 391.31  24 409.5  25 065.0  64.7  58.9 
EAGGF  -Guidance  727.1  863.2  1 142.3  1 349.0  1 826.3  2.1  4.3 
Fisheries  115.7  150.4  260.0  260.0  322.7  0.3  0.8 
Other measures  39.4  25.4  52.3  63.7  101.7  0.1  0.2 
Social policy  2 375.6  2 780.7  2 365.5  2 773.8  3 314.2  6.9  7.8 
ESF  2 321.2  2 715.3  2 298.8  2 676.1  3 212.0  6.8  7.5 
Employment, social security, health  - - - 65.5  79.1  0.0  0.2 
Disaster relief (within EC)  - - - 32.2  23.1  0.0  0.1 
Other measures  54.4  65.5  66.7  - - 0.2  0.0 
Regional policy  2 539.9  2 664.9  3 301.7  4 113.7  4 877.2  7.4  11.5 
EFRD  2 483.8  2 535.1  3 092.8  3 920.0  4 554.0  7.3  10.7 
Mediterranean programmes  17.3  116.1  151.1  83.8  191.9  0.1  0.5 
PEDIP (Portugal)  - - - 80.0  101.0  0.0  0.2 
Other measures  38.9  13.8  57.8  29.9  30.3  0.1  0.1 
Other policy sectors  1 781.3  1 770.9  2 379.3  2 747.8  3 210.4  5.2  7.5 
Cooperation with LDCs  853.4  814.7  1 041.3  1 063.8  1 225.1  2.5  2.9 
Education and culture  27.4  47.0  107.1  155.1  182.1  0.1  0.4 
Environment and consumer protection  17.0  26.2  23.9  30.1  48.0  0.0  0.1 
Traffic  46.2  24.3  46.6  30.6  24.6  0.1  0.1 
Research and investment  683.1  683.1  929.2  1 211.3  1 425.2  2.0  3.3 
Energy policy (incl.  nuclear safety)  83.6  92.9  134.4 
137.9  151.6  0.2  0.4 
Refunds to Member States  2 972.4  2 408.8  3 447.4  3 268.3  2 381.0  8.7  5.6 
Staff and administration costs  1 521.4  1 080.5  1 908.22  2 006.9  1 471.2  4.4  3.5 
Total  34 192.9  34 708.1  41  248.0  40 992.7  42 569.7  100.0  100.0 
1  As reported by the Member States. 
2  Taken from the budget draft. 
Source:  Annual activity reports of the EC, 1987-90. 
22 for  investing  in  infrastructure,  stimulating  private 
investment  or  raising  household  incomes  - the 
overall  effect is  to counteract the regional  income 
gap. This, then, constitutes a step in the direction of 
the Community's regional policy objective. But if it 
is  the  better  off,  more central  areas  that benefit, 
this reinforces the regional divide and the approach 
in question is  failing to achieve the regional policy 
goal. 
(iv)  The extent to which a particular policy objective is 
actually  achieved  is  not  considered.  But  it  is 
assumed that the contribution of a policy area may 
be gauged from the importance assigned to it in the 
budget. 
(v)  The  revenue  side  of  the  Community  financing 
system does not exacerbate disparities. However, it 
is  only since  1988  that some hesitant progress has 
been  made  towards  this  objective.  Until  then, 
revenue raising had a regressive effect, if anything, 
as the bulk of revenue was determined by the VAT 
assessment base,  which was  relatively higher in the 
poorer regions with lower levels  of investment and 
export  quotas  than  in  the  richer.  As  a  result,  a 
fourth revenue source was introduced, relating each 
country's  financial  contribution  to  its  national 
product. 
The  method  described  is  obviously  subject  to  the 
following restrictions: 
(i)  It is  fundamentally only applicable to policy areas 
affecting  the  budget.  Consequently,  the  regional 
extremely minor part. It is  always  possible to stimulate 
large-scale research with small contributions. It is just as 
likely  that  resources  will  be  diverted  into  other  R&D 
applications that were not originally proposed, with their 
opportunity costs not being taken into account. In other 
cases, resources are simply 'transferred' to activities that 
are  already  proceeding  under  their  own  impetus  and 
would probably have gone ahead anyway even without 
Community  support.  Direct  effects  must  also  be 
distinguished  from  indirect  effects  where  support  to 
backward  regions  through  the  promotion  of 
infrastructure and industrial investment  are  concerned. 
A  strengthening  of investment  no  doubt  also  benefits 
with  the  regions  supplying  the  necessary  goods  and 
services.  Spin-offs  like  this,  however,  are  extremely 
difficult to pin down. 
The major problem in examining the issue involved here 
is that the analytical difficulty of deriving the direct and 
indirect income effects from the revenue effects posited 
- let alone to quantify them - is tremendous. This not 
only applies to the three structural Funds but even more 
to  the  awarding  of  loan  financed  credit  and  the 
EAGGF's Guarantee  expenditure.  In  the  case  of loan 
financed credits, the advantage of EC involvement to the 
recipient  is  probably no  more  than  1 to  11  I 2  OJo  of the 
gross proceeds. This also reduces overall the quantitative 
importance of this equalization instrument. Ultimately it 
is only possible to measure the financial impulse in terms 
of  its  regional  distribution,  using  actual  or  forecast 
payment  flows,  but  not  the  economic  effect  resulting 
from this impulse. 
effects of competition policy must be studied using  2.4.  The CAP _  a special problem 
other methods. 
(ii)  The less impact a policy area has on the budget, the 
more the  non-budgetary elements,  neglected  here, 
will  overlap  the  demonstrated  'quantitative' 
influence  on  the  relative  position  of the  region, 
whether  as  a  strengthening  or  compensating 
factor. 
Training  grants  to a  backward region  from  the  social 
Fund,  for  example,  are too little to increase per capita 
income in any direct way. If  better qualifications lead to 
a  new  job or a  move  to another  region,  this  indirect 
influence on per capita income is all the greater. It is, of 
course, not plain whether this benefit should be assigned 
to the region of origin or - via the migratory effects -
to  other  regions.  Another  example  is  indirect  R&D 
financing  through  grants  to companies.  In  relation  to 
aggregate  corporate  expenditure  on  R&D  it  plays  an 
Much  more  difficult  than  measuring  the  impact  of 
Community structural assistance is the evaluation of the 
net  advantage  to  a  region  of  agricultural  guarantee 
payments.  They  are  chiefly  designed  to  maintain 
farmers' incomes at an adequate level.  They do this not 
by raising them directly but by supporting the prices paid 
to  farm  producers.  The  income  advantage  for  the 
farmer, all other things being equal, is equivalent to the 
difference between the Community price and the world 
market  price,  multiplied  by  the  total  volume  sold  at 
home or abroad. The sum total of these amounts for all 
Community farmers is not simply identical with the sum 
spent by the EAGGF on intervention. The EAGGF buys 
part of the output but does so at the full price, including 
the margins of the intermediary traders, and for another 
part (that goes to export) it pays the difference between 
the Community and world  prices.  The  bulk of output 
goes  straight  on to  the  Community's  internal  market. 
23 The cost  of buying  is  increased still  further  by  storage 
costs,  though  reduced  by  revenue  from  sales  from 
storage,  at  prices  close  to  the  world  market  level, 
sometimes  lower.  The  entire  budgetary  costs  of 
maintaining  farmers'  incomes  (without  direct  income 
support) is thus equivalent to the total of all intervention 
amounts,  the  value  of net  changes  in  stocks  held  and 
export refunds. 
Although  only  part  of  the  EAGGF's  guarantee 
disbursements goes to farmers, they are required in their 
entirety,  under  the  present  system  of productivity  and 
marketing, in order to maintain farmers' incomes at the 
desired  level.  This  should  not  disguise  the  fact,  as 
repeatedly  revealed  by  the  Court  of Auditors  of the 
European Communities, that systematic attempts made 
to  inflate  the  budget,  in  conjunction  with  the 
'irregularities'  favoured  by  the  system,  lead  to  excess 
expenditure on agriculture. To take the criticism one step 
further,  it is  true  to  say  that the  Community's  whole 
farm  policy set-up,  with its  fatal,  inherent tendency to 
produce enormous surpluses, is a highly extravagant way 
of  handling  the  Community's  financial  (and  real) 
resources,  which in countless cases  even fails  to achieve 
its main aim, income maintenance, thus forcing farmers 
to abandon their farms.  But this is  not the topic under 
discussion. 
In  terms  of  safeguarding  incomes  under  the  market 
regulation system, it does not matter in which region of 
the Community the products on which guarantee funds 
are  spent  originate.  Instead,  selective  intervention 
benefits  all  Community  suppliers.  Regional  price 
differences,  over  and  above  differences  in  transport 
costs, can only be briefly maintained, with the exception 
of the  price  gap  that  has  arisen  as  a  result  of the 
'monetary gap' (the difference between the 'green rates' 
and  official  conversion  rates),  as  the  Community's 
regional  Fund  markets  are  largely  interdependent. 
Accordingly,  it  is  not merely reasonable to allocate the 
income-boosting effects of the guarantee expenditure on 
agriculture  to  the  individual  regions  in  proportion  to 
their share in the output of the product in question as a 
makeshift solution, in the absence of data on the direct 
regional  incidence  of  guarantee  expenditure;  it  is 
logically necessary.  The only sensible exceptions to this 
are cases of targeted aid to producers. 
To the extent that agricultural products are marketed at 
excess prices, this represents a direct subsidy of the farm 
sector  by  consumers;  exports  and  stocks  bought  into 
State  intervention  represent  a  subsidy  from  the 
Community budget,  which  is  ultimately  funded  by the 
taxpayer. 
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Now it is not only farming that derives benefit from the 
agricultural support system; owing to the very nature of 
farming  policy,  a  substantial  part  of  the  support 
payments  end  up  in  other  areas  such  as  trade  and 
industry, creating income that would not otherwise have 
arisen.  It should  be  noted  that  guarantee  payments 
cannot simply be described to the extent of the amount 
that accrues to trade. If  this part was removed, farmers' 
incomes would fall unless they themselves took over the 
distribution  of their  produce.  This  is  a  task  for  which 
they are hardly fit.  However, the guarantee price system 
also  creates  income  in  the  commercial  sector.  The 
problem as far as we are concerned is that the part of the 
guarantee  payments  to  be  allocated  cannot  strictly 
speaking  be  assigned  to  the  regions  on  the  basis  of 
agricultural  output  or  the  balance  of  the  regional 
incidence of guarantee payments,  on the one hand,  or 
the  estimated  consumer  subsidies  and  the  revenue 
contribution,  on  the  other.  There  is  no  prima-facie 
evidence  to  suggest  that  farm  trade  as  a  whole  is 
distributed equally or similarly across  the regions.  One 
hypothesis is that trade is organized at several levels and 
at the lower, less tightly-knit level is more closely tied to 
production, in its  regional  structure as  well  as  in other 
ways.  The part of the guarantee payments that 'trickles 
down'  to this  first  level  may  be  treated  in  exactly  the 
same way as that which reaches the farmers in terms of 
its regional classification. 
The  second  stage,  on  the  other  hand,  is  probably 
concentrated  on  far  fewer  regions.  A  major  criterion 
governing  localization  is  proximity  to  manufacturing 
centres,  ports,  internal  Community  consumer  centres 
and  intervention  points.  The  organizational  structure 
and  regional  distribution  of  farm  trade  can  only  be 
ascertained  by  questioning  federations,  individual 
companies  and  authorities  (intervention  agencies, 
ministries and the Commission). This also applies to the 
usual trading margins and profit-sales ratios: some data 
on these matters is required if guarantee expenditure as a 
whole  is  to be divided  up into farming  sector  and the 
various stages of the distributive trade. Problems relating 
to this are raised in Chapter 4. 
Arguments such as these take, of course, no account of 
the dynamic changes in the system as a whole that would 
occur  if the  Community's  price  support  system  was 
simply scrapped  and replaced  by world  market forces. 
Initially,  EC  markets  would  be  swamped  by  imports 
from third countries, while domestic output would only 
be marketable after corresponding price cuts.  Farmers' 
incomes  would  fall  accordingly.  The next  phase would 
see a world-wide drop in supplies, as an exceedingly large 
number  of Community  farms  would  be  forced  out of business at very short notice. This would lead to a rise in 
world market prices, speeded up by consumer reaction to 
the  original  price  cuts  within  the  Community,  which 
would  be  to buy  more.  This  would  be  followed  by  a 
period in which supply began to pick up once more, as 
the surviving farms took over land from those that had 
closed, with productivity improvements ensuing from the 
advantages of scale and keener competition. In the mean 
time,  suppliers  from  third  countries  would  also  have 
increased  production,  the market offering them  higher 
prices  compared with their initial position and more -
production-stimulating - security as with the loss of the 
Community markets price stability it  will  no longer be 
possible to pass on all fluctuations in supply and demand 
to the world market, which would in effect have shrunk 
into  a  residual  market.  (A  final  phase  would  see  the 
formation  of  a  hard-to-predict  world  market  price 
level, with relatively stable regional demand structures in 
accordance with comparative cost advantages.  The one 
thing that is beyond doubt is that these structures would 
differ substantially from  today's.) Community farming 
production as a whole would be much smaller and there 
would  be  far  fewer  farms,  as  only  highly  productive 
concerns would stay in business. There would be greater 
regional  concentration  of  production  within  the 
Community.  Budget-funded  spending  would  be 
differently  structured,  also  reflecting  its  regional 
distribution.  Owing to the effects of the elimination of 
farm  price  support  on  the  sectoral  and  regional 
economic  structure  as  a  whole,  regional  income 
distribution would differ unpredictably from the current 
position.  This  analysis  is  unable  to  take  account  of 
potential changes of this kind. All it can do is to present 
'marginal comparative statistics'. 
25 3.  Regional concentration of EC spending 
3  .1.  Preliminary note 
The  tendency  for  the  regional  divide  within  the 
Community to be  evened  out (or accentuated) depends 
on the extent to which the stimuli provided by payments 
in  individual  policy  areas  are  concentrated  on  the 
backward (or affluent) regions.  This  may be illustrated 
in  compressed  form  by  a  concentration  curve  derived 
from the Lorenz curve. 
For this purpose the Community regions are ranked by 
per  capita  income  (as  a  measure  of  their  level  of 
development).  The  aggregate  payments  are  then 
compared with the aggregate populations of the regions 
thus  ranked.  The  resulting  graphs  show  how  far 
payments  are  concentrated  on  the  population  of 
backward regions,  whether they tend to counteract the 
elimination  of  regional  disparities  or,  being  evenly 
distributed, are neutral from a regional policy angle.  A 
curve following a line emerging at 45° from the centre of 
the  coordinate  system  would  imply  equal  per  capita 
distribution.  1 A concave curve signifies disadvantageous 
treatment of the poorer  regions,  while  a  convex  curve 
indicates  preferential  treatment.  For  the  sake  of 
simplicity and comparability, it must be assumed for the 
purposes of this presentation that investment promotion 
does  not alter the regional ranking in  any fundamental 
way. 
When it comes to a regional breakdown of the analysis, 
the  obvious  course  is  to  choose the level  at which  the 
requisite data are available without any major gaps and 
which the Community's explicit regional policy aims  to 
tackle. 
Allowing  for  differences  of  definition  ansmg  from 
factors peculiar to each country, these are essentially the 
176  regions  defined  by  the  Commission  at  NUTS 
Level  2.  A  search  through  regional  databanks,  from 
which  the most important statistical data are available, 
does  show  that in  individual  cases  a greater degree  of 
aggregation must be accepted,  particularly in respect of 
the United  Kingdom,  which  has  scarcely  any  NUTS  2 
regions  to date,  with the result that recourse has to be 
had to the NUTS Level 1. There is also a lack of data on 
the Portuguese islands  of Madeira and the Azores  and 
the French overseas departments, and consequently these 
1  This theoretical extreme would, of course, rule out the possibility of 
ranking the regions. 
regions  have  been  entirely  excluded  from  the  analysis. 
From the period up to 1986, before Spain and Portugal 
joined  the  Community,  calculations  have  to  be 
performed separately for the Community of Ten. 
An analysis of this type cannot be performed without a 
considerable number of estimates. In sifting the available 
data we  found  that regional  payment  flows  are  by  no 
means documented in the form required.  In all cases in 
which regionalized data is available at all, payments are 
recorded at the level  of local government,  which  is  the 
direct recipient. 
Where the Community makes a payment, for example to 
advanced  vocational  training  programmes  in  Germany 
within  the  framework  of  social  policy,  to  federal 
institutions such  as  the Federal  Institution for  Labour, 
this is recorded as a payment to the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  It  is  not  possible  to  make  any  regional 
classification  without  further  information.  The  same 
applies to payment flows  to the German Lander which 
are used there to fund programmes in various regions of 
those Lander.  Only where  the  NUTS  Level  2 region  is 
the  direct  recipient  of the  Community  payment  is  it 
possible  to  arrive  at  the  desired  regional  classification 
without  any  element  of doubt.  The  German  example 
may  be  applied to  all the  other Community countries, 
except those that are regarded as a single region, such as 
Luxembourg and Ireland. 
It is hardly feasible to acquire the Community-wide data 
required  for  a  closer  regional  breakdown  of the  EC 
funds paid out to the higher levels of local government. 
At national level  - the  ministries  responsible  and the 
institutions  answerable  to  them  - this  information  is 
available for that part of the funds that is administered 
by them. 2  What is  more,  it  is  often impossible  to tell 
when it comes  to the lower  levels  of local government 
from what source - European or national - the funds 
received by them come.  3 Detailed regional classification 
of European payments would, therefore, only be feasible 
after the  most  painstaking research  at all  the  different 
regional  levels  of the  recipients  of such  funds.  This  is 
quite  feasible  for  case  studies,  focusing  on  individual 
regions.  But overall  it  should be  underlined  that in  all 
areas in which the Community is active only part of the 
funds  can be subjected to a more far-reaching  regional 
breakdown in line with the NUTS 2 subdivision. 
2  The German Federal Institution for Labour, for example, classifies 
its  spending  regionally  by  employment  areas;  these  are  not 
synonymous with NUTS Level 2 regions. 
3  According  to  representatives  of  the  Court  of  Auditors  of  the 
European Communities, this also  makes it  much more  difficult  to 
keep a check  on the efficient use of Community funds. 
27 The proportion of funds going to higher levels  of local 
government  varies  widely,  both  as  to  time-span  and 
according  to  Member  State.  National  peculiarities  in 
assigning tasks to the different levels of local government 
and consequent differences  in spending levels,  shifts in 
emphasis  in the provision of assistance and changes  in 
the  support  frameworks  are  undoubtedly  just  as 
important  in  this  respect  as  a  pragmatic  approach  to 
fund allocation. 
Thus  Greece,  Spain  and Portugal  evidently  received  a 
great deal  of EC money in the first  few  years  of their 
membership  for  the  direct  co-financing  of  national 
programmes for which, in consequence, no regionalized 
data  are  available.  In  the  area  of employment  policy 
there are often national institutions responsible  for the 
entire  country,  so  a  substantial  proportion  of  the 
European  funding  contribution  goes  to  the  national 
institution  as  the  body  responsible  for  the  measures. 
Further  there  are  programmes,  such  as  those  under 
ECSC credit operations, which are expressly designed as 
global measures, whose exact regional application is not 
set  out in advance.  True,  the  reform  of the  structural 
Funds did stipulate stricter linkage to programmes and 
more intensive coordination of the various national and 
Community instruments in order to make the measures 
more  efficient.  On the  other  hand,  this  implies  more 
flexibility in the use of funds,  allowing money from the 
funds to be made available to national organizations and 
administered for the benefit of small and medium-sized 
projects  in  accordance  with  Community  rules.  So  in 
cases  like these too, it is  possible to speak of complete 
regional transparency with regard to EC spending, only 
after the individual measures have been carried out and 
the final statements have been cleared. 
In  view  of these  problems,  a  two-stage  approach  for 
looking at the Community's structural policy operations 
has been selected. The first stage only covers Community 
expenditure that has flowed direct to the NUTS Level 2 
regions  with  regard  to  its  effect  in  equalizing  or 
reinforcing imbalances between the European regions. In 
real terms this expenditure is naturally smaller- in fact 
sometimes  substantially  smaller  - than  spending  on 
each  area  of activity.  This  varies  from  one  fund  to 
another and from one country to another. In the second 
stage, spending in the larger regions was imputed to the 
regions corresponding to NUTS Level 2 with the aid of 
appropriate  indicators.  For  example,  European  Social 
Fund payments to the Italian South were assigned to the 
NUTS  Level  2 regions  which  it comprises,  viz.  Puglia, 
Basilicata and Calabria. This procedure can only give a 
rough estimate of the actual regional use  of funds,  but 
should  at least  not give  rise  to  any  major distortions, 
28 
regional data being taken into account as far as possible. 
We  shall  return  to  this  point  when  discussing  our 
findings. 
In selecting the indicators, we tried to take into account 
the specific goal of each policy area.  In distributing the 
supraregional  payments  made  by  the  European Social 
Fund, for instance, we considered the regional structure 
of  long-term  unemployment,  as  combating  this 
widespread  phenomenon  is  one  of the  main  aims  of 
European  employment  programmes.  In  classifying 
regional Fund expenditure, we took into account that it 
is only a clearly demarcated group of regions that is able 
to  benefit  from  European  support  funds.  The  same 
applies to ECSC credits and subsidies designed to aid the 
restructuring of coal and steel  regions.  As  an indicator 
here we took the structure of spending that has a direct 
regional effect. 
In the case of EIB credits, the main emphasis of which is 
on achieving a fairer  provision of infrastructure to the 
people  of the  European  regions,  population  structure 
was  used  to achieve  better  regional  breakdown  of the 
supra-regional loans,  for want of adequate information 
on infrastructure endowment, which would have been a 
better indicator. 
Despite  the  above  difficulties,  breaking  down  the 
distribution  of  the  Community's  structural  resources 
among the regions constitutes a relatively minor problem 
compared  with  the  dilemma  of classifying  guarantee 
payments  under  the  EAGGF.  For  one  thing, 
regionalized  data  are  available  for  a  substantial 
proportion of structural policy operations. Secondly, the 
number of regions, sectors and individuals that benefit is 
quite clearly defined, with the result that classification is 
unlikely  to  be  highly  contentious,  despite  a  certain 
amount of uncertainty over detail. 
As  explained  above  in  our  description  of  the 
methodological  approach employed,  this  is  particularly 
true of agriculture, as the majority of those who benefit 
are  not  in  receipt,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  of 
Community  payments.  These  are  more  a  way  of 
covering  the  costs  arising  from  the  system  used  to 
maintain producer prices ·which  would  be  untenable  in 
market  conditions  in  an  economy  open  to  foreign 
competition and are ultimately financed by the consumer 
and not by the Community. In many cases, however, the 
costs of the system do not arise in the farming regions.  I 
This means that the bulk of EEC expenditure, roughly 
three-fifths, can only be regionalized in a makeshift way 
by means of model calculations. 
I  Cf. Chapter 4. The  approach  used  in  this  section  means  disregarding 
regionalized  payment  flows  in  the  case  of agriculture. 
For  one  thing,  there  is  hardly  any  data of this  kind 
available;  for  another,  such  a  method  would  be 
inadequate from the point of view  of the actual impact 
of Community  fund  policy.  Instead,  we  have  tried  to 
trace the regional effects on the basis of production. This 
called  for  a  differentiated  approach.  Each  group  of 
intervention  products  was  divided  up  separately.  With 
regard to  aids  to producers,  it  is  safest to assume  that 
such aid benefits producers directly rather than indirectly 
via  market  stabilization.  I  This  is  why  the  EAGGF 
financial  reports  list  payments  made  separately  by 
Member State, and also by regional production for each 
individual  country  separately.  In  respect  of the  other 
costs  of  the  system,  the  incidence  of  which,  being 
relatively  independent  of  the  place/  country  of 
intervention,  is  more  widely  spread  owing  to  the 
interdependence  of national  farming  markets,  support 
spending  was  also  broken  down  in  accordance  with 
regional production structure, but across the EC. Spain 
and Portugal were generally dealt with separately since 
under their treaties of accession these countries are still 
subject  to  transitional  provisions,  with  the  result  that 
they do not benefit from the CAP to the same extent as 
the  other  Member  States.  For  this  reason,  country-
specific spending was  regionalized. 
The calculations  cover  the  period  from  1985  onwards. 
For  R&D  contracts  information  was  available  for  the 
period 1983-90. For a number of intervention areas, data 
was  only  available  from  the  Community  Statistical 
Office's Regional  Data Bank up to 1987.  Data for  the 
regional  Fund,  social  Fund,  guarantee  payments  and 
ECSC  subsidies  for  the  period  up  to  1989/90  was 
supplied by the Commission. A complete overview was 
thus only possible for the brief period 1985-87.  In 1985, 
Portugal and Spain had not yet joined the Community, 
so  the figures  for  the year  are not directly comparable 
with  those  for  following  years.  Consequently,  the 
calculations were initially performed for the  10 original 
Member  States  for  the entire period studied,  and were 
then  reworked  from  1986  on  for  the  Community  of 
Twelve. By comparing these findings it is possible to find 
clues as to whether the Community managed suitably to 
involve  the  new  structurally  weak  countries  in  the 
process  of structurally orientated financial  adjudication 
or  whether  there  may  have  been  certain  'teething 
troubles'. 
I  In so  far as  product-specific data are available, this also applies to 
refunds,  guidance  and  set-aside  premiums  and  co-responsibility 
levies.  Some  of these  measures,  of course,  are  more  related  to 
market stabilization. See Chapter 4. 
With the above reservations, the following payments by 
the European Community have been studied with regard 
to their regional distribution: 
grants  from  the  European  Regional  Development 
Fund  for  infrastructure  projects,  private  investment 
and other 
grants from the European Social Fund 
grants from the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section 
Commission contributions towards R&D  contracts 
EIB  spending  on  infrastructure,  industrial  projects 
and other 
grants and loans  from the European Coal and Steel 
Community 
payments  made  by  the  Agricultural  Guidance  and 
Guarantee Fund Guarantee Section covering a whole 
range of products. 
3.2.  Income distribution as  a reference curve 
Assuming  that  EC  payments  to  the  regions  are 
proportionate to the effects on income in those areas, the 
question  of whether  a  category  of payments  has  an 
equalizing effect on regional  income distribution - or 
the reverse - can be decided on the basis of whether it is 
more or less  evenly distributed across the regions when 
ranked by per capita income than income itself. As  per 
capita income is the criterion used in this study and there 
is  never any question of a perfectly even distribution of 
income  (equal  earnings  for  all},  the  Lorenz  curve  for 
income  distribution  is  always  concave,  that  is,  to  the 
right of the 45°  line.  The further it moves to the right, 
the more  unequal income  distribution  becomes.  If the 
regional distribution of payments is  still to the right of 
the  income  distribution  curve,  it  is  reinforcing  this 
inequality. If  it lies between the 45 o  line and the income 
distribution curve, it might be mitigating this inequality 
but, no matter how substantial, the payments would still 
not be able fully to offset the inequality of the primary 
income  distribution.  (This  can never  be  the  goal:  it  is 
merely intended to help explain what our demonstration 
can  and  cannot  show.)  If these  incentives  produce 
substantial knock-on effects, they may even  lead to an 
increase in inequality. Only when the payments curve is 
to the left of the 45°  line is  it quite clear that they are 
having  an  effect  in  evening  out  regional  income 
distribution  (varying  according  to  the  size  of  the 
payments involved and the convexity of the curve) and 
are in theory capable of making the income distribution 
curve congruent with the 45°  line. 
29 Since  the  primary income  sources  Oabour,  capital  and 
land) are factors whose regional distribution is not easily 
influenced even over a period of several years, the curve 
for  medium-term regional  distribution is  comparatively 
stable. For this reason, it is  enough for the purposes of 
this study to illustrate it with a single year (1988) - see 
Graph  1.  The  secondary  income  and  payment  flows 
from the EC budget and the EIB, however, are subject 
to  largely  discretionary  decisions  and  are  thus  more 
liable to breaks in continuity. 
Differences in the EC's territorial size are apt to show up 
clearly in the course taken by the curve - the wider the 
development gap between the original and the new areas, 
the  larger  the  differences.  This  shows  up  clearly  in  a 
comparison between the income distribution curves  for 
EC 10  and  EC 12.  As  might  be  expected,  the  EC 10 
curve  (Appendix  B)  is  much  flatter  than  the  EC 12 
curve,  showing the income gap between the EC regions 
was  much  less  pronounced  before  the  Community's 
enlargement than it was afterwards. This is most clearly 
seen in the course taken by the original curve. Whereas 
in  the  Community  of Ten,  the  poorest  200Jo  of the 
population still  earned  roughly  12%  of EC income  in 
1988,  this fell  to 8% in the Community of Twelve.  1 
3.3.  Comments on the debate about the 
distribution of payments 
The  curves  for  the  distribution  of payments  generally 
differ  from  the  income  distribution  curves  in  several 
respects. 
First,  they  are  liable  to intersect  the  45°  line.  This  is 
because they are not genuine Lorenz curves, as the study 
is  based on an alien criterion (per capita income).  Only 
when  the area  formed  by  the  payments  curve  and the 
diagonal above the diagonal line is  larger than the area 
beneath  it  can  the  payment  flow  exert  an  overall 
equalizing  effect.  The  payments  may  be  said  to  be 
having a retrograde distribution effect if the curve in the 
area of origin, that is,  in the area of the poor regions, is 
below the 45°  line. 
Second,  the  payments  curves  are  severely  disrupted  in 
places. This is  chiefly to do with the fact that payments 
often involve only a small number of projects, are often 
linked with drawing facilities based on irregular intervals 
and the projects concerned are most unevenly distributed 
across  the  regions  in  terms  of  the  purpose  of  the 
1  As these calculations are based on average regional income, they do 
not reflect the fact that 'poor' regions also have their share of high 
income earners. 
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payments.  Naturally,  ECSC loans are never granted to 
regions where there is  no coal and steel sector. 
Third, curves for individual years are even less constant 
than  those  for  the  entire  period  under  consideration. 
This  is  merely  an  automatic  effect  resulting  from 
compensation  for  conflicting  discontinuity  trends  in 
individual  years.  In  general  it  is  true  to  say  that  the 
payments  curve  is  more  constant  when  payments  are 
spread  over  a  wider  area,  annual  payments  are  larger 
and the period under consideration longer. 
3  .4.  Regional distribution of individual 
payment flows 
Regional Fund 
European  Regional  Development  Fund  investment 
grants - around 10% of the EEC budget in 1990 - are 
a powerful factor in evening out the regional disparities 
in the European Community. The compensatory effects 
have even increased over the period under consideration, 
a result that is undoubtedly linked with the reform of the 
structural  Funds  and  the  ensuing  concentration  of 
assistance  on a small  number of regions  (see  Graphs 2 
and 3).  In 1989  and  1990  an average  of some 800Jo  of 
investment  support  granted  went  to  the  20%  of the 
Community  population  living  in  the  poorest  regions. 
Even so, the effect of financial equalization in favour of 
backward  regions  was  somewhat  stronger  under  the 
Community of Ten than for the present Community. In 
1985 the same Community regions (EC 1  0) received only 
70%  of the  investment  subsidies;  by  1986,  under  the 
Community  of Twelve,  the  proportion  benefiting  the 
fifth  of the  population  living  in  the  least  developed 
regions  had  shrunk  to  little  more  than  60%  (see 
Appendix B).  Spain and Portugal evidently required an 
initial period of adjustment before making full use of the 
regional Fund, with the result that they were not able to 
extract as much benefit from the first few  years of their 
membership as  the other backward regions. 
This  applies  to basics  such  as  infrastructure measures. 
When it comes  to investment  support for  industry the 
differences are even more pronounced. In the backward 
regions  of Spain  and  Portugal,  which  are  among  the 
economically weakest in the Community, the main thrust 
of regional  assistance  - even  more than in  the other 
regions  - has been directed at infrastructure measures 
(see Graph 4).  Poor infrastructure has always been (and 
still  is)  a major obstacle to private investment in  these 
areas.  Empirical  studies  show  that  the  existence  of 
infrastructure servicing companies - and households -Graph 1 - Regional concentration of income in the European Community 1988, EC 12 
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Income distribution curves lie always beneath the 45°  line. For structural reasons they are in the short and medium 
term,  rather  stable  for  the  overall  economy.  Payments'  distribution  curves  on the  right  of income  distribution 
reinforce regional imbalances and on the left of it they mitigate them. 
31 Graph 2 - Concentration of ERDF investment grants, total 1986-87, EC 12 
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The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) amounted in 1990 to ECU 4.5 billion, i.e. nearly 11 OJo  of the EC 
budget.  In 1986-87,  ERDF investment grants were  highly concentrated on economically weak regions.  More than 
50%  of all grants were spent on the poorest regions, where 20% of the EC's population live. 
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From 1989  onwards, due to the reform of the structural Funds, the impulse from the regional  fund's investment 
grants was  markedly shifted to the poorer regions in the EC:  700Jo  was spent on the lowest fifth of the regions. 
33 is  a crucial factor in attracting private investors to such 
regions.  1  In  this  situation  not  even  the  attractive 
financial  incentives  of Community investment  support, 
with investment grants rising to 70% of total costs, have 
sufficient  bite.  In  1986  and  1987,  for  example,  the 
poorer  regions  of the  Community  (EC 12),  containing 
100Jo  of the Community's population, received less than 
5%  of investment subsidies to trade and industry, with 
the  lowest  fifth  receiving  no  more  than  40%  of this 
money  (see  Graph  5).  In  the  Community  of Ten,  in 
which regional assistance was already well-established at 
this  time  and  had  brought  substantial  benefits  to 
backward regions in the form of infrastructure measures 
- or where infrastructure deficits  were  anyway  not so 
pronounced  as  in  most  of  the  Iberian  regions,  the 
concentration of private investment subsidies is tangibly 
higher.  It  is  not substantially  lower  than the  level  for 
infrastructure  measures.  Comparing  the  calculations 
based  on  investment  subsidies  to  the  NUTS  Level  2 
regions  from  the  regional  Fund  with  the  modified 
accounts  which  routinely  include  payments  initially 
directed  to  the  higher  ranking  regional  authorities  and 
administered and distributed by them, we find no major 
difference in the outcome. This is  partly due to the fact 
that the additional amount to be taken into account is 
not very big. What affected the outcome most, however, 
was  that the model calculation had to take into account 
the restriction that the group of regions to be favoured 
should  not  be  extended  beyond  the  eligible  areas  laid 
down in the regulations (see  Appendix B). 
Overall  the  calculations  show,  as  expected,  that  the 
financial impact of European regional policy is largely in 
line  with  the  desired  compensatory  function.  In  this 
process, the promotion of infrastructure plays something 
of  a  pioneering  role,  with  investment  in  trade  and 
industry lagging  somewhat  behind,  with  the result that 
the  take-up  rate  has  not  up  to  now  been  uniform 
throughout the regions. In so far as it is possible to draw 
conclusions from the short period under study,  there is 
however  a  noticeable  trend  towards  greater  regional 
equalization in this area, too. 
Social Fund 
Like the regional Fund, the European Social Fund- the 
second most important structural Fund, with 7% of the 
EEC budget in  1990 - is also a strong force in evening 
out regional imbalances in the Community. The regional 
1  Cf.  Biehl and Dieter,  The contribution of  infrastructure to regional 
development.  Luxembourg  1986  (ed.  by  the  Commission  of the 
European  Communities),  especially  p.  114 ff.,  347 ff.;  Nam, 
C.  W.  et a/.,  An empirical assessment of  factors shaping regional 
Competitiveness in problem regions,  Luxembourg  1990 (ed.  by  the 
Commission of the European Communities), especially p. 29 ff. 
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concentration  of aid  is  not  quite  so  pronounced:  its 
operations  have  a  broader  regional  spread.  None  the 
less,  in  1989,  something  like  one  half  of the  strictly 
regional  resources  were  tied to measures in the  poorest 
regions,  with  a  fifth  of the  Community's  population. 
Over  the years  this  regional  concentration has  become 
somewhat  more  pronounced  (see  Graph  6).  This  is 
undoubtedly  due  partly  to  some  of the  funds  being 
committed to the underdeveloped regions  and to better 
coordination of the various Community operations that 
come  under  the  support  programmes.  Finally,  it  is 
evident  from the social  Fund's gentler curve compared 
with the regional Fund that despite long and continuous 
growth in the 1980s long-term and youth unemployment 
in the Community are not only the problem of a small 
number  of underdeveloped  regions  but  are  relatively 
widespread. 
With a clearer sense of purpose than was  the case with 
the  regional  Fund,  the  Community  channelled  ESF 
resources to Spain and Portugal from the earliest days of 
their  membership.  For this  reason,  the  distribution  of 
resources at the start of the period under observation for 
the Community of Twelve is only slightly less favourable 
to  the  poorer  regions  in  terms  of concentration  than 
demonstrated  by  the  calculations  for  EC 10  (see 
Appendix B).  Comparison over time indicates  that the 
better treatment  for  backward regions  occurred in  the 
late 1980s, i.e. mainly in the Community of Twelve, thus 
obviously  benefiting  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
regions, while the regional concentration of social Fund 
resources  on the basis of need  in the regions of the  10 
original Member States hardly changed. 
A substantial proportion of the social Fund's resources is 
not credited directly to the NUTS  Level  2 regions that 
benefit  from  employment  measures  but  to  the  higher 
ranking  regions  or  to  State  level.  The  estimated 
distribution  of  these  sums  to  the  regions  yields  a 
somewhat  different  picture  of regional  concentration, 
with  an  unmistakeable  trend  towards  a  more  even 
distribution  of  resources  (see  Graph  7).  This  can 
undoubtedly  be  traced  back  to  the  method  of 
classification.  Given  the  relative  importance  of  fund 
payments at State level,  classification using an indicator 
for  this  purpose  - long-term  unemployment  was 
selected - inevitably leads to a more balanced regional 
distribution than the payments themselves actually seem 
to  warrant.  Nevertheless,  the  general  trend  of  our 
findings  is  unaffected.  The  equalizing  function  of 
Community  employment  policy  is  unmistakeable;  its 
effects  are  more  marked  under  the  Community  of 
Twelve  than  they  were  under  EC 1  0;  and  the 
compensatory effect  is  increasing  - if only  slowly  -
with the passage of time. Graph 4 - Concentration of ERDF investment grants, infrastructure 1986-87, EC 12 
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Incentives for infrastructure investment have a high priority in development programmes for underdeveloped regions. 
They amount to three-quarters of total ERDF grants and have the highest ratio of regional concentration: in the 
years  1986-87,  700Jo  of those grants was spent on the weakest regions, with 200Jo  of the EC's population. 
35 Graph 5 - Concentration of ERDF investment grants, industry 1986-87, EC 12 
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About one-quarter of ERDF grants is spent on the private sector. The weakest regions of the Community make use 
of investment grants for private investment to a lesser extent as compared with grants for infrastructure purposes: in 
1986 and 1987 the lowest tenth of the regions received hardly any. 
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In the last  five  years the expenses of the European Social Fund (ESF)  amounted to about ECU 3 billion a year. 
Compared to ERDF expenses they were regionally less concentrated. Nevertheless, they gave remarkable impulses to 
lower the regional  imbalances.  These impulses  became stronger in the course of the period observed.  Taking the 
average for  1986 to 1989,  450Jo  of the ESF obligations were concentrated on the poorer regions,  with  20%  of the 
EC's population. 
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The regional distribution of the modified ESF data enclosing financial flows to the State or Nuts 1 level which were 
distributed to the Nuts 2 regions by model calculations shows a slightly lower extent of regional concentration than 
those flows  spent directly to the Nuts 2 level. 
38 EAGGF Guidance 
With about ECU 2 billion, the Guidance Section of the 
European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund 
accounts  for over  407o  of the EEC budget.  It promotes 
the improvement of agricultural structures, in particular 
by  granting investment  subsidies.  These  resources  thus 
chiefly benefit rural areas which, compared with regions 
dominated by manufacturing and service industries, are 
amongst those most in need of help. The reform of the 
structural Funds caused the objectives of regional policy 
to become even more closely identified with those of the 
agricultural  structures  policy.  1  This  regional 
equalization  function  can  also  be  detected  in  the 
concentration  of  investment  subsidies  to  the 
Community's  poorer  regions.  In  1986  and  1987,  for 
example, about half the subsidies on average went to the 
poorest  regions  of  the  EEC,  where  a  fifth  of  the 
Community's population lives.  On the  other hand, the 
top 4007o  of the rich  regions  received  only  2007o  of the 
Guidance  Fund's  investment  grants  (see  Graph  8). 
Resources were relatively equally distributed between the 
poorer  regions  of the  new  Community  countries  and 
those  of  the  other  Member  States  and  there  is  no 
significant  difference  between  the  two  concentration 
curves (see Appendix B). The investment grants shown in 
the  statistics  could  all  be  directly  allocated  to  NUTS 
Level 2 regions, so that there was no need for any extra 
model calculation. 
R&D expenditure 
With little more than ECU 1.5 billion from 1983 to 1990, 
the  amounts  granted  by  the European Community to 
businesses and research institutions for R&D projects as 
part  of  contractual  research  (excluding  research  into 
fusion)  comprises  no  more than a  tiny  fraction of the 
EEC budget.  Subsidies  benefit developed  regions  more 
than regions whose development is lagging behind. Over 
the  same  period,  at least  two-fifths  of these  resources 
was  spent  in  the  economically  strongest  regions  of 
EC 12,  with  roughly  one-fifth  of  the  Community's 
population  (see  Graph  9).  The  lowest  fifth  of  the 
population, from the weakest economic regions, did not 
receive  as  much  as  a  tenth of the  Community's  R&D 
expenditure. Support for R&D thus tended, if anything, 
to counteract the levelling out of regional disparities. If 
one  looks  at  the  figures  for  the  Community  of Ten 
I  See Commission of the European Communities (Ed.), Guideline for 
the  reform  of the  Commmunity's  structural  Fund.  Luxembourg 
1989. 
separately, the regional distribution of R&D resources is 
rather more balanced. Evidently the new countries have 
not yet been able to make much use of support for R&D. 
It must be pointed out, of course, that the study looked 
at the Community's contributions to R&D contracts over 
the  entire  period  of  1983-90.  But  the  older  Member 
States  (EC 1  0)  received  these  resources  over  a  longer 
period  of  time  than  the  new  Member  States.  This 
introduces  a  complication  into  the  issue  of 
comparability.  Yet  there  is  a  trend  towards  more 
pronounced  regional  imbalances  as  a  result  of more 
intensive R&D operations within the Community of Ten. 
This  is  not so  surprising.  For one thing,  highly  skilled 
staff are required to carry out research and development; 
as  a  rule  such  personnel  are  not  available  in 
underdeveloped  areas.  For another,  businesses  have  a 
tendency to locate their own research operations within a 
reasonably  comfortable  distance  of  company 
headquarters  or to  employ  local  research  institutes  in 
order  to  ensure  smoother  communications  between 
company management and research institutions. Finally, 
the fact that universities and research institutes have been 
established  in  less-developed  areas  on  regional  policy 
grounds has not yet  resulted in any practical reversal of 
this  trend.  As  long  as  the  Community's  economic 
structure remains regionally imbalanced, the centripedal 
effect of R&D  operations,  despite  substantial  financial 
incentives for regional diversification, will continue to be 
a fact of life. 
ECSC credits 
At roughly ECU 1 billion (1986 and 1987), ECSC credits 
are  among  the  more  modest  financial  flows.  For  a 
number of regions, including some of the poorest, there 
is simply no material basis for such payments. This is all 
the truer for the Community of Twelve. The 15% of the 
population  in  the  poorest  regions  derive  virtually  no 
benefit  at  all  from  them.  This  is  particularly  true  of 
Portugal  and Greece.  Overall,  ECSC  loans  exacerbate 
regional inequality.  While this is  definitely the case  for 
the  'original  data'  that can  be  imputed with  precision 
(see  Appendix  B),  the  effect  is  even  stronger  if  one 
includes  payments  that can only  be  imputed indirectly 
(Graph 10).  Under the Community of Ten and over the 
period  1985-87,  the  distributive effects  of ECSC loans 
have  been  largely  neutral,  taking  into  account  all 
financial  flows  - including  those  that  can  only  be 
imputed  indirectly.  No  broad  trend  is  in  evidence. 
Between  1986  and  1987,  under  the  Community  of 
Twelve, inequities of distribution in the true poverty area 
widened,  though  the  overall  regional  distribution  of 
ECSC loans actually became more even than before. 
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The investment grants, paid by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, help especially rural areas 
with  low  income to restructure the production capacities and the market infrastructures.  In 1986,  the Fund spent 
ECU 0.7 billion, in 1990 ECU 1.8 billion, i.e.  20Jo  or 4% of the EC budget. Taking the average for 1986 and 1987, 
nearly half of the investment incentives were granted to the weakest EC regions, where 200Jo  of the EC's population 
live. 
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CEC contributions for R&D contracts amount to ECU 1.4 billion from 1983 to 1990. They are granted to a greater 
extent to firms which are resident in the richer EC regions. 
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In 1986 and 1987 ECSC loans totalled about ECU 1 billion a year. Coal and steel industry is not just typical for the 
poorest regions of the Twelve. Therefore, regional distribution of ECSC loans is less favourable as compared to the 
; EC 10,  where the distribution curve oscillates around the 45°  line. 
42 ECSC aids 
The  same  applies  to  ECSC  readaptation  aids  as  to 
credits.  They  favour  companies  and  employees  from 
structurally weak areas dominated by the coal and steel 
sector.  In  relation  to  the  Community  average,  these 
regions are not necessarily those with the lowest incomes, 
even  though their economic outlook may be  poor and 
structural help badly needed. On the other hand, most of 
the Community's poorer regions derive no benefits from 
this specific form of sectoral aid.  In any event, the aids 
are of no great size.  In 1989 they still amounted to little 
more than ECU 60 million. 
ECSC aids are even more unevenly distributed than the 
corresponding readaptation credits, tending to boost,  if 
anything,  regional  income  inequalities.  The  adverse 
regional  effects of this  trend show the tendency to fall 
off somewhat between 1986 and 1989,  although in  1989 
the Community's poorest regions,  accounting  for  40o/o 
of the population, received less  than 5% of ECSC aids, 
while the more prosperous regions with more than a fifth 
of the Community's population received something over 
a fifth of these aids (see Graph 11). 
The regional concentration is  less  marked if we  confine 
our analysis  to  the region  of the original  Community. 
There is also a certain levelling effect when aids credited 
to  groups  of regions  are  imputed  to  NUTS  Level  2 
regions  in  accordance with  the  model.  The differences 
between  directly  credited  and indirectly  imputable aids 
obviously have a greater effect in countries and regions 
with an average per capita income than in the higher and 
lower income regions (see relevant diagrams in Appendix 
B).  In evaluating  this  finding  - rather an unwelcome 
one from a regional policy point of view - it should be 
borne in mind  that in  terms  of their  financial  volume 
ECSC aids are of far less consequence than the structural 
Funds. 
EIB loans 
Unlike  ECSC  aid,  loans  granted  by  the  European 
Investment Bank amounting to the fairly substantial sum 
of ECU 7 billion  (1986  and  1987),  have  an altogether 
equalizing  effect  on  regional  income  distribution.  The 
distribution  curves  were  convex  in  respect  of all  the 
aspects  and modifications studied.  It is  plain from this 
that the rectification of regional imbalances is one of the 
BIB's stated aims, though this is a truer reflection of the 
position  under the Community of Ten than under the 
present expanded Community. The curves for EC 12 in 
the poverty area even drop below the 45 o  line in places 
(see  Graph 12  and Appendix B).  First we  examined all 
EIB credits, irrespective of their purpose. As there are no 
significant differences  between the curves  based  on the 
original figures  on the one hand, and those taking into 
account amounts that can only be imputed indirectly on 
the other, we  may limit discussion to ,the curves taking 
all financial flows into account. An interesting point here 
is to compare the figures for different dates. It turns out 
that the regressive effects in  the poverty area were  still 
clearly  discernible  in  1986  and had disappeared by  the 
following year. Making due allowance for the brevity of 
the period  under consideration,  it  seems  plausible  that 
the uneven  distribution of 1986  was  not a  problem of 
discrimination,  but  one  of  absorption  and  political 
adaptation:  1986  was  the  first  year  of  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  membership.  Until  then,  EIB  policy  had 
been  geared  towards  regional  equalization  within  the 
Community of Ten (see Graph 13).  Projects with longer 
lead  times  had  gradually  reached  maturity,  bringing 
follow-up  projects  in  their  wake.  In  this  process 
project-related  commitments  are  established  years  in 
advance.  The  Iberian  countries  first  had  to  develop 
projects eligible for EIB funding. This takes time. For its 
part, the EIB could initially only make cash available to 
Spain  and  Portugal  within  the  limits  of its  available 
surplus.  In addition,  it  is  also  obliged  to carry out an 
exact  appraisal  of  the  business  risks  involved.  This 
presupposes established arrangements for gathering and 
processing information. 
In so  far  as  would-be  borrowers  in  the  needy  regions 
create  the  conditions  necessary  for  meaningful  and 
promising loans take-up, the EIB is able to offer the two 
new  countries  preferential  finance  from  amounts 
returning  to  it  from  old  loans  and  the  accumulating 
value of its overall resources. This trend was  first noted 
in 1987.  It emerges more clearly from the modified data 
than  from  the  directly  imputable  original  data  (see 
Appendix  B).  This  might  confirm  the  above 
considerations  with  regard  to  the  capacity  for 
absorption.  For  in  the  absence  of  competent  or 
established contractual partners on the spot, and wishing 
to  provide  aid  with  the  minimum  of delay,  the  EIB 
originally employed supra-regional project managers to 
channel  its  financial  aid.  If the EIB  does  not  wish  to 
abandon  its  policy  of  regional  equalization  in  the 
original territory of the Commumty, its ability to switch 
its  resources to recently acceded regions  is  limited. This 
emerges  perfectly  clearly  from  the  way  the  curve  for 
EC 10 develops over time.  In 1985  it was still markedly 
convex;  the way in  which  funds  were  being  distributed 
was  therefore  clearly  having  an equalizing  effect.  The 
diversion of money to the Iberian Peninsula from  1986 
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In 1989 the subsidies of the European Coal and Steel Community amounted to ECU 60 million. They were spent on 
regions where a need for restructuring existed because of the dominance of the declining coal and steel sector. With 
respect to their income per head, these regions are not the poorest ones in the Community. Therefore, the subsidies 
do not contribute to equalizing existing global regional imbalances, but could prevent the aggravation of individual 
regional problems. 
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In 1986 and 1987, the EIB loans for EC regions totalled up to ECU 7 billion a year. After the enlargement by Spain 
and Portugal,  the  equalizing  effect of EIB  credits  in  regional  terms  diminished  significantly  as  compared to  the 
EC 10.  This was  because the Iberian regions were  only able to attract EIB money in proportion to their share in 
population. 
45 Graph 13  - Concentration of EIB loans, total 1985-87, EC 10 
tU  .a 
tU 
~ 
'tS 
Q) 
;;:: 
·~  'tS 
8 
u; 
d  ca 
.9 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Concentration of  EIB  Loans 
Total1985-1987, EC  (10) 
I  .  :  .  -··-·-·-·· ·---,----~--r------,----
0f-------~------~-------+------~~----~ 
0  20  40  60  80  100 
Population, ranking by income per head 
EIB credits counteract regional imbalances significantly albeit not sharply. Part of the distribution of credits could 
not be calculated directly but had to be estimated. Probably, actual flows were somewhat more concentrated on the 
poor regions than shown here. 
46 on leads to progressive flattening of the curve in the two 
following  years.  This  process  may  be  expected  to 
continue after 1987, too. For the Community of Twelve, 
on the other hand, the distribution curve will continue to 
bulge  outwards,  becoming steeper in the lower section, 
especially.  Unless  there is  a  major boost to the overall 
funds available, this will  inevitably be at the expense of 
the old Community of Ten. 
In  the  distribution  calculations  presented  here,  EIB 
operations were also analysed separately on the basis of 
the  purpose  of the  loan - infrastructure or industry. 
Spending on infrastructure was by far the greater of the 
two  and  dominates  the  picture.  But  the  difference  in 
relative  importance  apart,  there  are  significant 
differences  between  the  distribution  of  spending  on 
industry and spending on infrastructure (see  Graphs  14 
and  15).  On the  basis  of the  Community of Twelve, 
industrial  credits  overall  are more unevenly  distributed 
-thus helping to counteract regional income disparities, 
within the limits  set by their size  - than infrastructure 
credits.  As  far as poverty is  concerned, their effects are 
not regressive. Yet the curves for infrastructure spending 
stick  relatively  closely  to  the  45°  line  and in  both the 
years  under  observation  are  strongly  regressive  in  the 
poverty area after the end of each period. 
This  shows  that  it  is  much  harder  to  draw  up 
infrastructure projects that can be swiftly put into effect 
than it is  to provide support to industry. The problems 
involved are often complex and considerable preliminary 
planning is required. The financial outlay is considerable 
and  it  is  necessary  to  recruit  co-financiers.  It  takes 
several  years  to find  ways  round these  obstacles.  This 
may be demonstrated by comparing the distribution of 
EIB  spending  on infrastructure  over  a  period  of time 
with spending according to size of the Community. The 
original  data  show  that  the  regressive  effect  fell  off 
sharply even between 1986 and 1987  (implying a switch 
of funds to the poorer regions). And in 1985, four years 
after  Greece's  accession,  no  regressive  distribution  is 
detectable in the poverty sector under the Community of 
Ten. This is not of course quite so true for the years that 
follow,  but the impact of the general flow· of money out 
of the Community of Ten mentioned above as a result of 
the southward enlargement is quite evident. Further, this 
might also be an indication that the EIB is  not able to 
distribute its resources purely according to need. Instead, 
we  find  a  number  of roughly  similar  poorer  regions 
competing for scarce financial resources, and it is on this 
score that Greece has lost ground to Portugal during the 
second half of the  1980s.  This might also explain why, 
when it comes to support for  industry, the distribution 
curve  did  not  flatten  out  with  the  second  southward 
enlargement  in  the territory of the old  Community of 
Ten all at once, like spending on infrastructure, but did 
so a year later. As direct investment shifted away from 
Greece  towards  Spain  and  Portugal,  fewer  and  fewer 
applicants  for  these  funds  came forward in  Greece.  In 
the Community of Twelve,  this  is  clearly reflected in a 
simultaneous  concentration  of  financial  assistance  to 
industry in  the lower  sector (where  Portugal is  heavily 
represented). 
Agricultural guarantee payments 
As agricultural guarantee payments were imputed to the 
regions  by  product,  on  the  basis  of  their  share  of 
production, and production statistics are relatively up to 
date,  the  study  was  able  to cover  the  periods  1986-89 
(EC 12)  and 1985-89  (EC 10).  It included all  the major 
products subject to market organization, accounting for 
more than nine tenths of all price support payments, or 
560Jo  of the Community budget. 
Many  of the  curves  are  remarkably  stable  over  time, 
while  others  vary  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.  The 
reasons for this have to be explored from case to case. In 
contrast to other comparisons over time, the curves for 
EC 10  and  EC 12  differ  considerably  in  places,  with 
their effects  in  terms of equalizing  income distribution 
occasionally going into reverse. It also emerges from the 
analysis that the distribution curves for specific products 
diverge very sharply at times. In particular, they include 
a  number  of extremely  convex  curves  indicative  of a 
strongly equalizing  effect - though commensurate, of 
course, with their often modest importance. 
Despite  reservations  about  lumping  together  different 
categories of expenditure on account of their different 
effects,  we  first  look at the two  summary distribution 
curves (1986-89 and 1985-89) for all the selected products 
combined and the product-specific components of these 
curves.  The  most  conspicuous  difference  is  that 
guarantee payments made under the old Community of 
Ten appear  to have  had  a  fairly  consistent  - if not 
substantial  - effect  on  regional  income  distribution, 
whereas no such effect is  discernible in the Community 
of Twelve seen as a whole (see Graphs 16 and 17). 
The way  the curve  intersects  the  diagonal  around  the 
middle of the population range reflecting the shift in the 
accumulated financial flows  from less than proportional 
to  more  than  proportional  shows  that  it  is  primarily 
regions with average per capita income that benefit from 
guarantee  payments.  These  regions  were  among  the 
poorer  regions  of  the  Community  of  Ten.  EC 
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Loans for infrastructure purposes amount to three quarters of total EIB loans. The flattening of the concentration 
curve  for  total  EIB  credits  results  only  from  the  distribution  of payments  for  infrastructure.  Here  the  South 
obviously has  problems of absorption. It is  mainly the directly calculable figures,  which  are free  from equalizing 
estimates, that show this. 
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Loans to  the private sector  amount to one  quarter of total EIB  loans.  Industry projects  eligible  for  EIB  credits 
mature faster than those in infrastructure. The curve is expected to show somewhat more concentration in the years 
after 1987 as may be deducted from comparison with that for the EC 10. 
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In 1990, EAGGF guarantee payments totalled ECU 25  billion, i.e. nearly 600Jo  of the EC budget. A comparison with 
the EC 12 shows a distribution of total guarantee payments which is, with respect to the poorer regions, more clearly 
counteracting  income  gaps.  This  indicates  that  the  original  CAP  was  constructed  for  a  'Community  of the 
North'. 
50 . Graph 17  - Concentration of CAP guarantee payments, total 1986-89, EC 12 
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In the EC 12 the poorer regions attract guarantee money only in proportion to (or somewhat less than) their share in 
population. Within the upper 60% of population there is  some income-equalizing effect. 
51 agricultural policy was thus, on the whole, tailored more 
to the  needs  of the  richer  regions  of the  north.  In  the 
case  of cereals,  sugar,  oilseed,  milk,  beef and veal  -
products which accounted for some 700fo of all guarantee 
payments  over the period  1986-89 (see  Table  3)  - the 
poorer  half  of  the  Community  of  Twelve  is 
disadvantaged by the regional distribution effects of the 
price support mechanism whereas in the Community of 
Ten there  was  no  such  effect  in  the case  of milk  and 
beef,  and  at  any  event  400fo  of  the  Community 
population at most (EC 10) were affected. 
In  1988  the  system  for  providing  agricultural  price 
support  was  reformed.  With  the  aid  of a  number  of 
measures  (stabilizers)  the  support  level  is  now 
automatically  lowered  whenever  set  production 
thresholds  are  exceeded.  Since  then  there  has  been  a 
marked change in the  distribution effects  of guarantee 
payments. Whereas in  1987 the curve in the area of the 
poorer  half  of the  population  of the  EC 12  was  still 
clearly concave, by  1988 it already largely represented a 
proportional  distribution  along  the  45°  line,  moving 
completely  above  it  in  1989.  The  reasons  for  the 
noticeable  equalization  of regional  income  distribution 
linked with this might be that owing to the introduction 
of price stabilizers northern products cease to enjoy the 
heavy  support  they  had  received  previously  while 
southern  products  began  to  receive  much  more 
favourable  treatment.  This  might  also  apply  to  the 
Community of Ten, that is, including Greece, the Italian 
Mezzogiorno and some regions of southern France. 
Below  we  show  how  the  individual  product  groups 
studied contribute to the overall distribution curve  and 
which  of them  may  be  credited  with  bringing  about a 
change in  the situation which  is  undoubtedly beneficial 
from the regional policy point of view. 
The regional  distribution effects  vary in  respect  of the 
individual products (see  Graphs  18-21  and the  relevant 
diagrams in Appendix B).  In the case of sugar, it is the 
richer regions of the Community (EC 12) that benefit; in 
the  case  of cereals,  milk,  oilseed  and  beef the  poorer 
regions  are  also  disadvantaged,  with  the  regional 
equalization effects  being  confined to the economically 
stronger  northern  regions.  Thus  700fo  of  guaranteed 
expenditure,  or  fully  400fo  of  the  entire  Community 
budget,  is  in  effect  working  against  the  Community's 
regional  policy  objectives.  Only  in  tobacco,  olive  oil, 
sheep and goat meat and - to a lesser extent - wine, 
fruit  and  vegetables  are  the  poorer  regions  of  the 
Community  of Twelve  favoured  to  any  extent.  These 
products attract less  than 20% of guarantee payments. 
For certain product groups,  the price  support situation 
changed  between  1986  and  1989.  The  distribution  of 
expenditure on milk, beef and veal and tobacco has to all 
Table 3 - EAGGF guarantee payments for selected products 
EC 10  EC 12 
Product  1985-89  1986-89 
Mio. ECU  I 
OJo  Mio. ECU  I 
OJo 
Cereals and rice  17067.3  15.8  15  320.2  16.4 
Milk  27 065.2  25.1  21  320.9  22.9 
Tobacco  4 361.5  4.0  3 690.7  4.0 
Cattle (meat)  13  187.7  12.2  10 534.7  11.3 
Sugar  9 274.1  8.6  7 822.7  8.4 
Wine  4 425.6  4.1  4 124.4  4.4 
Sheep and goats (meat)  3 556.8  3.3  3 937.2  4.2 
Fruits and vegetables!  4 710.2  4.4  3 658.5  3.9 
Olive-oil  4 415.7  4.1  4 153.0  4.5 
Oleaginous products  10 878.8  10.1  10 360.3  11.1 
Selected products total  98 942.9  91.8  84 922.6  91.1 
EAGGF guarantee payments total  107 781.2  100.0  93  185.5  100.0 
1  Excluding pineapple. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  EAGGF financial reports; DIW calculations. 
52 Graph 18  - Concentration of CAP guarantee payments 
Sugar 1986-89, EC 12 
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Payments for sugar amount to 8.50Jo  of total EAGGF guarantee payments. The poorest 45% of the people are at a 
disadvantage, more than with any other product. In the EC 10, this imbalance is weaker. Distribution there resembles 
more that for cereals,  milk and cattle meat showing that sugar is  more a northern product, too. 
53 Graph 19 - Concentration of CAP guarantee payments 
Cattle (meat) 1986-89, EC 12 
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Payments  for  cattle  amount  to  11 o/o  of total  EAGGF  guarantee  payments.  The  poorer  regions  run  short  of 
payments, here.  Similar distribution curves can be  found with cereals and rice,  milk and oleaginous products. The 
curve for this typical  'northern product' is  relatively invariant over time. 
54 Graph 20 - Concentration of CAP guarantee payments 
Fruit and vegetables 1986-89, EC 12 
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Payments for fruit and vegetables amount to 40Jo  of total EAGGF guarantee payments. This distribution is strongly 
in  favour  of the  second  poorest tenth  of the  people  which  is  the  poorest  tenth in  the  EC  10.  Total  payments 
significantly counteract regional gaps.  Concentration on poorer regions increases  over time with  production there 
growing fast under CAP. (Similar but flatter with wine.) 
55 Graph 21  - Concentration of CAP guarantee payments 
Sheep and goats (meat) 1986-89, EC 12 
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Payments for sheep and goats amount to 40Jo  of total EAGGF guarantee payments. These payments, even more than 
those for tobacco and olive oil, are in strongest contrast to regional income imbalance. Especially the richest regions 
receive little or nothing (olive oil). 
56 intents  and  purposes  remained  unchanged,  undesirable 
though it  is  from a regional policy angle.  In respect of 
most other products, guaranteed expenditure was  more 
in line with the objective of reducing regional disparities 
by  the  end  of the  period  covered  than it  had  been  to 
begin  with.  The  boost to  incomes  linked  to guarantee 
expenditure  in  respect  of wine,  sheep  and  goat  meat, 
cheese  and vegetables,  has  increasingly come to benefit 
the poorer regions, while the richer regions are no longer 
so  heavily  favoured  with  regard to cereals,  oilseed  and 
sugar as  they were at the start. 
All  in  all,  the  evidence  confirms  the  theory  that  less 
preferential treatment of some (though not all) northern 
products  and  more  preferential  treatment  of  major 
(again,  not all)  southern  products  have  resulted  in  the 
EAGGF  guarantee  payments  - which  ultimately 
constitute  the  bulk  of  Community  expenditure  -
helping  to counteract the regional  income gap  in some 
way. 
If one compares the distribution curves  for EC 12 with 
EC 10,  taking each product group separately, one finds 
both similarities and differences. 
The  curves  for  tobacco,  beef and veal  have  remained 
unchanged, even compared with the Community of Ten. 
This demonstrates that their production is  concentrated 
in the original Community of Ten.  It also attests to the 
fact that between 1985 and 1986 (following the accession 
of Spain and Portugal) the relevant  flow  of guarantee 
funds  to the  regions  in question continued unchanged. 
But in respect of fruit and vegetables,  cereals including 
rice,  sheep  and  goat  meat  and  sugar,  the  distribution 
curves  for  EC 10  have  remained  practically  constant, 
while  on  the  basis  of EC 12  a  shift  towards  a  more 
equalizing effect was  noted. Many of these are product 
groups  for  which  output  levels  are  far  higher  in  the 
south. As the northern regions did not forfeit any funds, 
and  the  south  received  more  than  its  due  proportion 
(more  than  it  had  before),  the  overall  effect  is  an 
equalizing  one.  In  respect  of oilseed,  distribution  was 
worse  for  EC 10  than  it  was  for  EC 12.  What  has 
happened here is that the southern regions of the old EC 
have  'ceded'  produce  bought in  to  intervention to the 
Iberian countries as a result of competition. Comparison 
of the curves shows that for olive oil the.opposite is true. 
In  the  case  of  wine,  finally,  there  were  equalizing 
distribution  effects  at  either  end  of  the  period. 
Guarantee payments were more heavily concentrated on 
Italian, Greek and/  or southern French wine,  as  well  as 
Spanish varieties. 
As with oilseed, this is not necessarily to be welcomed. It 
may  also  mean  that  amid  the  already  tense  market 
conditions prevailing for table wines,  price support has 
stimulated production to the extent that large quantities 
can  only  be  absorbed  through intervention.  This  issue 
cannot be explored in detail here. 
Overall effects 
Scrutiny  of  the  regional  concentration  of  the 
Community's  aids,  credits  and  support  to  agriculture 
showed  whether  each  package  of measures  tended  to 
reduce  or  reinforce  disparities,  although  this  was  not 
related to actual financial impact. To arrive at an overall 
assessment  of these  measures,  they  must  be  evaluated, 
along with their financial impact and then summarized. 
The  difficulties  of doing  so  were  pointed  out  in  the 
introduction.  Strictly  speaking,  the  Community's 
payments or commitments cannot be simply added up. 
The subsidy value of each individual measure varies too 
widely;  when  it  comes  to credits,  it  is  often  called  in 
question  completely.  It  is  also  likely  that  the  income 
effect  resulting  from  the support programmes  - hard 
though it is to gauge- is fairly widely scattered. Finally, 
the  boost  to  economic  development  in  the  region 
concerned - or in another region that profits indirectly 
- by  Community  financial  assistance  is  far  from 
uniform. 
Consequently, the approach adopted here for want of a 
better  one  - simple  addition  of the  financial  flows 
within the Community - can only provide a number of 
fairly rough-and-ready indicators. Closer examination of 
the  regional  concentration  of aid  from  the  structural 
Funds  (regional  Fund,  social  Fund  and  EAGGF 
Guarantee Section) - amounting to more than one fifth 
of the Community's budget  for  1990  - shows  a clear 
trend towards the elimination of regional disparities.  In 
1986  and 1987  half this  money on average went to  the 
regions  with  the  poorest  20%  of  the  Community's 
population, whereas the 400Jo  living in the economically 
powerful  areas  receive  little  more  than  1  OOJo  of  the 
structural Funds (see Graph 22).  Regional concentration 
for the Community as a whole is  somewhat less  than it 
was  for  the  10  original Member States.  Thus  while  the 
tenth of the population living in the poorest regions  of 
EC 10  received 40%  of the resources allocated to these 
countries  by  the  structural  Funds,  the  figure  for  the 
corresponding  group  of regions  in  the  Community of 
Twelve  was  only  250Jo  (see  Graph 23).  Looking at the 
development  of specific  measures,  however,  we  found 
that this  was  largely  due  to  the  new  Member  States' 
transitional problems. With the reform of the structural 
Funds, their regional equalization effects should turn out 
to be even more tangible than for the period 1986-87. 
57 If, in  addition to the  structural Funds,  one takes  into 
account  the  Community's  other  structural  policy 
operations of financial  significance  - EIB  credits  and 
ECSC credits and aids, amounting to roughly 25-300Jo  of 
the Community budget - a substantial dilution of the 
equalizing  effect  is  noticeable.  This  is  partly  because 
ECSC  money  has  no  impact  whatsoever  on  regional 
equalization  and  partly  because  EIB  credits  are 
significantly more dispersed throughout the Community 
region by region. While the bottom fifth of the regions  1 
received  over  half  the  resources  provided  by  the 
structural Funds, they received little more than 40%  of 
the  structural  assistance  provided.  As  a  form  of aid, 
credits play a minor part and their levelling effects have 
undoubtedly been overstated.  The tendency was greater 
for the regions of the Community of Ten than it is  for 
the Community as a whole. Owing to the relatively small 
amounts involved - little more than half a million ECU 
for  the  period  1985-87  - the  curve  remains  virtually 
unchanged  even  if  financial  contributions  to  R&D 
contracts  are  included  in  this  spending,  despite  their 
adverse impact on regional equalization. 
But taking into consideration guarantee payments under 
the  common agricultural  policy  - roughly three-fifths 
of the Community budget- we find a marked levelling 
off in the financial incentives  for regional equalization, 
farm  policy as  a  whole  doing little  to support regional 
policy  objectives  and  hence  running  counter  to  the 
structural  Funds'  equalizing  effect.  The  concentration 
curve clearly approaches the diagonal, that is,  assistance 
in the form of financial policy incentives was not, on the 
whole,  geared  to  regional  poverty  measured  on a  per 
capita  income  basis.  This  is  particularly  true  of the 
Community  as  a  whole.  For the  10  original  Member 
States the equalizing effect of farm  spending is  slightly 
more  pronounced,  being  countries  at  a  generally 
advanced  stage  of development where  there is  a  closer 
correlation  between  regional  income  lows  and 
agricultural structures. 
In assessing these findings it must be borne in mind that 
where  there  is  room  for  doubt the  regional  equalizing 
effects  of  agricultural  policy  tend  to  be  overrated, 
whereas their tendency to level out structural spending in 
terms of impact is underrated, if anything. For under the 
existing  farm  system,  because  of  the  price  support 
mechanism the income effect is greater than it appears to 
be  in  the  expenditure  of  the  agricultural  fund. 
I  By population. 
58 
Furthermore, the effect on income is greater with regard 
to a number of northern products subject to traditional 
market organization than in the case of many southern 
products  and  the  deficiency  payments  for  special 
products,  which  are  even  more  expensive  for  the 
Community. The extent to which the levelling  effect of 
EIB and ECSC payments is overestimated is probably at 
least offset by agricultural spending. 
3.5.  Assessment of findings 
If one wishes  to draw  conclusions  from  these  findings 
with  a  view  to  the  adjustment  of the  Community's 
structural and agricultural  measures  from  the  point  of 
view of regional policy, it is essential to bear in mind the 
reservations  to which  the  statements made are  subject, 
owing to the methodological and statistical problems and 
shortcomings we encountered. The main point to bear in 
mind is  that the tendency of the Community's financial 
instruments  to  narrow  or  widen  regional  disparities 
described  in  the  study  cannot  represent  more  than  a 
trend;  it  cannot be  used  to  gauge  the  actual  effect  of 
each  individual  measure.  This  would  have  entailed 
constructing a  highly  complex,  differentiated model  of 
interdependent  regional  development,  which  was  not 
feasible here in view  of the limits set.  In any event, it is 
debatable  whether  models  of  this  kind  provide  a 
sufficiently  accurate  portrayal  of reality  to  be  of any 
practical use. 
Even in measuring the various financial stimuli a number 
of caveats are necessary. These relate to: 
the question of money outflow, 
progress in programme implementation, 
the  problem  of  the  additionality  of  Community 
resources, 
the efficiency of the specific measures taken, 
the knock-on effect, 
and, last but not least, the ability of eligible regions to 
absorb aid. 
If there  are  regional  peculiarities  in  these  areas,  equal 
financial  input will  produce different effects.  This  may 
cause  major shifts  in  the overall  picture  of the  trends 
towards  regional  equalization,  with  corresponding 
changes in the position and course of the concentration 
curves in question. 
Calculations  involving  Community payments  from  the 
three  structural  Funds  are  based  on  data  on Graph 22 - Regional concentration of EC payments, 1986-87, EC 12 
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The subsidies of the European structural Funds give considerable impulses to the economically weak regions. More 
than half of them were concentrated on the poorest regions, with 20% of the EC's population. Grants and loans of 
ECCS and EIB were less concentrated. Therefore, the poorest fifth of the regions made use of only 350Jo  of the EC's 
structural interventions as  a whole.  Total EC payments for structural and agricultural purposes, of which  CAP's 
guarantee payments have the biggest weight,  do not contribute much to global regional equalization. 
59 Graph 23  - Regional concentration of EC payments, 1985-87, EC 10 
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Among the regions of the Member States of the EC 10 the expenses for CAP contribute more to distributive goals 
than in the overall EC 12, due to the fact that in the EC 10 countries' rural structures and relative economic weakness 
are correlated more strongly. 
60 commitments,  not payments.  Yet  the desired  economic 
boost  is  linked  with  payments  actually  made  and  not 
with  the  Community's  willingness  to  make  funds 
available to the  regions.  It depends,  then,  whether the 
funds  set  aside  are  actually  utilized.  This  constitutes  a 
major problem, particularly in respect of the years prior 
to the reform of the structural Funds. There were often 
substantial time-lags between commitment and payment. 
Of  the  commitments  made  for  specific  Community 
measures  over the period  1981-87  (just under ECU 0.5 
billion),  only some 600Jo  was  actually paid out over the 
same  period,  with  substantial  differences  between 
various countries.  1 In the case of the social Fund, this 
backlog  problem  was  partly  dealt  with  by  suspending 
commitments where authorized projects were not carried 
out  or  where  funds  were  shown  to  have  been  only 
partially or incorrectly spent.  2 This backlog problem not 
only reduces the efficiency of European structural policy 
but also  greatly  complicates  matters  when  it  comes  to 
payments to be made in the current financial year arising 
from  earlier  commitments.  The  European  institutions 
concerned can only step in to help here if they themselves 
are contributing to the delay or if they might be able to 
prompt  the  recipients  into  taking  swifter  action  on 
projects.  The  reform  of  the  structural  Funds  made 
provision  for  this  by  empowering  the  Commission  to 
make greater use of advances than hitherto. 
Yet  the  gap  between  commitments  and  payments  is 
probably  chiefly  due  to  the  slow  rate  at  which 
programmes  are  implemented  and  delays  by  national 
bureaucracies  in  processing  applications  and  providing 
supplementary  national  funding.  3  The  possibility  of 
drawing on Community funds more quickly in the form 
of advances  does  not always  prove to be  an automatic 
remedy.  Experience,  if anything,  points  in  the  other 
direction.  There  is  no  visible  speeding  up  in  the 
implementation of programmes, 4  though  transparency 
with regard to the state of operations and the recipients' 
1  Cf  Commission  of the  European  Communities  (Ed.),  European 
Regional Development Fund.  14th Annual Report (1988) from the 
Commission  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Economic and Social Committee.  Luxembourg 1990,  p. 26. 
2  CF.  European  Parliament  (Ed.),  'Report  on  behalf  of  the 
Committee  on  Budgetary Control on  the  problems relating to  the 
financial  management  and  administration of the  European  Social 
Fund in the period 1981-87 (special report by the Court of Auditors, 
No.  1188, OJ C 126 of 16 May 1988)'. Rapporteur: Claude Wolff. 
PE Doc.  A2-297 /88, p.  12 ff. 
3  CF.  inter alia,  the Court of Auditors,  'Special  report 2/86 on the 
specific  Community regional  development  measures  of the  ERDF 
(non-quota  measures)  together  with  the  Commission's  replies'. 
OJ C 262,  20 October 1986,  p. 6. 
4  Ibid., p.  6. 
financial management suffered as a result.  5 This is only 
a  way  of dealing  with  the  problem  for  bookkeeping 
purposes, to make it less obvious, as it were;  basically it 
is  no solution to it. 
As old as European structural policy as a complement to 
national measures is  the question of how  far European 
financial contributions really are additional payments or 
simply a substitute for national expenditure. Community 
action can  only  be  said  to  have  an effect  in  terms  of 
regional  equalization  over  and  above  that  of national 
policies if it triggers off additional economic activity. 
For several reasons the question of whether Community 
money reinforces national efforts in the field of regional 
and  structural  policy  is  virtually  unanswerable.  In 
individual  cases,  such  as  the  integrated  Mediterranean 
programme for Greece, the empirical evidence- based 
on investment trends - tends to show that it does not. 6 
Of course,  there  is  no  clear  benchmark to show  what 
would  happen,  or  would  have  happened,  without  the 
European contributions to structural policy  operations. 
For another thing,  the  Community  does  not generally 
run  any  independent  projects  of  its  own  but  -
particularly since  the reform of the structural Fund -
makes  a  financial  contribution  to  programmes  either 
conceived  and funded jointly or nationally.  Lastly,  the 
willingness or ability to initiate fresh projects may suffer 
considerably  from  the  co-funding  requirement  - not 
least where there are major problems with the national 
budget, as in Greece and Italy for example.  In this sort 
of situation,  however,  Community financial  support is 
most  welcome,  with  the  result  that  the  national 
bureaucracy will  in any event  furnish  evidence that the 
money forthcoming  from Europe is  used  as  additional 
funding.  In  the  final  analysis,  recent  recipients 
occasionally  appear  to  be  unaware  that the  European 
Community is involved in funding a specific measure as 
well  as  the national government, especially as  the lower 
levels  of local  government have no financial  autonomy 
in many of the EC countries. 
The  question  of the  efficient  use  of allocated  funds 
cannot  be  answered  on  the  basis  of a  financial  flow 
analysis.  There are a number of different aspects to the 
issue.  First,  there is  the basic  question of regional and 
structural  policy,  that is,  whether the active  or passive 
reorganization  of regions  and  sectors  is  economically 
s  Cf,  for  example,  the  'Court of Auditors'  Annual  report  on  the 
financial year  1989 together with the institutions' replies'. OJ C 313, 
12 December 1990,  p. 124. 
6  Cf Court of Auditors,  'Special  report  No  4/90 on  the integrated 
Mediterranean programmes (IMP) together with  the Commission's 
replies'. OJ C 298,  28  November  1990,  p.  16 f. 
61 more efficient in the long run. If  the knock-on effect of 
State  support  is  greater  in  modern  industries  and 
go-ahead regions, this can result in a more rapid boost to 
growth  and  employment  and  - given  manpower 
mobility  - in  the  right  circumstances  lead  to  the 
levelling  up  of  the  general  standard  of  living  and 
prosperity than is  feasible via the protracted procedures 
of providing  financial  support  to  economically  weak 
regions  and  sectors.  But  if  one  opts  for  greater 
geographical balance instead, even at the cost of purely 
economic efficiency,  one is  still  faced  with the question 
of the  effectiveness  of the  means  employed,  and  the 
evaluation of individual financial instruments in relation 
to  the  desired  objective.  Where  there  is  doubt,  case 
studies  must  be  conducted  in  order  to  establish  how 
efficient  the  selected  measures  are  in  comparison  with 
alternative  projects  and to  provide  some  idea how  the 
implementation of measures can be made more effective, 
that is,  cheaper or economically more successful. 
A  clear  line  must  be  drawn  between  the  problem  of 
efficiency and the question of the magnitude of impact. 
However necessary,  sensible and efficient they may be, 
support measures - whether taken alone or coordinated 
with others - do not have the same knock  -on effects in 
relation to incomes. What is more, the level of assistance 
must be related to the degree of disadvantage. This must 
also  be  borne in  mind when the regional concentration 
of support funds is considered. 
Finally, it must be taken into account that the ability to 
absorb  financial  resources  may  be  limited,  particularly 
on a regional basis, so that if it is to remain efficient the 
regional  concentration of funds  cannot be  increased at 
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will.  Following  the  European  Council's  decision  in 
February 1988 to double the size of the structural Funds 
within six years,  smoothing the way  for the completion 
of  the  internal  market,  people  are  voicing  growing 
misgivings  that  the  most  disadvantaged  regions, 
particularly  in  Greece  and  the  Mezzogiorno,  will  be 
unable to benefit fully from them. The reasons given for 
this are both the particular economic conditions in these 
regions, particularly the neglect of human resources and 
the  resulting  lack  of popularity with  private investors, 
and  administrative  problems,  chiefly  the  lack  of 
coordination  between  the  various  levels  of  the 
administration  and  the  specific  official  instance 
responsible for a particular matter. On top of this there 
are  various  technical  implementation  problems  and 
national socio-cultural peculiarities.  1 
Taking  all  these  reservations  into  account,  caution  is 
called  for  in  drawing  political  conclusions.  Broadly 
speaking,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  structural 
Funds  clearly  help  to  narrow  the  gap  between  the 
regions, and also that agricultural policy - if it is to be 
placed more squarely in the service of the Community's 
regional  policy  - is  in  need  of adjustment.  This,  of 
course,  does  not  relieve  the  Community of the  job of 
monitoring more closely than before the effectiveness of 
such a policy, more attuned to regimial equalization. 
I  Cf  'The  Community's  structural  Funds  and  problems  of 
absorption,  memorandum  from  the  Directorate-General  for 
Research,  Internal  Market  Division,  of  25.9.1990,  IV/WIP/ 
90/09/053'. 4.  The regional impact of EAGGF 
(Guarantee Section) spending -
breakdown by financial flows 
4.1.  Preliminary observations 
To achieve the objectives set out in Articles 38-42 of the 
EEC  Treaty,  Community  agricultural  policy  has 
introduced a system based on interlocking organizations 
of the market (COMs) that now covers more than nine-
tenths  of farming  output.  There  is  no  single  form  of 
COM applicable to all products but they are all designed 
to ensure that Community products are given preference 
in  Community  markets,  that  is,  to  protect  producers 
from  foreign  competition.  The  system  of Community 
preference,  necessary  because  of the  excessively  high 
price level in the EC's internal market as compared with 
third country markets, is  backed up by the principle of 
financial  solidarity,  which  lays  down  that all  Member 
States  shall  assume  responsibility  for  funding  the 
common agricultural policy. 
The market organization policy on the basis of common 
producer prices was originally intended to play the dual 
role  of guaranteeing producers a  'fair' income,  that is 
compared with non-agricultural incomes, and regulating 
the  markets,  that is,  maintaining  the  balance  between 
supply  and  demand.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the 
policy has failed to achieve these aims, with this failure 
being  reflected  in  the  static  or  declining  incomes  of 
Community  farmers  and  in  the  growing  market 
surpluses, which are only disposed of - chiefly outside 
the Community - at considerable economic loss. 
Producer  prices  for  COM  products  are  supported  by 
intervention  measures  and export  refunds  provided  by 
the  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee 
Fund  (EAGGF),  Guarantee  Section.  The  resources  of 
the EAGGF Guarantee Section account for the bulk of 
Community spending. In 1989 it amounted to just over 
ECU 26 billion, approximately 630Jo of all expenditure.  1 
A  question  often  raised  in  connection  with  farming 
spending is which group of the population derives direct 
benefit from the specific farming policy measures, and to 
what extent.  In any event,  the real target group - the 
producers  - are  by  no  means  the  chief  recipients  of 
these EC payments. 
I  Cf.  Court of Auditors,  'Annual report on the  financial  year  1989 
together  with  the  institutions'  replies',  p.  51,  OJ C 313/01  of 12 
December  1990,  and  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities, '23rd general report on the activities of the European 
Communities  1989', p. 65. 
An analysis  of the  regional  income  impact of farming 
spending would require a clear breakdown of Guarantee 
Fund spending at least at product level  and would also 
have  to  take  costs  into  account.  Even  if  we  were 
successful in doing this for the EC as a whole, or just for 
individual  Member  States,  the agricultural  peculiarities 
of the  regions,  such  as  farm  size  and  use  of labour, 
would  have  to be  taken into  account.  It  is  often held 
against farming policy that considerable sums  from the 
Guarantee  Fund  never  reach  agriculture  directly  or 
indirectly,  but  'trickle  down'  into  the  distributive  and 
processing trades. This is to imply that it is ultimately the 
exporters, warehousing firms,  shipping lines,  processing 
companies and banks that are the chief beneficiaries of 
agricultural policy, whereas the producers are left by and 
large  empty-handed.  It  is  also  argued  that  these 
payments conflict with regional policy objectives in that 
they favour the region in which the company receiving 
them is  based. Although it is  true that, as corroborated 
by our talks with the Community authorities, companies 
commercially  involved  in  warehousing,  processing  and 
export within the  framework of the agricultural policy 
derive  additional  income  therefrom  and,  in  so  doing, 
attempt  to  exploit  every  possibility  to  maximize  their 
profits, it must be borne in mind that these are spin-offs 
of the  support  system  that  was  originally  devised  for 
farming policy reasons and cannot be avoided without a 
radical  overhaul  of  the  system;  indeed  it  could  be 
claimed  that  it  would  otherwise  not  be  capable  of 
functioning. 
We shall now attempt to establish whether there is  any 
reasonable  prospect of gauging  the  regional  effects  of 
agricultural  market  organizations  by  looking  at  the 
revenue and expenditure incurred, identifying the payer 
and  recipient  in  each  case  and,  finally,  tracing  their 
regional  structure. If the direct  recipients  of payments 
could be ascertained, an analysis of this type would have 
to be extended further: revenue in one place may lead to 
income  in  entirely  different  places.  But  in  exploring 
regional disparities, the increases in income are of greater 
interest than revenue growth in the absence of data on 
expenditure.  This  section  sets  out  to  describe  the 
methodological  approach  when  establishing  regional 
financial  flows  in  connection  with  the  Community's 
agricultural  market  organization.  The  difficulties  of 
obtaining  data are  discussed  along  with  a  number  of 
theoretical reservations. 
4.2.  Direct participants in financial flows 
As  well  as  expenditure  under  the  Community's 
agricultural market organizations, the volume of which 
63 is  determined by political debate, the agricultural policy 
may  also  generate  revenue  that  is  not  directly  offset 
against Guarantee Fund expenditure but appears in the 
accounts as  a separate source of funds.  1 
These  are  the  levies  imposed  on  the  exports  of 
agricultural products from non-Community countries to 
offset the competitive advantage of lower prices. In 1989 
the  levies  contributed  ECU  1.3  billion  to  the 
Community's  own  resources.  With  the  principle  of 
non-assignment  applying,  the monies  thus  received  are 
not assigned to any particular purpose. 2 They are of no 
imputable  benefit  to  individual,  social  or  regional 
groupings.  It is  primarily the trading sector that meets 
the cost of the levies. 
Less well known but more significant in terms of volume 
at ECU 1.4 billion in 1989 were the various sugar levies. 
They are divided  into production,  disposal  and storage 
levies  for  sugar and isoglucose.  Furthermore, according 
to the 19th financial  report, in the sugar sector farmers 
and processing companies meet the costs of the market 
support measures that arise in  connection with sales  of 
Community  surpluses.  Again  it  is  not  possible  to  say 
who  benefits  from these payments.  But the costs  are a 
burden  on  domestic  producers  and  processors,  and 
should be examined from the point of view  of regional 
distribution. 
Other  revenue  under  the  agricultural  market 
organizations  is  treated  as  agricultural  market 
intervention and is  deducted direct from expenditure in 
respect  of the  products in  question.  We  shall  consider 
this again below. 
The largest item of Guarantee Fund expenditure in 1989 
was  export refunds,  amounting to ECU 9. 7 billion (see 
Tables 4 and 5).  Qualitatively, too, this instrument is of 
major importance. Only refunds bridging the difference 
for  exporters  between  purchase  price  (Community 
producer  price)  and  sales  price  (world  market  price) 
make it possible to market Community surpluses abroad 
and  thus  take  some  of the  strain  off the  Community 
farming  system,  with  its  buy-in  guarantee. 3  The 
I  Cf  Commission  of the  European  Communities,  '19th  financial 
report on the EAGGF - financial year  1989 - Guarantee Section 
and  food  aid  and  accounts  clearance',  Brussels  1990  (hereafter 
referred to as:  19th financial  report); see  on this point p.  37  f. 
2  See Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Community public finance- the European  budget after the 1988 
reform,  Luxembourg 1989,  p.  39. 
3  Cf Commission  of the  European Communities,  The  EAGGF-
significance and mode of  functioning,  1986, p. 24.  In the exceptional 
cases  in  which  Community  prices  are  lower  than  world  market 
prices,  export levies  must be paid which are not treated as  negative 
refunds but counted directly as  Community revenue. 
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recipients of these payments are trading companies. The 
money is  paid out, irrespective of the regional origin of 
the  goods  or  of the  exporter,  at  the  place  where  the 
customs formalities relating to the export transaction are 
carried  out.  Refunds  apply not  only  where  sales  from 
intervention stocks or via the free  market are concerned 
but also in the case of food aid measures for developing 
countries. The cost of these supplies to the development 
budget  is  limited  to  the  relevant  world  market  price 
(including transport costs, etc.). 
Withdrawals are not widely employed except in the case 
of a number of products and cost relatively little (some 
ECU  800  million  in  1989).  This  instrument  is  of 
relatively major importance in wine production and also 
in cheese and vegetables. The Community pays relatively 
low  withdrawal  prices  for  surplus  produce.  The  goods 
are  withdrawn  from  the market so  as  to  cut  available 
supplies.  This  enables  producers  to  achieve  relatively 
high  market  prices  for  their  remaining  stocks.  Goods 
withdrawn are destroyed (800Jo  of cheese and vegetables), 
with  small  quantities  being  distributed  free  of charge, 
used  as  animal  feed  or  distilled,  though  even  so  the 
marketing  opportunities  for  distillates  of this  kind  are 
slim indeed. In many cases EAGGF withdrawal is more 
profitable to producers than selling on to the processing 
industry.  Furthermore, it  is  possible that goods sold to 
the processor are of poorer quality than those withdrawn 
from the market. 4 There is  a clear correlation between 
export  refunds  and  producer  aids,  the  second  most 
expensive  specific  measure  (ECU  7. 8  billion  in  1989). 
Each  group  of products  is  dominated  by  one  or  the 
other,  cereals,  sugar,  milk,  beef  and  veal  receiving 
refunds  but no or very  small  producer aids.  Producer 
aids  account,  however,  for  almost  100%  of  market 
organization expenditure on oilseeds,  protein crops and 
textile plants. Both measures cause market prices to fall: 
the refunds depress  world market prices,  and producer 
aids reduce internal Community prices. 
There are  also  price  compensation aids  for  processing 
and consumption (ECU 3.6 billion). These are of special 
importance in the case  of milk,  cheese  and vegetables. 
Recipients  of this  aid are chiefly processors.  Consumer 
aids  apply chiefly to olive oil,  although financial  flows 
cannot be  traced with  any accuracy,  and - to a lesser 
extent  - milk  and  milk  products. 5  The  criteria  for 
classifying a measure as a production or processing and 
consumption aid are not always clear. For example, the 
4  Cf Court of Auditors:  'Special report 2/89 on the organization of 
the markets  in  fresh  and processed cheese and vegetables  together 
with the Commission's answers'. OJ C 128,  24 May 1989,  p.  56 ff. 
and p.  66. 
s  Cf 19th financial report, Annexes 2 and 10. T
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 ECU  182  million suckler cow  premium is  shown in the 
Court of Auditors' report as a processing aid and in the 
Commission's  financial  report  as  a  production  aid. 
These payments are interesting in the light of the current 
budgetary  difficulties,  which  are  partly  attributed  to 
strain  imposed  by  rising  surpluses  in  beef  and  veal 
production.  1 
This  trend  may  have  been  accentuated  by  the  calving 
premiums (ECU 41  million in 1989),  which are included 
among  the  guidance  premiums  (total  of  ECU  970 
million).  Apart  from  this,  these  premiums  are  only 
applied  to  wine  and milk,  for  the voluntary definitive 
abandonment  of  wine-growing  areas  and  milk 
production and also as  compensation for the temporary 
freeze on quotas. 2 It is the producers who receive these 
payments. 
The  set -aside  premiums  are  similar  in  purpose  to 
guidance  premiums.  In  1989,  ECU  20  million  was 
earmarked for these new budget items. Owing to start-up 
difficulties  and  inadequate  incentives,  only  ECU  6 
million  was  actually  used.  3  These  funds  also  benefit 
producers directly. 
The  co-responsibility  levies  for  cereals  and  milk  are 
producer  payments  into  the  EC  budget.  They  do  not 
count as  the Community's own resources  - as  do the 
levies - but as agricultural market intervention designed 
to finance the marketing of surpluses. There are simple 
co-responsibility levies and additional levies to come into 
effect when the maximum amount is  exceeded.  4 These 
entailed EAGGF guarantee expenditure of nearly ECU 
1.6 billion in 1989. 
The purpose of the storage provided for in most market 
organizations  is  the  temporary  equalization  of supply 
and  demand,  reducing  price  variations  to  a  minimum 
and improving market stability.  A distinction is  drawn 
between  public  and  private  storage.  Under  public 
storage,  products  bought into  intervention become  the 
property  of  these  agencies,  whereas  private  storage 
merely commits the owners of the produce to store it in 
return for  costs  and to observe technical  requirements. 
Only  the  technical  and  financial  costs  of storage  are 
refunded.  The  economic  risk  of  depreciation  is 
shouldered  by  the  owner  of  the  produce,  though 
exceptions are made. 
1  Cf  '60  Prozent  fiir  die  Landwirtschaft',  Frankfurter  Allgemeine 
Zeitung of 13  February 1991. 
Cf 19th financial report, Annex 2. 
Cf  19th  financial  report,  p.  7 f.;  EC  Commission,  23rd  general 
report 1989,  p. 65. 
4  Cf 19th  financial report, p.  37. 
In comparison with public storage, private storage plays 
only  a  minor  role  overall,  applying  to  only  a  small 
number of products. It is  subsidized to the sum of ECU 
843  million.  Half of this (ECU 423  million) is  spent on 
sugar;  this  should  be  compared  with  the  ECU  469 
million spent by sugar producers and processors on the 
storage levy in 1989.  5 
After export refunds and the intervention measures dealt 
with  so  far,  public  storage is  the third most important 
area  of  EC  agricultural  policy  with  an  effect  on 
expenditure. In 1989 it cost the Community budget ECU 
3.4 billion,  the Member States also  bearing part of the 
cost. 
Unlike  other  market  organization  measures,  public 
storage is  really  financed  by  the Member States. 6 The 
EC  reimburses  the  technical  costs  of  storage,  the 
financial  costs  and also  the  depreciation.  Whereas  the 
storage  firms  benefit  from  the  payments  covering  the 
costs  of  taking  goods  into  store,  warehousing  and 
removing  them  from  store,  it  is  no  simple  matter  to 
identify  the  recipients  of  interest  payments  on  the 
national  funds  thus  employed.  It is  up to  the  specific 
agencies  involved  to  find  the  money  required  for 
purchases  into  intervention  and  this  may  be  done  in 
various  different  ways.  The  Federal  Institute  for 
Agricultural  Market  Organization,  for  example,  is  in 
part funded  by discount  business.  The most  expensive 
aspect in  1989  was  depreciation. This does  not refer to 
possible  depreciations  of quality  for  technical  reasons 
connected  with  storage  but  to  bridging  the  difference 
between  the  intervention  price  and  a  realistic  market 
price. 
Depreciation is inevitable sooner or later, but the sooner 
it occurs and the more far-reaching it is, the more drastic 
the decline in the book value of the goods in storage and 
the  lower  the  interest  charges  incurred  by  the 
Community.  There  is  a  clash  of interest  here  between 
current liquidity and avoiding future expenditure. Thus 
in 1987 no provision was made for depreciation owing to 
the tense budgetary situation. 7 Community spending on 
depreciation  cannot  be  classified  directly  in  terms  of 
individual  recipients  but  benefits  the  budgets  of  the 
national intervention agencies. 
The  heading  'other  losses  (and  profits)  from  public 
storage'  is  essentially  the  result  of  Community 
5  Cf 19th financial report, p.  38. 
6  Cf Commission  of the  European Communities,  The  EAGGF-
significance and mode of  functioning,  1986,  p. 37. 
7  Cf 19th financial report, p. 32. 
67 Table 6 - First-round division of EAGGF expenditure by group of receivers, 1989 
EAGGF expenditure in  1989 
Group  Measure 
Billion ECU  o/o 
Producers  Withdrawals,  price  compensation  aids,  8  31 
guidance premiums (co-responsibility taxes 
paid by producers deducted) 
Trade  Refunds  9.7  38 
Processing  Price compensation aids  2.7  10 
Consumers  Price compensation aids  1  4 
Storage companies  Private storage, technical  1.2  5 
expenses for public storage 
Creditors  Financial expenses for public storage  0.3  1 
Intervening agencies  Depreciation 
- Other 
Total 
Source: EC Court of Auditors; estimation of DIW. 
accounting guidelines.  Part of them stem from the fact 
that at the  end  of the year  standard Community-wide 
transfer prices for stocks in store are set, in the form of 
weighted  average  values  of  national  book  values, 
replacing  the  book  values  of the  individual  Member 
States.  1  Accounting  profits  also  arise  through  the 
inclusion of the disposal of goods for distribution free of 
charge to needy persons in the Community and as  food 
aid to the developing countries in the guise of sales at the 
intervention  price,  although  the  intervention  product 
already appears in the accounts at the intervention price. 
Similarly enhanced values also appear under the heading 
'other  expenditure'  (Guarantee  Fund)  and  export 
refunds. Yet food aid to the countries of Eastern Europe 
is  shown as zero-rate sales, giving rise to corresponding 
losses.  2 In addition to the cost of free distribution to the 
needy,  the  heading  'other  expenditure'  also  includes 
contributions  to  the  cost  of  accession,  monetary 
compensatory amounts, interest payments arising  from 
the  financial  reform and the clearance of accounts  for 
earlier financial years and residual resources. Apart from 
the recipients of free  produce, there are no identifiable 
1  Cf Court of Auditors:  'Special  report  No.  5/88  on  management 
and  control  of  public  storage  together  with  the  Commission's 
replies'. OJ C 274,  24.10.1988,  p. 21. 
2  Cf Court of Auditors, annual report 1989. 
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2.6  10 
0.3  1 
25.8  100 
beneficiaries  of  the  last-mentioned  categories  of 
Community expenditure. 
These  reflections  make  it  possible  to  draw  up  a 
preliminary  summary  classification  of  the  individual 
guarantee  fund  payments  to  the  various  players  (see 
Table  6).  Producers  are  remunerated  via  withdrawals, 
price  compensation  aids,  guidance  premiums  and 
set-aside premiums and pay co-responsibility levies. This 
amounts to a total of about ECU 8 billion, or more than 
300Jo  of total  expenditure.  The  trading  sector  receives 
ECU  9. 7  billion  in  respect  of refunds,  37.5%  of all 
expenditure.  Processing  and  consumer  price 
compensation aids  are not fully  classifiable.  According 
to  estimates  on  the  basis  of  information  available 3 
processors receive roughly 750Jo  of this budget item, that 
is  ECU 2. 7 billion or one-tenth of the Guarantee Fund. 
Consumers  get  cheap  produce  (school  milk,  'social 
butter', free distribution, and so on) to the value of ECU 
1 billion (40Jo). Warehousing companies receive the funds 
for private storage and technical costs of public storage, 
totalling ECU 1.2 billion or roughly 5%. Creditors for 
financial expenses  for public storage are paid ECU 334 
million  (20Jo  of  expenditure),  with  the  intervention 
agencies accounting for one-tenth of EEC expenditure in 
the form of depreciation (ECU 2.6 billion). 
3  Cf 19th financial report, Annex II. Table 7  - Regional structure of cereals storage capicity, BR Deutschland, 1990 
NUTS region 
Code  Name  total 
'000 tons 
Rll  Schleswig-Holstein  1 169.2 
R  12  Hamburg  524.5 
R  13  Niedersachsen  1 816.8 
R  14  Bremen  305.9 
R  15  Nordrhein-Westfalen  1 870.3 
R  16  Hessen  354.5 
R  17  Rheinland-Pfalz  456.7 
R  18  Baden-Wiirttemberg  468.7 
R  19  Bay  ern  1 344.4 
RIA  Saarland  48.5 
Rl  BR Deutschland  8 359.4 
Source:  BALM statistics. 
In the form in which we  have looked at them hitherto, 
these payments can be regionalized. Turning to Table 5 
and taking only the columns significant for our purposes 
(4  to 10,  12,  13  and 16)  and deleting  the insignificant 
values  for  each  country,  approximately  600Jo  of  the 
measures are open to analysis. This does not entail any 
further  division  according  to  individual  products,  in 
excess  of  the  usual  division  into  two-digit  budget 
chapters.  There  are  43  Community  agencies  and 
institutions in existence to deal with the implementation 
of agricultural  policy.  Their  division  of labour in  the 
national  context  is  highly  specialized.  1  They  are 
responsible  for  overseeing  intervention  operations. 
National laws and regulations take precedence with the 
result that the corresponding structures and procedures 
differ  widely.  2  Irrespective  of  the  question  of  the 
theoretical meaningfulness of tracing individual financial 
flows,  comprehensive  study  would  entail  enormous 
expense,  while  quantitative statements based on a pars 
pro  toto  analysis,  on the other hand, would inevitably 
fail to yield much in the way of useful information. We 
can only ask here according to what criteria money for 
individual  measures  reaches  individual  recipients  and 
thus  exercises  a  regional  impact.  To illustrate  this  we 
take a brief look at the storage of cereals in Germany. 
I  Cf. OJ c 313,  8.12.1988, pp. 9-20. 
2  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  The  EAGGF  -
significance and mode of  functioning,  1986, p. 40 f. 
Capacity of intervening storage 
thereof harbour-linked 
as  OJo 
of R1  '000 tons 
as  OJo  as  OJo 
of total  of R1 
14.0  631.6  54.0  7.6 
6.3  485.1  92.5  5.8 
21.7  998.1  54.9  11.9 
3.7  305.9  100.0  3.7 
22.4  988.0  52.8  11.8 
4.2  165.3  46.6  2.0 
5.5  297.4  65.1  3.6 
5.6  297.9  93.6  3.6 
16.1  265.3  19.7  3.2 
0.6  11.3  23.3  0.1 
100.0  4 445.9  53.2  53.2 
The Federal Republic has substantial capacity for public 
and private storage of cereals (see Table 7). The trend is 
towards  increasingly  large. facilities,  particularly at the 
so-called main stores and harbour-linked locations. Total 
storage capacity at the disposal of the Federal Institute 
for Agricultural Market Organization (BALM) amounts 
to  approximately  8.4  million  tonnes.  The  major 
warehouses usually have on average more than 25 000 
tonnes'  capacity.  Individual  warehouses  average  about 
13 000  tonnes.  The  biggest  warehouses  are  in  the 
seaports of Hamburg, Bremen and Kiel.  Two-thirds of 
total capacity is  to be found in the northern Lander of 
Germany  and  those  bordering  on  the  Rhine.  Large 
harbour-linked  storage  facilities  provide  the  best 
conditions  for  export-oriented  intervention  agency 
storage operations. According to the agencies concerned, 
whenever  products  are  bought  into  intervention  in 
Germany increasing efforts are made to ensure that these 
cereals  are  transported  to or near  the  major harbour 
warehouses  at the  earliest  opportunity.  The  rule  that 
cereals  should  be  bought into intervention as  close  as 
possible  to  the  places  of production  has  been  greatly 
relaxed.  Smaller  and  less  technically  advanced 
intervention stores are now only used as a back-up. The 
trend towards larger size is  matched by the intention of 
raising  the  minimum  amount  subject  to  intervention 
from the present  100  tonnes to 700 tonnes (as  already 
practised in the new German Lander). 
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intensification of regional imbalances in financial  flows 
from the Guarantee Fund, but could reduce the unit cost 
of  intervention.  Providing  that  lower  costs  for  the 
companies are passed on to the intervention agencies (for 
example,  a  reduction  in  the  various  ali-in  rates),  they 
help ease the pressure on the Community budget. 
4.3.  Inclusion of indirect effects 
As  mentioned  above  in  Section  2,  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  draw  any  apposite  conclusions  on  the 
regional  effects  of EC  farming  policy  on  the  basis  of 
financial  flow  analysis.  As  a  rule  money  spent  by  the 
Community does  not remain in the hands of the initial 
recipients,  and  even  if this  were  the  case  its  effect  on 
income would generally be substantially smaller, as  it is 
offset  by  other  expenditure  (for  example,  for  the 
production of the  amounts bought  in  to intervention). 
But even revenue flows  at this second stage are hard to 
monitor in terms of size. Though the group of recipients 
is  certainly  bigger,  it  is  less  clearly  defined  than  the 
institutional recipients of the original flow  of payments. 
In any event, there are considerable shifts in the relative 
importance of the beneficiaries considered hitherto. 
In the first stage, export refunds were imputed entirely to 
the  traders.  But  these  are  not  the  only  beneficiaries. 
Refunds  are  ultimately  designed  to  bridge  the  gap 
between Community and world market prices, that is, by 
scaling down the export trade's high purchasing prices to 
a competitive level. Disregarding trading profits, wastage 
and other losses, it is then to this extent the producers as 
a group who  benefit indirectly from  the  payments,  for 
without  export  support  domestic  prices  could  not  be 
maintained  at  this  level  given  the  existing  volume  of 
output.  Withdrawals  and production aid,  on the other 
hand, go directly to producers. The technical cost linked 
with them - for example, in the case of withdrawals for 
the  destruction  of  fruit  and  vegetables  - may  be 
regarded as negligible in relation. The processors, on the 
other hand, are not the final recipients of processing aid. 
Frequently  it  is  more  practical  and  hence  more 
economical  for  the  Community  to  support  processors 
instead  of  paying  aids  to  a  large  number  of  small 
producers,  obliging  them  to  purchase  their  inputs  at 
specific  minimum prices.  In this  case,  aids  must be  of 
such  a  size  that  it  is  no  longer  profitable  to  utilize 
substitutes.  Once  more  - again  disregarding  trading 
profits,  wastage  and other losses  - it  is  ultimately the 
producers who are the beneficiaries. 
Under the existing intervention arrangements, it is above 
all the estimate of expenditure on depreciation that must 
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be  altered.  This  merely  signifies  that  the  product  in 
question  was  bought  into  intervention  at  prices  above 
world  market  level.  It  is  initially  entered  into  the 
accounts at the set intervention price,  from which  30 to 
70%  is  then deducted,  I  to achieve  a realistic valuation 
for marketing purposes and to reduce interest charges. 
This section of the expenditure is thus clearly part of the 
system  of costs  from  which  producers  chiefly  profit. 
From this  angle,  even  Community levy  revenue  causes 
problems within the Community. They ultimately result 
in foreign suppliers quoting higher prices, which cannot 
be  countered  by  rationalization  as  the  levies  are 
specifically  designed  to  raise  foreign  prices  to 
Community level and are therefore managed flexibly.  It 
is the Community's consumers who pay. 
Trading  profits,  wastage  and  other  losses  make  it 
difficult  to  put  an  exact  figure  on  these  things. 
Exporters'  trading profits  - most exporters are major 
international  trading  companies  - are  a  politically 
explosive  topic.  They  are  reluctant  to  supply  useful 
information on these  points,  and neither  is  it  available 
from  official  agencies.  A  better  idea  may  be  derived 
from the administrative minimum prices on which aid to 
processors  is  calculated.  The  amount  by  which  they 
exceed the prices that could be obtained otherwise may 
be  regarded  as  the  subsidy  to  the  producer  by  the 
processor made possible by the processing aid. But there 
is  no  knowing  how  high  these  prices  would  be, 
particularly  in  view  of Community  protection  against 
foreign competition. The problem of wastage and other 
losses also affects public storage, as producers do not sell 
into intervention directly but via the distributive trades. 
Nor is the final distinction of expenditure connected with 
the technical and financial  costs of public storage fully 
evident. The Community reimburses the Member States 
at a standard ali-in rate, worked out on the basis of the 
real  costs  reported. 2  This  is  intended to  encourage  all 
Member  States  to  cut  costs  or  keep  them  as  low  as 
possible.  This  system  inevitably  generates  revenue  for 
those countries in which the real costs are lower than the 
rates  offered.  It is  not  clear  who  benefits  from  this 
revenue.  Where  real  costs  are relatively  high,  however, 
the system  generates  corresponding additional costs.  In 
theory  these  two  effects  should  offset  each  other  at 
Community level;  but this does not, of course, apply to 
the  individuals  concerned,  so  that these  considerations 
cannot simply be disregarded. 
CjOJ L 244, 7.9.1990, p.  13  f. 
Court of Auditors: 'Special report on public storage', p. 20. The pressures resulting from levy payments are easier to 
classify. Suppliers continue to calculate their business on 
the  basis  of world  market  prices  and  pass  on  their 
expenditure  on  import  duties  to  the  customer.  I  This 
Community  revenue  is  thus  entirely  at the  expense  of 
Community consumers. 
Finally, there is  one further point which casts doubt on 
any attempt to classify payments in terms of individual 
groups of recipients where such a classification is  based 
solely on the purpose of the measures or the underlying 
administrative  regulations:  the  grey  area  of  illegal 
transactions, the 'irregularities'. This is not necessarily a 
problem  if the  analysis  is  confined  only  to  the  initial 
recipients. However, it does make it difficult to estimate 
the wastage  and other losses  which  hitherto have  been 
discussed  only  in  the  context  of  ideal  patterns  of 
behaviour  by  the  participants.  For example,  if export 
refunds  are  paid  for  a  transaction  which  never  took 
place,  it  is  clear  that  these  payments  never  reach  the 
producers. The special reports by the Court of Auditors 
contain numerous examples of inadequate controls and 
further  evidence  that  substantial  payments  are  being 
made which do not reflect the original intentions of the 
market organization measures.  2  The situation becomes 
a problem with public storage,  for example,  because in 
some  cases  it  is  not  possible  to verify  information  on 
quantities and quality of stored goods and because there 
are  suspicious  incidents  of traders  on  the  supply  and 
purchase  side  being  identical  to  the  operators  of the 
stores.  With  regard  to  the  system  of ali-in  rates,  the 
Court of Auditors states in  its  special  report on public 
storage  that the  'special  declarations  that the  Member 
States  send  in  of their  real  technical  costs  and  their 
interest rates  ... are in practice not subject to real audit 
verification'. 3  There is  therefore  'an inherent tendency 
f?r uniform rates to be set at an unnecessarily high level, 
smce  all  Member  States  stand  to  gain  if  costs  are 
overstated by any of their number in the context of the 
periodic declaration to the Commission'. 4 
Hence,  an  analysis  of the  actual  incidence  necessarily 
presents an entirely different picture of the recipients or 
1  The crucial disadvantage of levies for foreign suppliers is that there 
are far fewer transactions as a result than might be expected under a 
free  trade  system.  But  here  we  are  only  dealing  with  pressure 
resulting from levies paid. 
2  Cj.  Court of Auditors: 'Special report No 2/90 on the management 
and control  of export  refunds  accompanied  by  the  replies  of the 
Commission'. OJ C 133, 31.5.1990, pp. 3, 30 ff., 33 and the 'Special 
reports on fruit and vegetables, p. 65  ff. and on public storage', pp. 
7 ff.,  14 and 18. 
C<?urt  of Auditors:  'Special report on public storage', p.  19. 
Ib1d.,  p.  20. 
beneficiaries of the payments made to different groups 
than  is  shown  in  the  original  list  of  recipients  of 
payments. Even if it is not possible to assess the extent of 
the effects described above, it is clear that the producers 
account for a higher percentage of payments than seems 
obvious at first sight.  The importance of the processors 
diminishes, as does that of the consumers. Traders derive 
less  benefit from export refunds, but on the other hand 
profit  from  their  position  as  intermediaries  between 
producers and intervention agencies in public storage. 
Determining  the  regional  impact  of  the  EAGGF 
guarantee by monitoring payments becomes even harder 
even  if  not  outright  impossible,  in  this  in-depth 
approach.  For  example,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
establish the regional origin of the exported goods. The 
same line of enquiry would have to be  pursued for the 
input  of  the  processing  industries.  It would  also  be 
necessary  to  determine  the  regional  sales  structure  of 
foreign agricultural products in the Community. 5 Stocks 
in  public  storage  would  also  have  to  be  classified  by 
place  of  origin.  Answering  most  of  these  questions 
would involve  recourse to the records of private firms, 
which  in  practice  would  not  be  acceptable.  But  even 
where  public bodies  are concerned - in  respect  of the 
regional origin of stocks and the intervention of stores -
the information available is  barely adequate. It also has 
to  be  borne  in  mind  that the  proportion  of products 
which are bought in or further processed on the basis of 
processing  aids  by  no  means  emanate  from  the  same 
producers every year. 
The  following  examples  will  illustrate  these  general 
observations: 
Tobacco:  Large quantities of raw  tobacco produced in 
Greece  have  recently  been  supplied  to  German 
intervention agencies. Although the direct financial flows 
have been to the place of intervention in Germany, the 
money is clearly being used to support the Greek tobacco 
market. 
Wine  distillation:  Subsidies  for  voluntary  and 
compulsory  distillation  of wine  are  paid  to  processors 
who have to furnish proof that they have paid the wine 
producers the minimum prices  set  down for processing 
wines.  In this instance the processor receives revenue for 
a product which does not have to be produced in either 
the  region  or  the  country  in  which  the  distillation 
enterprise  is  located.  For  example,  a  well-known 
company  in  Riidesheim  usually  processes  wine  from 
5  Simply offsetting levies against payments made to EC consumers is 
not possible, even if the sums in question are roughly the same:  the 
consumers and the regions are not necessarily identical. 
71 southern France into brandy.  However,  the distillation 
aid is paid to this German enterprise. To avoid having to 
pay  the  subsidy  to  a  large  number  of  individual 
producers, the 'bottleneck principle' is  used,  as  is  often 
the case with processing and producing aids. 
Seeds: This is also true of aids for seeds. Production aid 
for  quality  seed  is  paid  exclusively  via  the  producer 
associations. The registered offices of the association -
as  a  rule  a  largish  administrative  centre  - give  no 
indication of the regional effect of this special  form of 
aid. The funds are passed on by the producer association 
to the producers of quality seeds, who may be scattered 
quite widely. 
Ewe  premium:  As  the  main  instrument  of  income 
support of sheep and goat meat producers, the market 
organization provides for  'variable slaughter premiums' 
(Great Britain only) and 'ewe premiums'. The financial 
costs  of this  market  organization  have  shot  up  since 
1988, currently accounting for some ECU 5 billion (circa 
60Jo  of guarantee expenditure).  As  with a whole variety 
of market support measures,  the Community does  not 
bear the full costs: the Member States also contribute. In 
some instances, official bodies of the Member States at a 
level  lower  than  that  of  central  government  are 
responsible for organization, funding and supervision. In 
Germany,  the  Lander  are  responsible  for  the  ewe 
premium.  Apart  from  the  considerable  problems 
involved in monitoring the use of this instrument,  I  it is 
not possible in practice to make a further classification 
of the  transfer  payments  for  producers  made  to  the 
Lander  or regional  authorities  of the  Member  States. 
However, the initial 'recipient' of the payments- which 
for  budgetary  purposes  appears  as  the  Land  of the 
Federal Republic or as the 'Federal Office for Food and 
Forestry' 2  - merely  passes  on  the  payments  to  the 
target  group:  the  approximately 0.5  million  sheep  and 
goat farmers in the Community. 
Aids for the consumption of  skimmed milk 
Although it is a high-protein by-product of butter, only 
9% of skimmed milk in the Community is  sold directly 
at market prices for human consumption. Because of the 
intervention  price  policy  of  the  last  few  decades, 
skimmed milk is  far too expensive a product to be sold 
inside or outside the Community without a subsidy. 
1  Cf Court of Auditors,  'Annual report  on the  1988  financial  year 
accompanied  by  the  replies  of  the  Commission',  OJ  C  312, 
12.12.1989. 
2  The Federal Office for Food and Forestry is  an agency  within the 
meaning of Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70. Cf also OJ C 
313,  8.12.1988. 
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Aid  for  the  sale  of skimmed  milk  is  payable  in  the 
following instances: 
skimmed milk powder for feeding calves, 
liquid skimmed milk for feeding calves, 
skimmed milk powder for other feeding purposes, 
skimmed milk for the production of casein. 
In 1988 these programmes accounted for some ECU 1.6 
billion (circa 270Jo  of market organization costs for milk 
and  6.40Jo  of all  market organization expenditure).  At 
roughly  ECU 850  million,  subsidies  for  skimmed  milk 
powder for calf feeding accounted for half of this part of 
the intervention costs.  3 Approximately 94%  of this aid 
was  paid  to  only  three  Member  States:  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany, France and The Netherlands. The 
aid was  passed on to the recipients  via the appropriate 
agencies (in Germany the 'Bundesamt fiir Ernahrung', in 
France 'Onlilait' and in The Netherlands 'Produktschap 
voor Zuivel'). 
The aid paid to dairies for liquid skimmed milk as feed is 
passed on indirectly to producers: the skimmed milk they 
receive after the milk they have supplied is  processed is 
available at a rate reduced by the amount of aid. 
These examples  show that a whole range of bodies are 
involved  in  the  distribution  of  aid  to  producers.  A 
detailed, comprehensive corpus of data would therefore 
be needed to enable the regional incidence of individual 
measures  to  be  described.  Although  regionally-specific 
effects could be deduced from this corpus, for example 
from the subsidized return deliveries of liquid skimmed 
milk,  this  hardly applies to the subsidizing of skimmed 
milk  mixed  in  with  calf  feed,  and  it  is  completely 
irrelevant to the subsidized production of casein since in 
this  case,  because  a  cheap  product  is  produced,  the 
effects  can  be  attributed  to  the  purchaser  only 
indirectly. 
The two by-products of milk production are, moreover, 
a  good  example  of  the  overlapping  effects  of 
intervention  instruments  on  regions  and  on  Member 
States: 
(a)  The major milk-processing  plants,  which  in  some 
cases operate exclusively for intervention purposes, 
obtain  some  of  their  raw  materials  from  quite 
remote  regions  and,  because  of  the  differences 
between the 'green currencies', from other Member 
States too. 
3  Cf  18th  financial  Report,  p.  75,  and  'Report  of the  Court  of 
Auditors on the 1988  financial year', OJ C 312,  12.12.1989. Table 8 - Cereals stocks of intervention 1985-89, as at 31  December 
Product  1985 
Cereals  EC  16 427 
D  5 741 
D  OJo  of EC  34.9 
thereof:  durum  EC  1 023 
D  -
D  OJo  of EC  -
wheat  EC  10 027 
D  3 383 
D  OJo  of EC  33.7 
rye  EC  1 062 
D  805 
D  OJo  of EC  75.8 
barley  EC  4 315 
D  1 553 
D  OJo  of EC  36.0 
corn  EC  -
D  -
D  OJo  of EC  -
Sources:  Official statistics, BR Deutschland. 
(b)  The nature of sales of skimmed milk powder to the 
foodstuff  industry,  the  intervention  stores  and  in 
various  Member States does  not permit a detailed 
identification  of  regional  effects.  Italy,  which 
produces virtually no skimmed milk powder itself, 
uses  almost  exclusively  skimmed  milk  powder 
(mainly from Germany and France). However, the 
aid is paid directly by the payment authority of the 
exporting  State  to  the  exporting  enterprise.  The 
same  is  also  true of subsidized  casein  production 
from skimmed milk:  the main intention here is  to 
induce  the  foodstuffs  industry  to  substitute  EC 
casein for cheap protein from third countries. The 
main objective of all these intervention measures is 
to relieve the pressure on what is still an imbalanced 
supply and demand relationship. 
Aid for fruit and vegetables 
In the  1988  financial  year  some ECU  708  million  was 
spent  on the  fruit  and vegetable  market  organization. 
Withdrawal and processing  aids  accounted for  900Jo  of 
this  fig~ue. Greece and Italy enjoyed the lion's share of 
('000 tons) 
1986  1987  1988  1989 
12 880  8 153  8 399  8 636 
5 184  3 147  4 182  4 128 
40.2  38.6  49.8  47.8 
1211  1 442  1 280  927 
- - - -
- - - -
7 703  2 909  3 322  2 633 
1 765  1 765  2400  1 675 
45.1  60.7  72.2  63.6 
1 112  750  904  1 312 
711  521  717  1 025 
63.9  69.5  79.3  78.1 
2 854  3 022  2 789  2 763 
1 001  861  1 065  1 404 
35.1  28.5  38.2  50.8 
- 22  18  998 
- - - 25 
- - - 2.5 
this  (800Jo ).  I  In  the  opm10n  of  the  Court  of 
Auditors 2  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  monitor  the 
accounting of Community funds in this sector; it would 
be  even  harder  to  provide  a  regional  breakdown  of 
guarantee expenditure on the basis of payments. 
Cereals:  Budget expenditure for the EAGGF for cereals 
varies quite considerably from year to year, and the same 
is  true of export  refunds  and interventions.  There are 
obvious differences in the use of instruments between the 
Member  States,  or  at  least  between  the  major 
cereals-producing Member States: whereas France tends 
overwhelmingly  to  use  the  EAGGF  to  pay  export 
refunds,  payments  in  Germany  are  predominantly  for 
storage costs. The comparison between Germany's share 
in  EAGGF  payments  for  storage  of cereals  with  the 
corresponding share of other EC countries shows that in 
recent  years  the  largest  quantities  were  stored  for 
intervention  in  Germany.  Although  the  cereals  are 
predominantly produced in Germany, they also include 
significant  quantities  from  other  Member  States.  No 
information on this  matter has been forthcoming  from 
18th financial report. 
Cf Court of Auditors,  'Special report on fruit and vegetables'. 
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culture the  agencies  in  Germany.  Table  8  shows  cereals 
intervention stocks stored in Germany. It is interesting to 
note that the  Federal  Republic  has  apparently  become 
increasingly  attractive  as  an intervention  place  for  the 
main types of cereals, but particularly wheat and barley: 
the  structure  of  storage  has  shifted  rapidly  towards 
Germany. With the exception of durum which is neither 
produced nor placed in intervention storage in Germany 
and corn which has been placed in store only since 1987, 
up  to  800Jo  of  Community  intervention  stocks  are 
currently held in German stores. In 1989 the figure, as an 
average  of all  varieties of cereals,  was  500Jo,  compared 
with  some  350Jo  of total  intervention  stocks  in  1985 
(end-of-year figures in both cases). 
It is important to bear in mind that these statistics relate 
to  stocks  on 31  December  and that the  cereals  stored 
account  for  by  far  the  smaller  proportion of the total 
volume of cereals sold in Community markets. 
Graph 24 shows the cereal flows  in the German market 
in  1988.  Just  over  half  the  volume  is  bought  up  by 
private  and  cooperative  traders  and  the  processing 
industry, the remainder being retained by enterprises as 
intermediate inputs for further production. According to 
a  recent  analysis,  1  in  1988  there  were,  in  the  Federal 
Republic, 2 524 cereals enterprises (half private and half 
cooperative) and  1 603  processing enterprises,  including 
608  mills,  200  malthouses  and  685  producers  of 
feedstuffs.  In recent years roughly half the cereals have 
been taken up by the cooperatives. 
The first stage in the trading process involves converting 
the cereals into batches of commercial quality. Since the 
stores  are  as  a  rule  inadequate,  the  trade  sells  to 
wholesalers  and the processing  industry.  Cereals  which 
cannot  be  sold  on  the  free  market  and  cannot  be 
exported  immediately,  are  stored  privately  in  the  first 
instance,  or  supplied  to  the  BALM.  In  1988  this 
intervention  agency  bought  up  1.9  million  tons; 
however,  this  volume  should  not be confused with  the 
stocks at the end of 1988  (4.2 million tons).  The graph 
shows  that  only  a  relatively  small  proportion  of the 
cereals on the market end up in the intervention stocks. 
Most remain on the  free  market,  some  being exported 
under the protection of the cereals market organization. 
In 1988- thanks, not least, to favourable conditions on 
1  Scientific Council of the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry:  Agrarpolitische  Konsequenzen  der  Realisierung  des 
EG-Binnenmarktes  bis  1992  (the  impact  on  agricultural  policy  of 
completion of the EC internal market by  1992).  Schriftenreihe des 
BML:  Angewandte Wissenschaft,  384,  Hiltrup-Miinster,  1990. 
third  country  markets  - some  8  million  tons  were 
exported and stocks as  a whole were reduced. 
4.4.  Impact of the payments on the farming 
sector as a whole 
One  way  of resolving  the  difficulties  of classification 
which are apparent from the examples is  a proportional 
breakdown of payments by production in the individual 
regions.  The disadvantage is  that a  picture of absolute 
amounts  of  ecus  reaching  the  recipients  directly  or 
indirectly is  not quite so precise,  since the extent of the 
trade  profits  and  the  irregularities  is  difficult  to 
estimate. 
However, this approach quite clearly reflects the impact 
of EC agricultural  policy.  This  is  also  true even  if the 
payments  under  the  Guarantee  Fund  do  not  always 
reach  the  regions  in  proportion  to  their  production 
results.  Simply  following  the  financial  flows  past  the 
initial  recipients  to  those  directly  affected  by  the 
payments is  not enough.  The question is,  what  are the 
direct effects of the Guarantee Funds? Only a part of EC 
agricultural  production  is  directly  affected  by  the 
intervention  measures:  for  example,  only  excess 
production  is  found  in  the  public  stores.  Even  minor 
fluctuations  in  harvests  have  a  considerable  impact  on 
the  intervention  system.  For  example,  if the  level  of 
utility in the EC is  11 OOJo,  an increase in supply by ten 
percentage points means a doubling of expenditure for 
export refunds and/or storage costs.  However,  it  is  not 
only  the  additional  ten  (or  twenty)  per  cent  which 
benefits  from  intervention.  In  the  final  analysis 
intervention hampers market forces  and a price collapse 
is  prevented  by  the  system  of regulating  volumes.  The 
beneficiaries are all EC producers without exception. 
Monitoring  the  financial  flows  is,  therefore,  an 
inappropriate means of determining the regional impact 
of the EC's agricultural policy.  An attempt to chart the 
regional  structure  of those  who  receive  payments  and 
those  who  benefit  directly  from  payments  presents  a 
range of problems. Firstly, the problems involved in data 
collection  are  extraordinarily  complex  even  for  a 
selective,  exemplary  approach.  Secondly,  a  whole 
number of areas require estimates which have no sound 
basis. But even if these difficulties were to be overcome, 
the  results  would  not  reflect  the  regional  impact  of 
agricultural policy. Measures pursuant to the Guarantee 
Fund  are  used  to  stabilize  a  situation  in  which  all 
agricultural  producers  could  obtain  higher  producer 
prices  than would be possible under conditions of free 
75 trade. Consequently, their regional impact cannot in any 
way  be  adequately described  using  regional  production 
results in the given system of market regulations. 
The fact remains that the approach described above of a 
proportional  break  -down  of  guarantee  payments  by 
production in the individual regions is  still a better way 
of showing the regional impact of the EC's agricultural 
76 
policy  than  a  superficial,  and  inevitably  incomplete, 
progress of following  up specific  payment flows.  What 
this also means is that as far as  a substantial proportion 
(three-fifths) of total EC expenditure is  concerned, it is 
not possible to provide a precise survey by regions of the 
beneficiaries,  let  along to describe  the regional  income 
effects  flowing  from  it.  Calculations  based  on models 
can only outline general trends. 5.  Regional effects of EC competition policy 
Fostering  competition  between  Community  enterprises 
and standardizing the terms of competition are amongst 
the fundamental original objectives of the Community. 
They should also be included in a study of the regional 
impact of the most important EC policies. However, the 
intensity and effects  of this  area of policy can only be 
described en passant,  on the basis of Community budget 
expenditure.  This  chapter  is  therefore  substantially 
different from the others.  Firstly,  it describes the main 
elements  of  EC  competition  policy.  Then  it  uses 
theoretical  considerations  and  empirical  studies  to 
describe  the  essential  macroeconomic  and  regional 
economic tendencies. It also takes into account sectoral 
considerations  to  the  extent  that  they  have  clear 
implications for the regional distribution of activities. 
In a broader sense the objective of vigorous competition 
without distortions permeates all  the entire EC treaties: 
the abolition of obstacles to trade between the Member 
States and the basic principles of·the market economy. 
Even in foreign trade the Community is committed to a 
competition-based  approach,  for  example  in  the 
preamble to the EC Treaty (' ... to contribute, by means 
of  a  common  commercial  policy,  to  the  progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade ...  ') and 
Article  110 (' . . . the harmonious development of world 
trade,  the  progressive  abolition  of  restrictions  on 
international  trade  and  the  lowering  of  customs' 
barriers.'). In the iron and steel sector the Member States 
retain far-reaching competences in respect of commercial 
policy  (Article  71,  ECSC).  In  a  more  narrow  sense, 
certain parts of the Community treaties are specifically 
devoted to competition policy.  These include legislation 
on  cartels  and  mergers  and  on  (national)  aids  to 
enterprises. 
Article  65  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  prohibits  concerted 
practices  in  respect  of prices,  quotas  and  territories, 
although  specialization  agreements  or  joint-buying  or 
joint-selling agreements may be authorized under certain 
circumstances.  Concentrations  are  subject  to  prior 
authorization  (Article  66,  ECSC).  There  are  special 
regulations  on  'manifest  crises'  which  give  the 
Commission  interventionist  powers  (compulsory  quota 
cartels) (Article 58) and on minimum prices (Article 61b 
and  c)  to  ensure  the  survival  of enterprises  suffering 
from  a  substantial  shortage  of  demand.  As  far  as 
Euratom  is  concerned,  'undertakings  which  are  of 
fundamental  importance  to  the  development  of  the 
nuclear  industry  in  the  Community'  may  be  granted 
'Joint Undertaking'  status  (Article  45,  EAEC),  which 
gives  them  fiscal  and  customs  exemption  and  other 
advantages  (Article  48  and  Annex  III)  although 
otherwise  they  are  subject  to  the  'rules  applying  to 
industrial  or  commercial  undertakings'  (Article  49, 
paragraph 4). 
Under  the  EEC  Treaty  which  applies  to  the  great 
majority of sectors and enterprises,  concerted practices 
are  forbidden  in  principle  pursuant  to  Article  85; 
however,  certain  agreements,  decisions  or  concerted 
practices  or  categories  of concerted  practices  may  be 
exempt  if they  contribute  to  rationalization,  technical 
progress or an improved distribution of goods or if they 
do  not  go  beyond  the  necessary  minimum,  are  not 
directed solely towards increasing profits but also  allow 
consumers  a  fair  share of the  resulting  benefits  and if 
they are not a substantial restriction on competition. A 
series  of regulations  and  implementing  legislation  was 
enacted  pursuant to  this  article  in  the  1980s  (exclusive 
right  of purchase  and  supply,  specialization,  licensing 
and  R&D  agreements,  franchising,  transfer  of 
knowhow;  legal  status of 'joint enterprise').  Abuse  by 
enterprises with a dominant position within the market is 
monitored pursuant to Article 86. 
By contrast, the Community did not originally have the 
opportunity pursuant to the EEC Treaty of preventive 
monitoring  of mergers  (by  analogy  with  the  coal  and 
steel sector). After many vain attempts it did not succeed 
in adopting an appropriate regulation pursuant to Article 
235  until  the  end  of  1989;  it  came  into  effect  in 
September  1990.  Aid  which  distorts  competition  is 
prohibited pursuant to Article 92(1 ). This does not apply 
to aid having  a social  character, aid to make good the 
damage  caused  by  natural  disasters  or  acceptable 
occurrences  and aid  granted to the peripheral areas  of 
the  Federal  Republic  and Berlin  (Article  92(2)).  Under 
certain conditions regional aid, sectoral aid in periods of 
economic crisis and aid to promote projects of common 
European  interest  may  be  explicitly  allowed  (Article 
92(3)).  Article  90  grants  public  undertakings  the  same 
status  as  other  undertakings,  provided  this  does  not 
prevent them from fulfilling certain functions of general 
economic  interest  or  having  the  character  of  a 
revenue-producing monopoly. 
An  examination  of  the  regional  impact  of  the 
Community's  competition  policy  shows  the  following 
basic broad areas: 
regional  distribution of general  effects  of increasing 
competition  while  harmonizing  the  conditions  of 
competition 
the  effect  of the  EC on  the  regional  policy  of the 
Member States 
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the regional impact of the effect of the EC on other 
forms of aid granted by the Member States which are 
not directly concerned with regional equalization. 
In  macroeconomic  terms  the  general  effects  can  be 
reduced  to  prosperity,  growth  and  structural 
components.  Prosperity  increases  if  production  is 
increased for the same use of resources or if production 
remains  the  same  while  resources  are  reduced. 
Specialization, rationalization and product innovation all 
play  their  part  in  this.  Liberalization  of trade  has  a 
positive effect on all three of these processes. If  there are 
effective  controls  on  monopolies,  competition  ensures 
that greater prosperity means not only higher profits but 
also lower prices. 
In  theory  these  price  reductions  benefit  all  regions; 
however,  the  share  in  demand  in  the  more  developed 
regions  of goods  in  question  sold  on an inter-regional 
basis  is  disproportionally  greater  than  in  the  less 
developed regions. Another factor is that the distribution 
system  is  not  ideal  in  the  latter:  firms  enjoying  a 
monopoly of trade are  often able,  by buying in cheap 
and selling  dear,  to cream off the increased  prosperity 
for themselves rather than passing it on to the consumer 
or - where intermediate inputs are involved - to local 
small businesses.  Only in the long term when the entire 
process has reached a stage where the State is responsible 
for improving the infrastructure for more advantageous 
supra-regional purchasing or there is a greater movement 
by enterprises of production and/  or marketing activities 
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from the centres into the periphery for reasons of costs 
(wages,  the cost of premises) or to develop the market, 
will  there  be  a  more  balanced  distribution  of  the 
increased prosperity resulting from integration. 
Price  comparisons  for  homogeneous  products  in  the 
Community 1  show  that  even  today  the  markets  for 
many  products  are  highly  compartmentalized,  but 
without EC integration this would without doubt be even 
more pronounced. Moreover, the price differences show 
the  potential  gains  in  prosperity  which  can  still  be 
achieved  through  completion  of the  internal  market. 
This could be of particular significance for the costs of 
loans to local enterprises. On the one hand, the Cecchini 
Group  feels  there  is  above-average  scope  for  reducing 
prices  for  financial  services.  2  On  the  other  hand, 
banking  is  still  very  underdeveloped  in  the  backward 
regions.  Participation  by  this  sector  in  the  increased 
prosperity  therefore  presupposes  a  greater  presence  of 
competing banks and insurance institutions on the spot. 
Telecommunications would be of great importance for 
this  sector,  since  it  favours  a  regionally  decentralized 
organizational  structure  designed  to  be  close  to  the 
customer without increased information and transaction 
1  Cf Buigues,  P .,  The  impact of the  internal  market  by  industrial 
sector:  the  challenge  for  the  Member  States,  in:  Franzmeyer,  F. 
(Ed.), Die Regionen im Europiiischen Binnenmarkt (The regions in 
the  European  internal  market),  DIW  special  series  No  146 
(appearing in summer 1991). 
2  Cf  Cecchini  P.,  Europe  '92  - The  advantage  of the  internal 
Market,  Baden-Baden,  1988,  p.  61  ff. charges. The Padoa-Schioppa Group sees good prospects 
here  for  the  periphery,  the  wage  cost  advantages  of 
which  would  become  increasingly  attractive  as  the 
disadvantages disappear.  1 Another study carried out on 
behalf  of the  EC, 2  however,  believes  there  are  risks 
particularly for. the financial sector: as a result of trends 
towards concentration, highly skilled activities would be 
removed  from  the financial  sector of the less-favoured 
regions  and  transferred  to  the  centres.  On  the  other 
hand, at the customer interface the increased pressure of 
competition  could  launch  a  trend  towards 
computerization and hence a reduction in staff numbers. 
However,  the  empirical  results  are  not  necessarily 
pessimistic. The centres in the southern Member States in 
particular  would  have  scope  for  development,  albeit 
without  the  access  to the  financial  metropolises  of the 
EC.  But  this  presupposes  political  support.  Given  the 
expected  takeovers,  it  is  the  function  of competition 
policy,  the  study says,  to ensure that the  best  possible 
level  of services  is  retained in the less  favoured regions. 
Increased  growth  results  from  increased  prosperity  if 
domestic and foreign demands have a positive effect on 
price cuts.  It is  important to remember here,  however, 
that  a  reduction  in  the  resources  used  also  means  a 
reduction  in  primary  income.  Furthermore,  exchange 
rates could change in such a way that the original price 
advantage is lost. Nevertheless, in this scenario there are 
still positive terms of trade effects which will enhance the 
increased prosperity correspondingly. 
Although  estimates  vary  quite  widely,  3  the  empirical 
evidence is  that the creation of a customs union and, in 
particular, the creation of trade in the  1960s  as  a result 
of intra-Community  liberalization  has  had  a  positive 
effect  on economic  growth in  the Community.  At the 
same time it is always stressed in the literature that (only) 
in  those  years  of  strong  growth  were  the  regional 
differences  in  development  minimized.  This  would 
suggest that the future completion of the internal market 
would  also  tend  towards  reducing  the  differences 
between the regions.  However, the evidence is  not very 
1  Cj.  'Effizienz,  Stabilitat  und  Verteilungsgerechtigkeit  - Eine 
Entwicklungsstrategie  fi.ir  das Wirtschaftssystem  der  Europaischen 
Gemeinschaft  (Efficiency,  Stability  and Proper Distribution - A 
development  strategy  for  the  Community's  economic  system)', 
report  by  a  study  group  set  up  by  the  Community  under  T. 
Padoa-Schioppa, Brussels,  1987,  p.  125. 
2  PA  Cambridge  Economic  Consultants  Ltd.,  The  regional 
consequences  of completion  of the  internal  market for financial 
services,  1990. 
3  Cj.  Mayes, D. G., The effects of economic integration on trade in: 
Journal of  common market studies,  No 1/1978, pp. 1-25 and the 
bibliography. 
conclusive.  In the 1960s the centres of economic activity 
in the Community absorbed some of the surplus labour 
from  the  underdeveloped  regions.  In other  words,  the 
trend towards equalization resulted from  real  output in 
the  centres  being  distributed  among  more  people  and 
amongst  fewer  people  on the  periphery.  In  the  1970s 
there was low economic growth, and the flow of migrant 
labour  came  to  a  virtual  standstill.  As  a  result,  the 
differences  in developments  became  more pronounced. 
This process continued in the first half of the 1980s when 
the growth rate was  still  weak on the whole.  The effect 
of powerful growth in the second half of the  1980s was 
not to reverse the trend but simply to bring it to a halt. It 
is  significant  that  because  of  the  high  cushion  of 
unemployment  in  most  countries  the  long  phase  of 
recovery  since  1983-84  has  not  meant  a  return  to  the 
1960s,  with  a  flow  of migrant  labour  into  the  more 
developed, northern countries of the Community. 
After eight years of growth the level of economic activity 
in  the  Community has  slowed  down again  since  1990. 
Will  this  result  in  widening  disparities  between  the 
regions?  This  will  depend  on  three  main  factors: 
demography,  economy  and financial  solidarity.  In the 
more  developed  countries  of  the  Community,  the 
demographically  determined  increase  in  the  potential 
labour force will come to a halt in the next few years. In 
the developing regions,  by contrast, it will on the whole 
increase,  and at a higher rate.  The economic downturn 
will also wipe out the increase in employment which has 
been quite considerable in recent years:  more than two 
million  extra  jobs  were  created  in  Germany  alone 
between  1983  and  1990.  If the  low  level  of economic 
activities continues over a period of several years, there 
will  be no compensatory movement of migrant labour. 
The  question  is,  however,  whether  in  the  near  future 
there will be a significant growth effect from the internal 
market.  The level  of the  'Cecchini  impact'  on growth 
will  not be enough in the years to come to compensate 
for  the  economic  weaknesses  determined  by  the 
world economy (temporary failure of the GATT round, 
the  Gulf  Crisis)  and/or  endogenous  sources  (anti-
inflationary  monetary  policy).  The  internal  market 
is  already  having  different,  anticipatory  effects, 
particularly  on  the  willingness  to  invest  and  the 
regional  allocation  of  investments. 4  According  to 
4  Cf.  Franzmeyer,  F.  'Die  Auswirkungen  des  Binnenmarktes  auf 
Arbeitsmarkt und Beschaftigung (The effect of the internal market 
on the labour market and employment)' in: R. Birk and Arbeitskreis 
Europaische  Integration  (Eds.),  Die  soziale  Dimension  des 
Binnenmarktes  (The  social  dimension  of  the  internal  market). 
Schriften des Arbeitskreises Europaische Integration e.V., Vol.  27, 
Baden-Baden 1990,  p. 36  ff. 
79 R.  Baldwin 1 these  effects could  be  much greater than 
those of the Cecchini  effect. If this  trend continues (in 
particular if investors are not disappointed because the 
'Cecchini  world'  has  only  been  partially realized),  this 
will tend to reduce regional imbalances. At least, this will 
be true of Spain and Portugal,  which  are  favoured  by 
investors because of intra-Community freedom of trade 
and the lack of regulations on the movement of capital. 
Empirical  estimates 2  have  shown  that  the  southern 
Member  States  in  particular  will  benefit  from  the 
continuing  international  division  of labour  within  the 
Community. 
In addition to the equalization effects expected to stem 
from  the  economy  under  favourable  terms  of growth, 
aid in the form of solidarity may come from the 'policy 
of cohesion'  which  after the substantial increase in  the 
Community structural  Funds  will  have  a  very  positive 
effect in the regions of Greece,  Portugal and Ireland: in 
1989  payments  in  these  countries  were  already 
accounting for between 2.2 and 2.70Jo  of gross domestic 
products, and in  1993  the level  will  be between 2. 7 and 
3.7%. 3 The higher the economic growth up to 1993  in 
the  Community  as  a  whole,  the  more  favourable  the 
prospects  for  building  up  the stocks  again  from  fiscal 
revenue and hence the EC's own resources. 
The prosperity and growth effects of greater competition 
go  hand-in-hand  with  changes  in  the  structure  of 
production.  As  income  increases,  so  the  structural 
demand  changes  and,  at  the  same  time,  new  supply 
factors  emerge  (productive  capital,  skilled  workforce, 
technology, level of wages), the distribution of which by 
countries  and  regions  reflects  comparative  cost 
advantages.  The Commission study of the  relationship 
between sectoral structure and internal market effects in 
the EC Member States 4 shows - as one might expect -
comparative advantages for Portugal, Spain and Greece 
for wage-intensive products and comparative advantages 
for  the  'northern'  members  of  the  Community  for 
technology-intensive products and modern services. 
Autonomous  structural  processes  can be  influenced  by 
regional policy. If the various advantages were to come 
1  Cf.  Baldwin, R., 'The growth effects of 1992', in: Economic policy, 
October 1989,  pp. 247-81, in  particular pp. 265  and 269. 
2  Cf.  Neven,  D., 'EEC integration towards  1992:  some distributional 
aspects', Insead Working Papers No 90/23/EP/SM, Fontainebleau 
1989,  p.  40 ff. 
3  The Commission of the European Communities, 'The regions in the 
1990s - Fourth periodic report on the social and economic situation 
and development of the regions  of the community',  Luxembourg, 
1990, Tab. 8.2,  p.  73. 
4  Cf.  Buigues, P. 
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fully  into  play,  the  EC  study  sees  the  risk  for  the 
southern countries of reliance on obsolete structures in 
the  internal  market.  Given  the  competition  from 
developing countries this could be particularly serious if 
the Community's foreign trade follows liberal principles. 
The  study  refers  in  this  respect  to  Ireland,  which  was 
initially  in  the same position as  the southern countries 
and  which  systematically  favoured  and  attracted 
high-technology firms, albeit with the result of creating a 
vulnerable,  dual  economic  structure  with  an 
international sector dominated by  multinationals and a 
largely underdeveloped domestic economy. 
The Community's regional policy was not uninvolved in 
this development. The Irish example therefore suggests a 
parallel  strategy  for  the  southern  countries.  While 
emphasizing  development  of  the  infrastructure,  they 
should  make  themselves  attractive  to  technology-
oriented  firms  by  promoting  human  resources  and  by 
not discriminating in their investment premiums against 
those sectors where their true advantages (still) lie. 
However,  competition affects not only the structure of 
sectors  but  also  the  structure  of company size.  While 
internal  company  growth  and  mergers  and  takeovers 
eliminate or 'absorb' competitors, specialization causes a 
trend towards the vertical distribution of labour with the 
result  that numerous companies  become established  or 
have  better  scope  for  development  upstream  or 
downstream.  This  process  is  particularly favourable  to 
small businesses. Internal or external company growth is 
not  harmful  to  competition  provided  the  frontiers 
between  the  national  markets  are  removed,  thereby 
giving  new  competitors  access  to  markets.  Company 
growth consistently parallels growth in the market until 
optimal technical and managerial use of the advantages 
of scale  are achieved.  It is  precisely this increase in the 
size  of  the  market  which  the  internal  market  was 
intended  to  achieve.  Companies  have  been  adapting 
themselves to this objective for a number of years.  The 
number of mergers  and takeovers has  been  increasing, 
disproportionately  so  between  European  companies. 
This trend towards concentration is an effect not only of 
the  internal  market  but  also  an  expression  of  the 
globalization  of  the  markets:  European  industry  is 
seeking  a  company structure which  will  make it  better 
able  to  withstand  intense  competition  on  the  world 
market. Preventive monopolies controls were introduced 
in  1990  at  world  level  so  that this  process  would  not 
unintentionally undermine competition in  the EC itself 
as  a  result  of  a  small  number  of  large  enterprises 
dominating the market, or as a result of the reduction in 
the number of suppliers encouraging collusion. How  will  the  structural  processes  related  to  company 
size,  which  Community policy  has  launched,  effect the 
regional  distribution  of  economic  activity?  World 
growth  markets  are  mainly  concentrated  in  high-
technology  goods.  Large  European  companies  are 
directing  their  activities  towards  this  end.  They  need 
highly trained staff, proximity to research institutions, a 
well-developed industry-friendly infrastructure, and close 
contacts with key upstream and downstream enterprises. 
The needs  of a discriminating,  well-paid  staff also  call 
for  an  attractive  local  infrastructure.  Multinationals 
therefore  tend  to  concentrate  their  main  areas  of 
operations  in  urban  centres,  spreading  to  the 
surrounding  region  when  the  problems  of  urban 
concentration  become  intolerable  (price  of  land,  the 
environment,  transport  chaos).  The  high  degree  of 
organizational  flexibility  shown  by  these  companies, 
however,  makes  it  likely  that they will  exploit  regional 
cost  differentials  (for  example,  wages)  by  relocating 
cost-intensive parts of their operations to the periphery. 
By  contrast,  to  the  extent  that  they  are  able  to  grow 
through  increasing  their  product  range  and  producing 
higher quality goods which can be sold supraregionally, 
local  firms  on the periphery will  be willing  and able to 
shift  their  research-based  and  administrative  functions 
closer to the centres. To the extent that the Community 
competition policy favours a growth in company size,  it 
may  help  consolidate  temporarily  the  intersectoral 
division of labour between the centre and the periphery. 
However,  since it also  favours growth in income in the 
peripheral  regions,  and  since  there  is  a  relationship 
between level of incomes and economic structure, in the 
medium-term  it  will  help  modernize  the  economic 
structure of the periphery. 
The  second  way  in  which  competition  policy  can 
influence the  regional  distribution of economic activity 
in  the  Community  is  by  monitoring  national  regional 
policies. Until1975 all that the Commission could do, by 
virtue  of the  EEC  Treaty,  was  to  examine  whether 
national  regional  aid  was  not  in  reality  sectoral  aid 
tending  to  distort  competition.  This  was  an extremely 
difficult task and therefore tended to be neglected.  The 
creation of a regional Fund increased the EC's influence 
to some extent. Aid from the Fund is now dependent on 
the  Member  States  producing  a  regional  development 
plan. The national fund quotas were  fixed  on the basis 
of  political  considerations.  Within  the  quotas  the 
Commission  had  to  approve  national  applications  for 
refunds,  regardless  of whether  it  felt  a  measure  was 
sensible.  Defining  the  recipient  regions  was  the  sole 
responsibility  of  the  Member  States,  although  they 
undertook only to provide investment-based regional aid 
and in the more centrally situated regions at least not to 
exceed a specific level of aid, the 'net grant equivalent'. 
The  purpose  of  this  agreement  was  to  increase  the 
effectiveness of regional aid.  The lower the inducement 
to invest in central regions, the greater the inducements 
on the periphery, provided the funds are available.  The 
sole criterion was the profit margin. In 1985 EC regional 
policy  was  revised.  With  regard to the  activities  of the 
Member States, the new Regulation provided for tighter 
policing  of  Community-wide  conformity  and  better 
coordination of national schemes for providing regional 
aid.  I The intention was that activity outside the defined 
regions  would  no  longer  be  possible.  One  of  the 
objectives was to concentrate national regional policy on 
the regions really requiring aid. The Commission played 
a  greater  role  in  defining  the  regions.  For example,  it 
took a restrictive attitude towards the Federal Republic. 
The dispute was over whether significant deviations from 
the  national  average  were  sufficient  grounds  for 
qualification  as  a  development  region  or  whether 
deviation  from  the  EC  average  - a  more  stringent 
requirement for the richer Member States - should be 
the  criterion.  Upper  limits  for  the  level  of aid  for  all 
regional categories were also fixed. 
Alongside this specific regional activity, the Commission 
has  been  endeavouring  since  1987  to  inject  greater 
transparency into all Member States' subsidies. In 1988 it 
published its  'First report on State aid in the European 
Community' which reviewed the period 1981  to 1986. In 
1990 the second Report updated the figures to 1987 and 
1988 and included data on Spain and Portugal. 
Table 9 includes data extracted from the second Report. 
It shows  the  importance  of direct  regional  aid  in  the 
Member  States.  For  the  processing  industry  such  aid 
accounts for one-third of all aid. At a level of some ECU 
8 billion (1986-88  average) the level  of funding  was  2.2 
times  the  funds  available  under  the  ERDF  before  the 
reforms increasing its  funds (1988:  ECU 3.67 billion). 
This is clearly no longer the case. In 1989 the ERDF had 
ECU  4.66  billion,  whereas  - as  Table  7  shows  -
national  regional  aid  has  tended  to  decline.  This 
increases the effectiveness of the Community's policy of 
cohesion and is to some extent a success for that policy. 
It should  also  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  the 
Commission  has  not yet  succeeded  in  determining  the 
subsidy value of all  the benefits, particularly those of a 
fiscal  nature. 2 
1  Cj. Franzmeyer, F., Seidel, B., Regional und Sozialpolitik (Regional 
and social policy) in: Weidenfeld, W., Wessels, W. (Eds.), Jahrbuch 
der Europiiischen Integration,  1984,  Bonn 1985,  p.  165. 
2  Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for 
Competition:  'Second  report  on  State  aid  in  the  European 
Community in  the  processing  industry  and in  a  number  of other 
economic sectors', Brussels  1990,  p.  26. 
81 Table 9 - Member States' financial help to manufacturing industry  I in regions with severe backwardness and high 
unemployment (Art. 92 (3)a EEC Treaty) as well as in other regions 
Averages  1981-86  Averages  1986-88 
Population and income 
in problem regions2 
Country 
Article 92  Other  Total  Article 92  Other  Total  Population  Income  ECU per 
(3)a  regions  (3)a  regions  share  capita3 
Mio. ECU  Mio.  ECU  Mio.  ECU 
BR Deutschland  - 427  4274  - 1 133  1 1335  37.5  20.906  54.21 
France  132  307  438  161  273  443  40.2  22.27  19.89 
Italia  4 248  556  4 804  4 261  655  4 916  38.8  22.21  221.34 
Nederland  - 172  172  - 161  161  14.7  2.14  75.23 
Belgique  - 203  203  - 215  215  33.1  3.26  65.95 
Luxembourg  - 12  12  - 19  19  79.5  0.29  65.52 
United Kingdom  270  1 305  1 575  242  904  1 149  37.7  21.40  53.69 
Ireland  200  - 200  159  - 159  100.0  3.54  44.92 
Danmark  - 14  14  - 20  17  20.7  1.06  16.04 
Ell ada  276  - 276  406  - 406  65.7  6.55  61.98 
Espana  - - - - 65  65  66.4  25.68  2.53 
Portugal  - - - 23  - 23  100.0  10.21  2.25 
EC total  6 459  3 3447  9 803  5 252  3 445  8 058  43.8  139.37  57.82 
1  Equal to 41 OJo  of total subsidies in the EC. 
2  1986. 
3  Average  1986-88 in  relation to population 1986. 
4  To be added 3 227  mio ECU  'Berlinhilfe' and financial help for  'Zonenrandgebiete'. 
5  To be added 3 340 mio ECU  'Berlinhilfe'. 
6  Berlin excluded. 
7  Published figure;  difference to sum  from individual items (2 996)  unimputable. 
Sources:  Commission  of the  EC  (Ed.)  'The  regions  in  the  1990s  - Fourth  periodic  report  on  the  social  and  economic  situation  and 
development of the regions of the Community'; Statistische Grundzahlen der Gemeinschaft, 26.  Ausgabe 1989;  calculations by  DIW. 
In Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece and Great Britain 
regional  subsidies  account for  a  high  proportion of all 
financial  and fiscal  aids  for the processing industry.  In 
Spain  and  Portugal,  by  contrast,  and  in  France  and 
Denmark too the proportion is  noticeably very low.  In 
the  Iberian  Peninsular  raising  the  overall  level  of 
development  of the economy evidently enjoys  absolute 
priority, in contrast to Greece. In France the lion's share 
of horizontal  and  sectoral  aid  already  has  a  regional 
bias,  with the result that the .figures  do not adequately 
represent  the  government's  intentions  with  regard  to 
regional  policy.  In  Luxembourg  and Great Britain the 
high  regional  support quotas  are  an expression  of the 
serious  problems  in  regions  with  declining  industrial 
sectors.  In  Italy,  by  contrast,  there  is  the  traditional 
North-South divide.  However, the fact that regional aid 
accounts for a high proportion of total aid may conceal 
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significant  differences  in  per  capita  amounts.  On  the 
assumption  that  the  group  of  regions  covered  by 
structural Fund Objectives 1, 2 and 5b is identical to the 
problem  regions  in Table 9,  the  per  capita figures  for 
Italy  are  extremely  high,  whereas  even  on  this  basis 
extremely  low  levels  of  funding  are  made  available 
explicitly for regional policy in Spain and Portugal. 
The  following  are  the  general  conclusions  from 
summarizing the information in respect of Community 
control of national region policy in the Member States: 
(i)  Until the late 1980s it was not possible to shed light 
on all  aspects  of national aid  policy,  and  to  this 
extent it was  not possible to exercise controls. (ii)  Nor apparently, was it, possible to induce Member 
States  to  accept  a  regional  level  of  aid  which 
reflected the actual problems. 
(iii)  However,  the  reason  for  this  does  not  lie  in  the 
misapplication of high aid rates, for example in The 
Netherlands, Belgium or Great Britain. The reason 
might be that in the poorer countries the funds (or 
planning capacity) made available are inadequate to 
exploit  the  maximum levels  of aid  to the  full,  or 
that because of the predominance of horizontal or 
(legitimate)  sectoral  aid  objectives  the  funds  are 
diverted  into  non-specific  regional  applications 
which cannot easily be allocated to the regions. 
(iv)  The problematic situation in Italy (a comparatively 
wealthy  country  with  large,  underdeveloped, 
though highly subsidized regions) shows that even a 
high  level  of  support  can  be  ineffective.  The 
problem  here  is  evidently  not a  financial  one.  In 
view  of such cases,  the Community would be well 
advised to build additional criteria governing  'soft 
factors' into its fund involvement policy, to enable 
it  to  withhold  funds  for  as  long  as  the  national 
government is incapable of independently mastering 
its  own  regional  problems.  If need  be  it  could 
increase its administrative and technical aid. 
(v)  The general structures of the amounts of aid have 
in  a  course  of time  proved  fairly  inflexible.  This 
suggests  fairly  low  Community  influence  on 
national regional policy.  Where developments have 
been along lines acceptable to the Commission (e.g. 
reduction  in  the  total  amount  available  in  Great 
Britain)  this  has  been  due  principally  to  other 
causes,  for example the change in economic policy 
under Thatcher and the alleviation of the problems 
as  a result of the economic recovery. 
The third aspect of EC competition policy that affects 
the regional  developmental  divide  is  the monitoring of 
non-regional aids against the backdrop of their regional 
incidence. The Commission's second report on subsidies 
makes a distinction here between horizontal aid, i.e. aid 
available in theory to all economic sectors,  and specific 
sectoral aids. Allocating the horizontal aids on a regional 
basis  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper.  It  may  be 
assumed, however, that there is a fairly even distribution 
within each country in  proportion to general economic 
level  of activity.  However,  there  are  differences  - in 
some cases  quite considerable - between  the  Member 
States. This can be seen if this category of aid is  applied 
to the national population. Most of this aid is also used 
for  the  precompetitive  modernization  of the  economy 
and it is permissible pursuant to EC legislation, with the 
result that the Commission has virtually no influence on 
the regional distribution (except in specifying co-funding 
programmes  such  as  Esprit  for  example).  The  'other' 
sectoral  aids  have  a  similar,  non-concentrated  regional 
basis. Transport, and more precisely rail transport, is the 
predominant  sector  here.  Railway  tariffs  - which  do 
not cover costs - benefit the regions similarly, largely in 
accordance with the distribution of economic activity in 
the  regions.  Where  sectors  of the  processing  industry 
receive considerable subsidies - as in the case of Spain, 
France,  Italy  or  Great  Britain,  they  only  appear  in 
statistics  as  totals.  Even  if  there  were  more  specific 
information  on  the  branches  of  industry  a  regional 
classification would not be possible. 
Only  subsidies  to  the  coal  and  steel  industry  and 
shipbuilding  can  be  reasonably  classified  by  specific 
regions  - or at least by specific type of disadvantaged 
region  (support  category  II).  In  Germany,  Spain  and 
Belgium no less than a third of all aid to enterprises goes 
to these three sectors, in the United Kingdom roughly a 
quarter,  and  in  France  just  under  a  fifth.  In  other 
countries they are of little or no significance.  However, 
the report on subsidies contains figures only for 1986-88. 
In  that  period  trends  in  the  steel  industry  were 
particularly  favourable,  and shipbuilding too benefited 
from  the  world-wide  economic  recovery.  Aid  to  these 
sectors  was  therefore  comparatively small;  it  had been 
significantly higher up until the early 1980s. At the time 
- following  severe  criticism  from  Germany  of  the 
practice  of  providing  subsidies,  particularly  in  Italy, 
which  was  regarded  as  distorting  competition  - the 
Commission endeavoured to tighten up what had been 
fairly  lax  controls  hitherto,  i.e.  by  restricting,  for 
example in terms of time,  the admissibility of subsidies 
and  making  them  dependent  on rationalization  plans. 
With the help of the special crisis powers pursuant to the 
ECSC  Treaty,  it  helped  ensure  that  the  burden  of 
readaptation was  shared  equally  amongst  all  the  crisis 
areas.  It thus prevented any given  region  being  unduly 
favoured  as  a  result of excess  subsidies  compared with 
other  regions,  but  it  also  prevented  the  comparatively 
efficient  enterprises  (and  regions)  from  establishing 
themselves on the market. 
For  example,  the  steel  areas  were  modernized  in  a 
'linear'  fashion,  whereas  under  competitive  conditions 
dynamic, regional differences would have arisen between 
the areas as a result of firms collapsing and regionalized 
mass unemployment. Hence, in the steel sector the policy 
of the  Commission  has  had  an  equalizing  effect  on 
differences  between the regions  in the Community, but 
on the  other  hand  it  has  prevented  the  sector  from 
developing its potential efficiency to the full. 
83 Table 10  - Member States' financial help to firms, by purposes, 1986-88 
Average amounts per year 
(Mio ECU) 
of which% 
Agri- Manufac-
'Goal 2' 
culture 
turing 
regions  Iron  Ship- Coal 
Other  of which: 
Regional  regional 
regional 
Country  hori- and  sectoral  transport- Total  indi- and 
zontal  sectoral 
steel 
building  mining 
help  ation 
help  directly 
rectly  fishery 
help 
help  imput-
imput-
able1 
ablel 
BR Deutschland  2 367  2 622  7 521  60  166  7 295  6 899  6 579  1 1323  20 5403  5.5  36.6 
France  2206  2 630  2 936  16  476  2 444  7 062  4 952  435  15 269  2.8  19.2 
ltalie  3 288  3 050  581  357  224  0  8 804  7 790  4 916  20 641  23.8  2.8 
Nederland  534  840  30  0  30  0  797  758  161  2 362  6.8  1.3 
Belgique  170  713  1 212  0  31  1 181  1 541  1 447  215  3 853  5.6  31.5 
Luxembourg  17  15  0  0  0  0  165  165  19  217  8.8  0.0 
United Kingdom  779  1 221  1 595  20  452  1 123  1 814  1 085  1 146  6 557  17.5  24.3 
Ireland  171  193  0  0  0  0  186  130  159  709  22.4  0.0 
Danmark  239  200  57  0  57  0  379  378  17  892  1.9  6.4 
Ellada  150  430  0  0  0  0  316  109  406  1 302  31.2  0.0 
Espana  220  365  1 916  891  103  922  3 332  1 827  65  5 898  1.1  32.5 
Portugal  158  299  47  21  24  2  207  108  19  731  2.6  6.4 
I  Column: Regional help. 
2  Iron and steel,  shipbuilding and coal mining; the assumption is  that these amounts fully  flow  into 'goal 2' regions. 
3  Berlin excluded. 
Source:  Commission  of the  EC  (Ed.),  The  regions  in  the  1990s  - Fourth  periodic  report  on  the social  and economic situation  and 
development of  the regions of the Community. 
In  Germany  the  subsidizing  of  coal  plays  quite  an 
exceptional role, with the support hitherto of a restrictive 
policy  on imports and through contracts with  industry 
and  public  electricity  suppliers  via  guaranteed 
purchasing.  In Belgian,  France,  Spain  and the  United 
Kingdom  too,  however,  the  sector  attracts  a  major 
proportion  of subsidies.  The  Commission  used  to  be 
generous  in authorizing the support of coal production 
for reasons connected with security of supply.  With or 
without  this  control  there  would  have  been  similar 
regional  effects.  In the Federal Republic,  in particular, 
coal  policy  did  a  great  deal  to  narrow  the  regional 
income  gap  by  safeguarding  large  numbers  of jobs in 
disadvantaged reasons. At the same time, however, there 
was  less incentive to modernize the coal region. 
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For  some  years  now,  the  subject  of  German  coal 
subsidies has no longer been taboo in the Community. 
Such  distortions  of competition  compared  with  other 
sources  of energy are harder to reconcile  with a  single 
internal  market.  In future  supply security can only  be 
identified  at the  Community level;  the urgency  of the 
problem  is,  moreover,  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of 
diversification  of  energy  use  and  of supply  sources. 
Doing away with subsidies will  temporarily increase the 
gap between the regions in Germany. However, the Ruhr 
region  has  been  catching  up  for  a  number  of years. 
Given  the  excellent  infrastructure  and  the  central 
position, the increased 'competition between the regions' 
will  ensure  that  the  modernization  process  is 
accelerated. 6.  Future research  requirements 
The studies presented in this report may be continued or 
supplemented in a number of ways. 
Some  of these  possibilities  are  purely  quantitative  in 
nature: in the first place, it would be useful to update the 
results in a number of years' time. This would show: 
(i)  the extent to which  and rate at which existing EC 
policies  have  adapted  in  terms  of  budget 
effectiveness to the expansion of the Community to 
include  Spain and Portugal and,  by  contrast,  the 
extent to which these two countries have been able 
to exploit the new  sources of funding; 
(ii)  how significant reforms of old policy areas and the 
inclusion  of new  Community  policy  areas  which 
have not yet been properly reflected in the statistics 
have  had  an  overall  effect  on  the  regional 
distribution of funds. 
Secondly,  an attempt might  be  made to include in the 
analysis  a  number  of categories  of expenditure  which 
have hitherto been excluded, in particular R&D,  so that 
an  even  greater  proportion  of  total  expenditure  is 
covered.  However,  this  would be  unlikely to show  any 
significant shift in the trend overall and the expenditure 
involved would be disproportionably high. 
More  important than these  quantitative  updatings  and 
additions  are  qualitative  improvements  in  respect  of 
objectives  and  methodology.  The  distribution 
calculations  presented  in  the  foregoing  have  been 
concerned solely with expenditure flows. We would have 
a  better  picture  of  how  these  flows  affect  living 
conditions in the individual regions if we could scrutinize 
such flows  to ascertain the effect on income. The static 
income  effects  approximate  quite  closely  with  actual 
expenditure in terms of a number of categories, at least 
for  subsidies  from the structural Funds.  In the case of 
loans, an 'income' analysis would have to take only the 
interest  advantage  into  account.  The  dynamic  effects 
(creation  of  jobs,  higher  level  of  skills,  growth  in 
productivity and real income) could be indicated only as 
trends, given the numerous reservations (cf. Section 3.5.) 
in  respect  of the differences in the efficiency of similar 
measures in different regions. 
The  major  problems  even  in  respect  of static  effects 
would  revolve  around  the  agricultural  guarantee 
payments.  Three  points  would  require  particular 
consideration. 
(i)  Firstly,  farmers'  incomes  benefit  from  the 
difference  between  the  EC-supported  price  level 
and the low world price level.  It might be possible 
to explore the implications of trends in world prices 
for  products  subject  to  market  organization. 
However,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  leave  the 
world  of  'marginal  comparative  statics'  (cf.  the 
comments on the methodology).  Since there  is  no 
such thing as a world price as such, it would only be 
possible to discuss long-term trends at the average 
quality level typical for the EC. 
(ii)  Secondly, the income-oriented analysis would need 
to  concentrate  not  only  on  the  target  group  of 
guarantee  payments  (farmers)  but  also  on  the 
regional  population  as  a  whole.  In  this  way  the 
price-related  loss  of  income  affecting  private 
consumers  is  balanced  by  price-related  growth  in 
farmers'  incomes.  The  regional  distribution  of 
consumers differs from the regional distribution of 
agricultural  production  not  least  because 
agricultural regions are, by their very nature, more 
thinly  populated  than  industrial  regions. 
Agricultural regions  are therefore subsidized  from 
consumer  income  in  the  centres  of  population. 
Inasmuch as the rural regions of the EC are also the 
poorer  regions,  the  equalization  effect  of the  EC 
system of agricultural price support is  greater than 
reflected  in  the  regional  distribution  of guarantee 
expenditure. This could be dealt with by 
(a)  producing quantitative estimates of the extent 
to which  EC agriculture  is  subsidized  by  the 
EC consumer, 
(b)  allocating the amount of the subsidies to the 
regions in line with their population, and 
(c)  offsetting the regional values of the guarantee 
payments  thus  allocated  against  the  regional 
values of consumer subsidies. 
Consumer  subsidies  are  calculated  as  EC 
production multiplied by the difference between the 
EC  price  and  the  world  market  price.  Exports 
(including  intermediate  inputs  included  in  exports 
of processed products) which are subsidized by EC 
citizens  as  a whole  in the  form  of export refunds 
and processing aid would need to be extracted from 
the  volume  of  production.  Variable  levies  on 
agricultural imports and the high duties on imports 
of processed  products  also  mean  a  reduction  in 
regional income for consumers. 
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This  method  of calculation  presupposes  that  all 
people living in the EC have the same standard of 
living as well as the same structure of consumption 
of agricultural  products  (directly  or via  processed 
products). It also assumes that exports are allocated 
to  regions  in  accordance  with  production  and 
imports  in  accordance  with  the  number  of 
inhabitants.  Since  the  regional  average  income  is 
known,  the  actual  regional  inequality  in 
consumption  could  be  taken  into  account  by 
assuming a similar quota of consumption of food 
and kindred products or - more realistically - a 
falling  quota as  income  rises.  The other-distorting 
elements  would  simply  have  to  be  accepted,  since 
not enough statistical information is  available and 
assumptions  of  similar  plausibility  cannot  be 
made. 
(iii)  Thirdly,  the  fund-raising  aspect  might  be  brought 
into the analysis, since the balances estimated in the 
foregoing  do not by any means  represent  the  full 
regional  income  effects  of  the  Community's 
agricultural  guaranteed  price  policy.  Guarantee 
expenditure  must  be  funded  in  some  way.  The 
Community's additional financial requirements are 
largely  met  out of VAT.  The regional  assessment 
basis for this should be estimated with the help of 
population  statistics,  per  capita  income  and 
assumptions about patterns of consumption. Once 
the maximum VAT share of the EC is  exhausted, 
expansion of the Community budget is  financed in 
proportion to the social product (fourth source of 
income). However, the amounts in question will  be 
paid by the Member States. Since it is not possible 
to analyse the regional incidence of such payments, 
they would have to be left out of account here. Appendix A 
Tables of EC financial flows by  region 
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A.3  European Regional Development Fund, investment grants by regions, modified data 
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87 Table A.l 
Population and income in the European Community by regions 
Population  Gross Domestic Product 
Code  Region Nuts 2 I  1988  1988 
1 ()()() 
I 
OJo  Mio ECU 
I 
% 
I 
ECU/head 
RC11  p  Norte  3602  1.11  10176  0.25  2823 
RC14  p  Alentejo  557  0.17  1734  0.04  3094 
RC15  p  Algarve  341  0.11  1056  0.03  3100 
RA41  GR  Voreio Aigaio  196  0.06  634  0.02  3240 
RC12  p  Centro  1783  0.55  6055  0.15  3382 
RA21  GR  lpeiros  321  0.10  1094  0.03  3404 
RA13  GR  Dytiki Makedonia  300  0.09  1137  0.03  3788 
RA43  GR  Kriti  514  0.16  2024  0.05  3934 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  652  0.20  2646  0.07  4060 
RA22  GR  Ionia Nisia  181  0.06  737  0.02  4074 
RA14  GR  Thessalia  696  0.21  2915  0.07  4189 
RA12  GR  Kentriki Makedonia  1654  0.51  7084  0.18  4284 
RA42  GR  Notio Aigaio  238  0.07  1073  0.03  4513 
RAil  GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  577  0.18  2630  0.07  4556 
RA25  GR  Peleponnisos  574  0.18  2629  0.07  4581 
RC13  p  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  3463  1.07  16277  0.40  4697 
RA3  GR  Attiki  3526  1.09  16755  0.42  4752 
RB43  E  Extremadura  1096  0.34  5391  0.13  4909 
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  126  0.04  672  0.02  5329 
RA24  GR  Sterea Ellada  563  0.17  3077  0.08  5464 
RB61  E  Andalucia  6798  2.10  39170  0.97  5759 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  1690  0.52  10327  0.26  6093 
RBll  E  Galicia  2847  0.88  18283  0.45  6398 
RB62  E  Murcia  1011  0.31  6669  0.17  6596 
R393  I  Calabria  2147  0.66  14838  0.37  6924 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  2623  0.81  18723  0.46  7114 
RB7  E  Can  arias  1448  0.45  10464  0.26  7221 
RB13  E  Cantabria  527  0.16  3832  0.10  7250 
R392  I  Basilicata  622  0.19  4689  0.12  7542 
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  3762  1.16  28476  0.71  7553 
R8  IRL  Ireland  3539  1.09  27494  0.68  7771 
RB12  E  Asturias  1135  0.35  8927  0.22  7833 
R37  I  Campania  5731  1.77  44881  1.11  7886 
RB24  E  Aragon  1208  0.37  9836  0.24  8091 
R3A  I  Sicilia  5141  1.59  42307  1.05  8269 
RB51  E  Cataluna  6090  1.88  51390  1.27  8417 
RB3  E  Madrid  4909  1.52  41764  1.04  8498 
R425  NL  Flevoland  194  0.06  1572  0.04  8560 
R391  I  Puglia  4043  1.25  34527  0.86  8568 
R3B  I  Sardegna  1651  0.51  14544  0.36  8832 
RB22  E  Navarra  520  0.16  4615  0.11  8856 
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  2194  0.68  19656  0.49  8933 
RB23  E  Rioja  259  0.08  2343  0.06  9031 
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  1578  0.49  14344  0.36  9085 
R382  I  Molise  335  0.10  3120  0.08  9313 
R523  B  Hainaut  1272  0.39  12670  0.31  9909 
R527  B  Namur  415  0.13  4140  0.10  10004 
R79  UK  Wales  2857  0.88  28634  0.71  10072 
R283  F  Corse  247  0.08  2506  0.06  10138 
R526  B  Luxembourg  227  0.07  2316  0.06  10257 
88 Table A.  I,  continued 
Population  Gross Domestic Product 
Code  Region Nuts 2 I  1988  1988 
1 ()()()  I 
o/o  Mio ECU  I 
%  I 
ECU/head 
R381  I  Abruzzi  1258  0.39  13146  0.33  10462 
R71  UK  North  3071  0.95  32457  0.81  10524 
R412  NL  Friesland  599  0.19  6445  0.16  10630 
R424  NL  Gelder  land  1784  0.55  19449  0.48  10868 
R77  UK  West Midlands  5207  1.61  57048  1.42  10950 
RB53  E  Baleares  672  0.21  7384  0.18  10954 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  4913  1.52  53851  1.34  10963 
R263  F  Limousin  732  0.23  8283  0.21  11272 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  2080  0.64  23360  0.58  11279 
R78  UK  North West  6354  1.96  72016  1.79  11279 
R13C  D  Ltineburg  1447  0.45  16684  0.41  11304 
R423  NL  Overijssel  1010  0.31  11492  0.29  11331 
R7A  UK  Scotland  5094  1.57  58113  1.44  11341 
R73  UK  East Midlands  3970  1.23  44958  1.12  11377 
R452  NL  Limburg  1095  0.34  12673  0.31  11479 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  1385  0.43  15959  0.40  11520 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  3925  1.21  45695  1.13  11607 
R76  UK  South West  4634  1.43  53426  1.33  11616 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  1600  0.49  18575  0.46  11617 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  2377  0.73  27702  0.69  11647 
R272  F  Auvergne  1328  0.41  15516  0.38  11651 
R352  I  Umbria  818  0.25  9562  0.24  11656 
R252  F  Bretagne  2773  0.86  32530  0.81  11727 
R515  B  Limburg  737  0.23  8734  0.22  11888 
R74  UK  East Anglia  2034  0.63  24021  0.60  11901 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  1329  0.41  16043  0.40  12047 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  2156  0.67  26306  0.65  12181 
R241  F  Lorraine  2321  0.72  28394  0.70  12192 
R524  B  Liege  992  0.31  12167  0.30  12247 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  3055  0.94  37998  0.94  12438 
R353  I  Marche  1429  0.44  17958  0.45  12545 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  1088  0.34  13681  0.34  12546 
R172  D  Trier  472  0.15  5908  0.15  12578 
R222  F  Picardie  1783  0.55  22439  0.56  12580 
R413  NL  Drenthe  437  0.13  5552  0.14  12659 
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  1095  0.34  13871  0.34  12681 
R226  F  Bourgogne  1614  0.50  20527  0.51  12704 
R471  NL  Utrecht  965  0.30  12301  0.31  12795 
R474  NL  Zeeland  356  0.11  4679  0.12  12991 
R16B  D  GieBen  956  0.30  12775  0.32  13152 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  4148  1.28  54500  1.35  13166 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  2128  0.66  28178  0.70  13202 
R261  F  Aquitaine  2737  0.85  36193  0.90  13227 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  970  0.30  12809  0.32  13241 
R192  D  Niederbayern  1029  0.32  13552  0.34  13253 
R224  F  Centre  2348  0.73  31500  0.78  13428 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  1360  0.42  18297  0.45  13435 
R153  D  MUnster  2392  0.74  32615  0.81  13514 
R171  D  Koblenz  1351  0.42  18503  0.46  13684 
R351  I  Toscana  3568  1.10  49087  1.22  13686 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  1210  0.37  16739  0.42  13705 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  3208  0.99  44181  1.10  13736 
R11  D  Schleswig-Holstein  2555  0.79  36190  0.90  13789 
R332  I  Veneto  4375  1.35  60509  1.50  13792 
89 Table A.J, continued 
Population  Gross Domestic Product 
Code  Region  Nuts 2 I  1988  1988 
1 ()()() 
I 
OJo  Mio ECU  I 
%  I 
ECU/head 
R196  D  Unterfranken  1207  0.37  16682  0.41  138I8 
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  882  0.27  12241  0.30  13870 
R36  I  Lazio  5137  1.59  71327  1.77  139I2 
R311  I  Piemonte  4377  1.35  61807  1.53  14023 
R313  I  Liguria  1750  0.54  24855  0.62  I4031 
R194  D  Oberfranken  1036  0.32  14867  0.37  14269 
R502  B  Brabant  2222  0.69  31806  0.79  14304 
R271  F  Rhone-Alpes  5205  1.61  75174  1.86  14453 
R16C  D  Kassel  1161  0.36  I7073  0.42  I4511 
R75  UK  South East  17344  5.36  257309  6.38  14823 
R242  F  Alsace  1614  0.50  23994  0.60  14875 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  587  0.18  8736  0.22  14877 
R6  L  Luxembourg  372  0.11  5555  0.14  14878 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  3924  1.21  59499  1.48  15066 
R154  D  Detmold  1798  0.56  27082  0.67  15086 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  2353  0.73  35579  0.88  15086 
R155  D  Arnsberg  3609  1.11  54205  1.34  I5138 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  1711  0.53  26094  0.65  15270 
RIA  D  Saarland  1054  0.33  I5993  0.40  15277 
RI83  D  Freiburg  I876  0.58  29038  0.72  15285 
R184  D  Ttibingen  1538  0.48  23950  0.59  15531 
RI97  D  Schwaben  I551  0.48  24447  0.61  15713 
R3I2  I  Vaile d 'Aosta  114  0.04  1810  0.04  I5854 
R511  B  Antwerpen  1588  0.49  25284  0.63  15928 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  I587  0.49  25656  0.64  16030 
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  1811  0.56  29107  0.72  16117 
RI52  D  Koln  3870  1.20  63032  1.56  16I40 
R13B  D  Hannover  200I  0.62  32630  0.8I  16I69 
R32  I  Lombardia  8886  2.75  I44331  3.58  16I97 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  2828  0.87  46318  1.15  16388 
R182  D  Karlsruhe  2408  0.74  42392  1.05  17510 
R151  D  Dusseldorf  5075  1.57  89678  2.22  I773I 
RI95  D  Mittelfranken  I528  0.47  27247  0.68  17830 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  2029  0.63  34397  0.85  1822I 
R181  D  Stuttgart  3509  1.08  6840I  1.70  I9508 
R191  D  Oberbayern  3628  1.12  73878  1.83  I9683 
R901  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  17I5  0.53  35944  0.89  20940 
R14  D  Bremen  659  0.20  I4093  0.35  2I446 
R16A  D  Darmstadt  3408  1.05  74259  1.84  2I707 
R21  F  Ile de France  10320  3.19  225272  5.59  2I846 
R411  NL  Groningen  557  0.17  13035  0.32  23013 
R12  D  Hamburg  I594  0.49  42112  1.04  26680 
EC (10)  275064  84.97  3708353  91.98  -
EC (I2)  323723  100.00  403I573  100.00  -
1  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer, A9ores and Madeira. 
The regions were put in order according to their regional GDP per head. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
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RC14 
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RA41 
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RA12 
RA42 
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RB43 
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Table A.2 
European Regional Development Fund, investment grants 
by regions,  original data t 
Total  Industry 
Region Nuts 2 2 
1986  1  1987  1  1989  1  1986  1  1990  1987 
p  Norte  84.2  142.1  55.2  32.6  - -
p  Alentejo  79.7  40.2  17.9  13.1  - -
p  Algarve  12.5  30.5  13.5  9.3  - -
GR  Voreio Aigaio  0.2  0.2  10.5  8.9  0.2  0.2 
p  Centro  109.9  51.2  74.6  14.2  - -
GR  lpeiros  15.8  15.7  26.4  10.4  - -
GR  Dytiki Makedonia  5.3  5.3  17.1  10.3  - -
GR  Kriti  37.0  36.7  46.2  58.2  - -
GR  Dytiki Ellada  - - 2.5  - - -
GR  Ionia Nisia  - - 0.7  0.3  - -
GR  Thessalia  21.9  21.7  16.3  24.0  0.1  0.1 
GR  Kentriki Makedonia  13.2  13.1  90.3  91.0  - -
GR  Notio Aigaio  0.5  0.5  1.4  - 0.6  0.5 
GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  13.7  13.6  76.4  96.0  0.6  0.5 
GR  Peleponnisos  0.1  0.1  152.3  24.7  0.1  0.1 
p  Lis boa e Vale do Tejo  26.6  40.8  111.0  59.6  - -
GR  At  tiki  - - - - - -
E  Extremadura  71.8  24.7  37.4  50.2  0.6  -
E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - 4.8  - -
GR  Sterea Ellada  - - - - - -
E  Andalucia  247.2  269.0  281.2  331.8  4.7  -
E  Castilla-La Mancha  62.9  107.7  135.4  157.1  1.4  -
E  Galicia  42.3  39.5  49.8  57.5  3.4  -
E  Murcia  23.0  38.7  24.1  42.7  - -
I  Calabria  66.8  35.1  17.9  26.6  15.6  -
E  Castilla-Leon  139.7  84.8  101.4  141.8  1.1  -
E  Canarias  10.5  14.6  16.0  65.7  - -
E  Cantabria  - - 1.2  31.2  - -
I  Basilicata  103.1  93.5  17.5  16.9  20.4  51.2 
E  Comunidad Valenciana  - - 45.5  52.5  - -
IRL  Ireland  126.8  163.5  209.1  291.3  22.0  24.8 
E  Asturias  37.7  53.0  82.6  62.8  - -
I  Campania  415.2  504.4  377.2  221.4  71.0  32.9 
E  Aragon  - 5.5  4.5  17.1  - -
I  Sicilia  55.5  159.3  110.4  129.8  12.8  -
E  Cataluna  - - 10.8  93.3  - -
E  Madrid  - - 18.6  0.4  - -
NL  Flevoland  - - - - - -
I  Puglia  34.6  17.7  28.9  67.8  17.0  1.0 
I  Sardegna  39.3  21.5  39.7  35.8  10.9  -
E  Navarra  - - 0.7  1.6  - -
E  Pais Vasco  - - 11.8  31.7  - -
E  Rioja  - - - 1.5  - -
UK  Northern Ireland  61.6  56.4  66.4  92.7  25.0  5.8 
I  Molise  26.6  5.9  29.3  1.4  4.0  -
B  Hainaut  - - 1.0  6.1  - -
B  Namur  0.7  - 0.6  0.0  - -
UK  Wales  67.1  79.3  34.4  0.5  14.3  7.2 
F  Corse  5.0  10.8  10.8  6.0  - -
B  Luxembourg  3.1  0.6  12.6  6.8  - -
(MioECU) 
Infrastructure 
1986  1  1987 
84.2  142.1 
79.7  40.2 
12.5  30.5 
- -
109.9  51.2 
23.0  15.6 
7.8  5.3 
24.9  16.9 
- -
- -
31.8  21.6 
19.3  13.1 
- -
19.3  13.1 
- -
26.6  40.8 
- -
71.2  24.7 
- -
- -
242.6  269.0 
61.5  107.7 
38.9  39.5 
23.0  38.7 
51.2  35.1 
138.6  84.8 
10.5  14.6 
- -
82.7  42.3 
- -
102.6  69.5 
37.7  48.7 
344.2  471.5 
- 5.5 
42.3  157.2 
- -
- -
- -
17.6  10.5 
28.4  21.5 
- -
- -
- -
33.6  50.6 
22.7  4.1 
- -
0.7  -
39.5  72.0 
5.0  0.1 
3.1  0.6 
91 Table A .2, continued 
Total  Industry  Infrastructure 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
1986  1  1987  1  1989  1  1986  1  1986  1  1990  1987  1987 
R381  I  Abruzzi  41.1  32.2  51.1  18.6  17.0  10.0  24.1  22.2 
R71  UK  North  58.0  89.5  11.2  13.0  4.4  1.3  53.4  68.4 
R412  NL  Friesland  2.6  6.8  10.7  5.5  - - 2.6  6.8 
R424  NL  Gelderland  - - - - - - - -
R77  UK  West Midlands  59.7  94.3  10.1  16.7  1.1  5.5  58.5  67.2 
RB53  E  Baleares  - - - - - - - -
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  59.4  43.8  3.7  57.5  6.9  8.0  52.5  35.7 
R263  F  Limousin  6.9  22.2  13.6  7.9  0.4  - 6.5  6.5 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  5.6  29.1  35.7  31.1  0.8  - 4.8  10.9 
R78  UK  North West  70.1  53.0  8.9  0.1  4.6  3.5  35.0  49.3 
Rl3C  D  Liineburg  3.9  3.8  3.2  5.3  1.0  1.2  2.9  0.8 
R423  NL  Overijssel  - - 0.8  0.2  - - - -
R7A  UK  Scotland  80.9  164.8  20.3  44.2  24.6  7.9  44.5  69.2 
R73  UK  East Midlands  4.0  3.6  - 4.5  3.1  1.1  0.9  2.5 
R452  NL  Limburg  17.9  8.4  7.6  5.1  - - 17.9  8.4 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  4.7  0.9  0.3  4.6  1.3  - 3.4  -
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  36.3  33.2  14.8  57.4  1.5  0.2  22.4  5.7 
R76  UK  South West  33.5  40.1  10.8  - 0.1  3.5  33.4  36.5 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  12.2  11.4  9.1  6.7  0.5  0.6  11.0  6.8 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  29.8  38.3  46.2  42.8  1.0  1.9  15.0  22.0 
R272  F  Auvergne  8.8  24.8  18.9  9.8  1.0  0.1  7.8  7.1 
R352  I  Umbria  - 3.1  1.5  3.1  - - - -
R252  F  Bretagne  21.6  12.1  17.5  15.9  1.6  - 19.0  3.0 
R515  B  Limburg  1.8  4.3  11.2  6.5  - - 1.6  0.8 
R74  UK  East Anglia  - - - - - - - -
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  - - 1.1  0.9  - - - -
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  - - - - - - - -
R241  F  Lorraine  54.1  33.0  48.1  51.7  3.1  0.2  31.4  20.3 
R524  B  Liege  4.2  0.8  1.3  9.0  - - 4.2  0.8 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  24.9  7.8  2.5  19.8  1.9  0.2  21.5  2.0 
R353  I  Marche  9.6  8.1  11.0  2.6  3.1  5.8  6.'5  0.5 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  0.4  2.0  - 6.2  0.4  - - 1.5 
R172  D  Trier  - 3.8  3.0  0.9  - 3.8  - -
R222  F  Picardie  3.3  1.3  - 8.1  0.1  0.1  2.1  -
R413  NL  Drenthe  - - 4.0  1.5  - - - -
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  0.4  1.5  0.6  - - - 0.4  0.1 
R226  F  Bourgogne  2.2  2.7  0.9  3.6  - - - -
R471  NL  Utrecht  - - - - - - - -
R474  NL  Zeeland  - - - - - - - -
R16B  D  GieBen  2.0  0.6  - - 2.0  0.6  - -
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  14.8  5.1  4.6  9.2  - - 14.8  3.4 
Rl3D  D  Weser-Ems  9.2  13.9  1.5  7.1  1.6  8.1  7.6  5.8 
R261  F  Aquitaine  17.0  18.3  34.4  28.0  1.1  0.1  15.9  6.1 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  0.8  1.1  1.1  3.9  0.5  0.9  0.4  0.2 
R192  D  Niederbayern  7.4  9.4  3.8  1.8  5.0  1.3  2.4  8.1 
R224  F  Centre  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  - - -
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  8.0  3.7  4.1  5.3  0.3  0.1  6.0  1.8 
R153  D  Munster  4.6  2.4  3.8  1.4  4.6  2.3  - 0.1 
R171  D  Koblenz  - 1.9  0.3  0.4  - 1.9  - -
R351  I  Toscana  - 15.2  13.4  9.7  - 0.4  - 10.0 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  - - 1.3  4.4  - - - -
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  - - - 2.8  - - - -
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  8.2  5.3  17.6  2.0  5.7  3.5  2.6  1.0 
R332  I  Veneto  - 5.0  - - - - - -
R196  D  Unterfranken  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.5 
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Total  Industry  Infrastructure 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
1986  1  1987  1  1989  1  1986  1  1986  1  1990  1987  1987 
R33I  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  - - - - - - - -
R36  I  Lazio  22.0  33.2  10.2  8.I  I4.4  I9.2  7.6  I4.0 
R311  I  Piemonte  - 6.3  3.6  I2.0  - - - -
R3I3  I  Liguria  - 0.9  7.6  6.6  - - - -
RI94  D  Oberfranken  4.5  4.8  0.7  2.5  4.2  4.0  0.3  0.9 
R502  B  Brabant  2.I  - 0.3  1.3  - - 2.I  -
R27I  F  Rhbne-Alpes  3.9  I2.8  6.6  I5.5  0.9  - 1.2  I1.4 
RI6C  D  Kassel  6.0  4.8  5.7  0.6  5.7  4.5  0.3  0.3 
R75  UK  South East  - - - - - - - -
R242  F  Alsace  4.I  0.2  1.6  - 1.6  - 1.6  -
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  1.8  1.0  1.6  2.6  0.2  0.2  1.6  0.3 
R6  L  Luxembourg  3.4  3.3  1.2  0.6  - - - 2.3 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  - - 4.0  - - - - -
RI54  D  Detmold  - - 0.4  O.I  - - - -
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  - - - 0.6  - - - -
RI55  D  Arnsberg  0.4  1.6  1.2  0.3  0.4  1.6  - -
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  1.2  2.I  0.2  7.2  1.2  - - 2.I 
RIA  D  Saarland  5.9  8.7  7.4  13.6  5.9  1.2  - -
RI83  D  Freiburg  - - - - - - - -
RI84  D  Tubing  en  - - - - - - - -
RI97  D  Schwa  ben  - - - - - - - -
R3I2  I  Valle d'Aosta  - - - 0.8  - - - -
R511  B  Antwerpen  1.2  0.5  2.5  4.2  0.9  - 0.3  0.5 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  6.0  9.3  2.9  3.3  5.5  4.2  0.4  5.I 
RI73  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  - Il.4  1.9  0.9  - I1.4  - -
RI52  D  KOln  8.2  - O.I  - 8.2  - - -
RI3B  D  Hannover  1.8  2.9  0.2  1.2  0.7  2.6  l.I  0.4 
R32  I  Lombardia  - 7.0  1.5  l.I  - - - -
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  9.3  11.5  9.2  I1.9  1.0  5.0  5.9  3.9 
RI82  D  Karlsruhe  1.2  0.5  0.0  O.I  1.2  0.2  - 0.2 
R151  D  Dusseldorf  0.6  9.2  4.2  1.0  0.6  4.7  - 4.5 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  0.4  1.5  1.5  0.1  - 1.5  0.4  -
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  O.I  22.I  I8.3  5.0  - - - 22.1 
R181  D  Stuttgart  - - - 0.0  - - - -
R191  D  Oberbayem  3.6  0.5  0.0  - - 0.5  3.6  -
R90I  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  - - - - - - - -
R14  D  Bremen  6.6  3.9  3.4  13.8  0.4  0.3  6.1  1.3 
RI6A  D  Darmstadt  0.6  0.4  l.I  0.4  0.5  0.4  O.I  -
R2I  F  Ile de France  - - - - - - - -
R411  NL  Groningen  0.7  5.3  2.1  9.4  - - 0.7  -
R12  D  Hamburg  - - - - - - - -
EC(lO)  I939.3  2284.2  I963.5  1888.9  368.7  260.I  I466.3  I581.9 
EC(12)  2887.3  3226.5  3056.7  3161.3  379.9  260.I  2403.2  25I9.9 
1  Grants chargeable directly on Nuts 2-regions. 
2  For United Kingdom Nuts 1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional GOP per head. 
Sources: Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
93 Code 
RC11 
RC14 
RC15 
RA41 
RC12 
RA21 
RA13 
RA43 
RA23 
RA22 
RA14 
RA12 
RA42 
RA11 
RA25 
RC13 
RA3 
RB43 
RB63 
RA24 
RB61 
RB42 
RB11 
RB62 
R393 
RB41 
RB7 
RB13 
R392 
RB52 
R8 
RB12 
R37 
RB24 
R3A 
RB51 
RB3 
R425 
R391 
R3B 
RB22 
RB21 
RB23 
R7B 
R382 
R523 
R527 
R79 
R283 
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Table A.3 
European Regional Development Fund 
Investment grants by regions 
Modified data t 
Total 
Region Nuts '2  2 
1986  1  1987  1  1989  1  1990 
p  Norte  88.6  153.6  71.5  72.4 
p  Alentejo  80.9  43.5  23.2  29.0 
p  Algarve  13.4  33.0  17.5  20.7 
OR  Voreio Aigaio  0.4  0.4  13.6  15.5 
p  Centro  111.5  55.4  96.6  31.5 
OR  Ipeiros  88.7  88.0  34.2  18.1 
OR  Dytiki Makedonia  14.5  14.4  22.1  17.9 
OR  Kriti  72.3  71.7  59.8  101.3 
OR  Dytiki Ellada  - - 3.3  -
OR  Ionia Nisia  - - 1.0  0.5 
OR  Thessalia  59.4  58.9  21.1  41.8 
OR  Kentriki Makedonia  35.9  35.6  116.8  158.3 
OR  Notio Aigaio  1.0  1.0  1.8  -
OR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  37.2  36.9  98.9  167.0 
OR  Peleponnisos  0.6  0.6  197.0  43.0 
p  Lis boa e Vale do Tejo  27.9  44.1  143.8  132.6 
OR  Attiki  - - - -
E  Extremadura  71.8  25.6  49.4  61.6 
E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - 5.9 
OR  Sterea Ellada  - - - -
E  Andalucia  247.3  278.8  371.4  407.1 
E  Castilla-La Mancha  62.9  111.6  178.9  192.7 
E  Galicia  42.3  40.9  65.8  70.5 
E  Murcia  23.0  40.1  31.9  52.4 
I  Calabria  67.5  36.7  20.3  48.8 
E  Castilla-Leon  139.7  87.9  133.9  174.0 
E  Canarias  10.5  15.1  21.2  80.6 
E  Cantabria  - - 1.6  38.3 
I  Basilicata  105.1  97.9  19.9  31.1 
E  Comunidad V  alenciana  - - 60.2  64.4 
IRL  Ireland  126.9  163.5  209.1  291.3 
E  Asturias  37.7  54.9  109.2  77.0 
I  Campania  426.1  527.7  429.2  406.2 
E  Aragon  0.0  5.7  6.0  20.9 
I  Sicilia  58.9  166.7  125.6  238.2 
E  Cataluna  - - 14.2  114.5 
E  Madrid  - - 24.6  0.4 
NL  Flevoland  - - - -
I  Puglia  35.0  18.5  32.9  124.4 
I  Sardegna  39.8  22.5  45.1  65.7 
E  Navarra  - - 0.9  2.0 
E  Pais Vasco  - - 15.6  38.9 
E  Rioja  - - - 1.9 
UK  Northern Ireland  67.3  57.3  72.2  94.2 
I  Molise  26.7  6.2  33.3  2.5 
B  Hainaut  - - 1.0  6.1 
B  Namur  0.7  - 0.6  0.0 
UK  Wales  75.2  80.5  37.4  0.5 
F  Corse  6.8  12.6  11.4  6.3 
(MioECU) 
Industry  Infrastructure 
1986  1  1987  1986  1  1987 
0.0  0.0  88.5  142.1 
0.0  0.0  80.9  40.2 
0.0  0.0  13.4  30.5 
0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 
0.0  0.0  111.5  51.2 
0.0  0.0  73.7  50.0 
0.0  0.0  15.6  10.6 
0.0  0.0  52.3  35.5 
- - - -
- - - -
0.1  0.1  63.5  43.1 
0.0  0.0  38.4  26.1 
0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3 
0.6  0.5  39.2  26.6 
0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2 
0.0  0.0  27.8  40.8 
- - - -
0.6  0.0  71.2  24.7 
- - - -
- - - -
4.7  0.0  242.5  269.0 
1.4  0.0  61.5  107.7 
3.4  0.0  38.9  39.5 
0.0  0.0  23.0  38.7 
15.6  0.0  51.2  35.1 
1.1  0.0  138.6  84.8 
0.0  0.0  10.5  14.6 
- - - -
20.3  51.2  82.7  42.3 
- - - -
22.0  24.8  102.6  69.5 
0.0  0.0  37.7  48.7 
71.0  32.9  344.2  471.5 
0.0  0.0  0.0  5.5 
12.8  0.0  42.3  157.2 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
17.0  1.0  17.6  10.5 
10.9  0.0  28.4  21.5 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
25.0  5.8  35.3  50.6 
4.0  0.0  22.7  4.1 
- - - -
- - 0.7  -
14.3  7.2  41.9  72.0 
0.0  0.0  5.8  1.0 Table A.3, continued 
Total  Industry  Infrastructure 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
1986  1  1987  1  1989  1  1986  1  1986  1  1990  1987  1987 
R526  B  Luxembourg  4.6  1.8  12.7  6.9  0.2  0.1  3.1  1.0 
R381  I  Abruzzi  41.8  33.6  58.1  34.2  17.0  10.0  24.0  22.2 
R71  UK  North  67.1  90.9  12.2  13.2  4.4  1.3  56.2  68.4 
R412  NL  Friesland  5.9  6.7  11.0  - 0.0  0.0  2.6  6.8 
R424  NL  Gelder  land  - - - - - - - -
R77  UK  West Midlands  69.3  95.8  11.0  17.0  1.1  5.5  61.4  67.2 
RB53  E  Baleares  - - - - - - - -
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  63.9  44.5  4.0  58.5  6.9  8.0  53.9  35.7 
R263  F  Limousin  10.6  25.9  14.5  8.3  0.4  0.0  8.2  8.3 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  10.4  33.9  37.9  32.7  0.8  0.0  7.1  13.4 
R78  UK  North West  75.5  53.8  9.7  0.1  4.6  3.5  36.6  49.3 
R13C  D  Liineburg  3.9  3.8  - - 1.0  1.2  2.9  0.8 
R423  NL  Overijssel  - - 0.8  - - - - -
R7A  UK  Scotland  97.7  167.4  22.0  45.0  24.6  7.9  49.6  69.2 
R73  UK  East Midlands  4.4  3.7  - 4.5  3.1  1.1  1.0  2.5 
R452  NL  Limburg  18.5  8.4  7.9  - 0.0  0.0  17.9  8.4 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  4.9  1.0  0.4  4.8  1.3  0.0  3.5  0.1 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  41.8  38.7  15.7  60.4  1.5  0.2  25.0  8.4 
R76  UK  South West  37.6  40.7  11.8  - 0.1  3.5  34.6  36.5 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  14.1  13.3  9.7  7.1  0.5  0.6  11.9  7.8 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  36.1  -44.6  49.0  45.0  1.0  1.9  18.0  25.2 
R272  F  Auvergne  12.9  28.9  20.1  10.3  1.0  0.1  9.7  9.1 
R352  I  Umbria  0.1  3.2  1.7  5.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
R252  F  Bretagne  23.6  14.1  18.6  16.7  1.6  0.0  19.9  4.0 
R515  B  Limburg  12.3  13.1  11.2  6.6  1.2  0.8  1.7  3.3 
R74  UK  East Anglia  - - - - - - - -
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  - - 1.1  0.9  - - - -
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  - - - - - - - -
R241  F  Lorraine  59.7  38.4  51.1  54.4  3.1  0.2  33.9  23.0 
R524  B  Liege  6.2  2.4  1.3  9.1  0.2  0.1  4.2  1.3 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  26.2  9.1  2.6  20.8  1.9  0.2  22.1  2.7 
R353  I  Marche  9.8  8.5  12.6  4.8  3.1  5.8  6.5  0.5 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  0.7  2.3  - 6.5  0.4  0.0  0.2  1.7 
R172  D  Trier  0.0  4.3  - 0.0  0.0  4.3  0.0  0.0 
R222  F  Picardie  3.5  1.5  - 8.5  0.1  0.1  2.2  0.1 
R413  NL  Drenthe  - - 4.1  - - - - -
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  4.1  4.6  0.6  - 0.4  0.3  0.4  1.0 
R226  F  Bourgogne  2.7  3.1  0.9  3.8  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2 
R471  NL  Utrecht  - - - - - - - -
R474  NL  Zeeland  - - - - - - - -
R16B  D  GieBen  2.0  0.6  - - 2.0  0.6  0.0  0.0 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d 'Azur  15.6  5.9  4.8  9.7  0.0  0.0  15.2  3.8 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  9.3  13.9  - - 1.6  8.1  7.7  5.8 
R261  F  Aquitaine  20.0  21.3  36.5  29.5  1.1  0.1  17.3  7.6 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  0.8  1.2  - - 0.5  0.9  0.4  0.2 
R192  D  Niederbayern  7.4  10.2  - - 4.9  1.3  2.4  8.1 
R224  F  Centre  0.2  0.3  0.1  - 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  8.7  4.3  4.4  5.6  0.3  0.1  6.3  2.1 
R153  D  Munster  4.6  3.5  - - 4.6  2.3  0.0  0.1 
R171  D  Koblenz  0.0  2.1  - - 0.0  2.1  0.0  0.0 
R351  I  Toscana  0.3  15.9  15.3  17.7  0.0  0.5  0.0  10.1 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  - - 1.5  8.0  - - - -
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  - - - - - - - -
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  8.2  5.3  - - 5.7  3.5  2.6  1.0 
R332  I  Veneto  0.1  5.2  - - 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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Total  Industry  Infrastructure 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
1986  1  1987  1  1989  1  1986  1  1986  1  1990  1987  1987 
RI%  D  Unterfranken  0.5  0.8  - - 0.2  0.2  0.3  0.5 
R33I  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  - - - - - - - -
R36  I  Lazio  22.7  34.7  Il.6  I4.8  I4.4  I9.2  7.6  I4.0 
R311  . I  Piemonte  O.I  6.6  4.I  22.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
R313  I  Liguria  0.0  0.9  8.7  I2.I  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
RI94  D  Oberfranken  4.5  5.2  - - 4.2  4.0  0.3  0.9 
R502  B  Brabant  2.I  - 0.3  1.4  - - 2.I  -
R27I  F  Rhone-Alpes  6.0  I4.9  7.0  I6.3  0.9  0.0  2.2  I2.5 
RI6C  D  Kassel  6.0  4.8  - - 5.6  4.5  0.4  0.3 
R75  UK  South East  0.0  0.0  - - 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
R242  F  Alsace  4.I  0.2  1.7  0.0  1.6  0.0  1.6  0.0 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  1.8  1.4  2.2  3.6  0.2  0.2  1.6  0.3 
R6  L  Luxembourg  3.4  3.3  1.2  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  - - 4.6  - - - - -
RI54  D  Detmold  - - - - - - - -
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  - - - - - - - -
RI55  D  Arnsberg  0.4  2.3  - - 0.4  1.6  0.0  0.0 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  1.6  2.4  0.2  7.6  1.2  0.0  O.I  2.3 
RIA  D  Saarland  5.9  8.7  - - 5.9  1.2  0.0  0.0 
RI83  D  Freiburg  - - - - - - - -
RI84  D  Tiibingen  - - - - - - - -
RI97  D  Schwaben  - - - - - - - -
R3I2  I  Vaile d 'Aosta  - - - 1.4  - - - -
R511  B  Antwerpen  2.4  1.5  2.5  4.3  1.0  O.I  0.3  0.8 
Rl3A  D  Braunschweig  6.I  9.3  - - 5.5  4.2  0.5  5.I 
RI73  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  0.0  I2.8  - - 0.0  I2.8  0.0  0.0 
RI52  D  Koln  8.2  - - - 8.2  - - -
Rl3B  D  Hannover  1.8  2.9  - - 0.7  2.6  I.  I  0.4 
R32  I  Lombardia  0.2  7.3  1.7  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  9.3  I5.7  I2.7  I6.8  1.0  5.0  5.8  3.9 
RI82  D  Karlsruhe  1.2  0.5  - - 1.2  0.2  0.0  0.2 
RI5I  D  Dusseldorf  0.5  13.3  - - 0.5  4.7  0.0  4.5 
RI95  D  Mittel  franken  0.4  1.6  - - 0.0  1.5  0.4  0.0 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  0.1  22.1  - - 0.0  0.0  0.0  22.I 
RI81  D  Stuttgart  - - - - - - - -
R191  D  Oberbayern  3.6  0.5  - - 0.0  0.5  3.6  0.0 
R90I  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  - - - - - - - -
R14  D  Bremen  6.6  3.9  - - 0.4  0.3  6.I  1.3 
R16A  D  Darmstadt  0.6  0.4  - - 0.5  0.4  0.1  0.0 
R2I  F  lie de France  - - - - - - - -
R411  NL  Groningen  3.3  5.3  2.2  - 0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0 
R12  D  Hamburg  - - - - - - - -
EC(IO)  22%.3  26I2.7  2I45.2  2537.7  370.5  263.5  1664.4  l716.I 
EC(12)  3253.9  3602.9  3582.2  4227.0  38I.6  263.5  2610.4  2654.3 
1  Grants chargeable on Nuts 2-regions directly as  well as indirectly by estimates. 
2  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional GDP per head. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
96 Table A.4 
European Social Fund, obligations 
(MioECU) 
Original data 2  Modified data 3 
Code  Region Nuts 2 I 
1986  1  1987  1  1988  1  1986  1  1987  1  1988  1  1989  1989 
RCll  p  Norte  - - - 20.4  47.2  75.0  70.3  76.7 
RC14  p  Alentejo  - - - 4.2  18.7  29.7  27.9  26.5 
:  RC15  p  Algarve  - - - 4.3  4.9  7.8  7.3  10.1 
RA41  GR  Voreio Aigaio  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  1.6  1.8  2.5  0.1 
RC12  p  Centro  - - - 8.5  29.3  46.6  43.7  43.5 
RA21  GR  Ipeiros  0.1  0.2  1.0  1.1  2.4  2.8  4.5  1.2 
I  RA13  GR  Dytiki Makedonia  0.2  0.4  0.7  1.1  2.8  3.3  4.6  1.7 
! 
RA43  GR  Kriti  0.7  0.6  1.5  1.4  3.3  3.5  5.4  1.5 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  4.8  6.9  6.1  5.0  11.6  14.5  16.3  5.2 
RA22  GR  Ionia Nisia  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.9  1.1  1.4  0.0 
RA14  GR  Thessalia  0.4  0.6  1.1  1.5  7.2  8.4  11.5  3.1 
RA12  GR  Kentriki Makedonia  2.9  4.8  5.5  13.5  19.0  23.0  29.9  17.1 
RA42  GR  Notio Aigaio  0.5  0.8  0.1  1.3  2.2  2.8  2.8  1.3 
RAll  GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  1.3  2.0  1.1  0.4  8.7  10.4  12.3  2.1 
RA25  GR  Peleponnisos  0.4  0.5  0.1  3.9  5.1  5.9  7.3  4.1 
RC13  p  Lis  boa e Vale do Tejo  - - - 44.5  115.5  183.6  172.1  182.1 
RA3  GR  Attiki  20.3  31.0  41.9  44.4  70.8  87.9  118.2  46.1 
RB43  E  Extremadura  8.5  15.9  17.9  26.9  11.6  16.2  18.0  26.9 
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  0.7  1.6  1.6  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.6  L9 
RA24  GR  Sterea Ellada  0.1  0.3  0.7  2.1  5.7  6.6  9.2  2.3 
RB61  E  Andalucia  46.7  101.7  115.5  153.7  72.2  104.0  116.1  153.9 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  11.3  19.3  22.5  27.2  14.4  19.6  22.6  27.3 
RBll  E  Galicia  17.8  30.3  32.1  31.4  24.1  30.9  32.2  31.4 
RB62  E  Murcia  7.7  13.2  14.7  16.7  9.9  13.4  14.8  16.7 
R393  I  Calabria  14.8  16.9  24.2  39.2  28.0  29.3  33.0  47.4 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  17.5  28.1  38.8  53.8  24.7  28.8  39.0  53.9 
RB7  E  Canarias  8.3  24.7  24.6  33.8  13.4  25.1  24.7  33.8 
RB13  E  Cantabria  2.4  4.2  5.6  7.0  4.3  4.4  5.7  7.0 
R392  I  Basilicata  15.7  15.5  18.8  19.3  19.3  18.9  21.2  21.5 
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  16.9  33.1  33.0  36.4  27.4  34.1  33.3  36.5 
R8  IRL  Ireland  242.0  209.1  213.5  234.7  242.0  209.1  213.5  234.7 
RB12  E  Asturias  3.7  9.4  12.3  13.1  8.2  9.8  12.4  13.1 
R37  I  Campania  11.8  26.2  12.2  16.9  62.4  73.3  44.0  47.8 
RB24  E  Aragon  4.6  11.2  12.9  15.8  7.2  11.4  13.0  15.8 
R3A  I  Sicilia  25.9  37.7  48.7  47.0  52.4  62.4  65.3  63.2 
RB51  E  Cataluna  32.5  67.6  76.6  87.3  55.7  69.8  . 77.3  87.5 
RB3  E  Madrid  17.6  44.5  41.8  53.5  32.5  45.9  42.2  53.6 
R425  NL  Flevoland  0.0  0.6  1.3  0.8  0.5  1.0  1.7  1.3 
R391  I  Puglia  28.0  33.5  26.6  30.0  44.9  49.2  37.8  40.5 
R3B  I  Sardegna  13.0  33.3  29.9  27.8  22.6  42.2  35.9  33.6 
RB22  E  Navarra  3.3  5.1  5.3  5.3  4.3  5.2  5.3  5.3 
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  28.7  24.9  28.9  33.3  37.6  25.7  29.1  33.4 
RB23  E  Rioja  1.0  2.0  2.6  3.1  1.6  2.0  2.6  3.1 
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  69.8  79.8  76.8  76.3  85.4  101.7  97.4  94.1 
R382  I  Molise  1.0  3.7  6.0  5.4  2.5  5.1  6.9  6.3 
R523  B  Hainaut  5.2  5.9  3.1  4.8  7.9  12.7  8.8  10.1 
R527  B  Namur  2.2  0.6  0.2  1.9  2.9  2.3  1.7  3.2 
R79  UK  Wales  7.8  8.5  10.0  29.0  20.9  26.9  27.3  43.9 
R283  F  Corse  0.6  0.9  0.5  1.8  1.4  1.8  1.4  2.6 
I  R526  B  Luxembourg  0.9  0.9  0.5  0.9  1.1  1.6  1.1  1.3 
R381  I  Abruzzi  17.3  15.4  28.8  28.3  21.0  18.8  31.1  30.6 
97 Table A.4, continued 
Original data 2  Modified data 3 
Code  Region Nuts 2 t 
1986 l 1987  1  1988  1  1986  1  1987  1  1988  1  1989  1989 
R71  UK  North  10.8  20.2  29.3  33.8  31.1  48.7  56.1  56.9 
R412  NL  Friesland  0.3  0.9  0.7  1.3  2.1  2.7  2.5  3.7 
R424  NL  Gelder  hind  2.2  3.1  3.6  5.1  6.6  7.8  8.3  10.4 
R77  UK  West Midlands  13.2  21.0  28.5  33.0  42.5  62.2  67.2  66.3 
RB53  E  Baleares  2.5  5.0  6.1  5.0  3.6  5.1  6.2  5.0 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  13.8  13.2  24.2  31.9  40.2  50.3  59.0  61.8 
R263  F  Limousin  1.4  3.9  4.2  15.1  3.5  6.1  6.5  17.4 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  6.8  5.3  3.3  11.2  15.2  14.1  12.6  20.4 
R78  UK  North West  21.3  32.2  31.9  51.2  59.1  85.3  81.7  94.1 
. R13C  D  Liineburg  0.0  - - - 1.5  2.5  2.7  3.1 
R423  NL  Overijssel  4.7  4.9  6.8  11.2  7.3  7.6  9.5  14.2 
R7A  UK  Scotland  22.5  27.2  30.3  48.0  53.7  71.0  71.4  83.4 
R73  UK  East Midlands  1.8  2.1  4.2  10.1  17.9  24.6  25.4  28.4 
R452  NL  Limburg  3.0  5.4  2.3  1.2  6.0  8.6  5.5  4.9 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  6.0  1.7  1.6  1.2  11.1  7.0  7.2  6.8 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  18.8  19.8  13.0  20.7  36.8  38.6  32.8  40.3 
R76  UK  South West  3.1  4.3  11.2  3.9  15.4  21.5  27.3  17.8 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  5.8  5.2  2.7  2.5  12.3  12.0  9.9  9.5 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  5.6  3.8  2.8  8.1  12.9  11.4  10.8  16.1 
R272  F  Auvergne  5.7  3.2  4.6  5.7  10.6  8.4  10.0  11.0 
R352  I  Umbria  4.3  3.8  2.6  6.4  7.0  6.3  4.3  8.1 
R252  F  Bretagne  6.4  4.3  4.7  6.7  16.9  15.3  16.2  18.2 
R515  B  Limburg  1.0  1.9  4.8  5.2  2.3  5.2  7.6  7.7 
R74  UK  East Anglia  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.6  5.2  7.1  7.2  6.3 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  1.4  0.3  0.1  0.2  2.8  3.8  3.1  2.9 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  4.5  2.9  3.5  6.6  9.6  8.3  8.8  12.7 
R241  F  Lorraine  10.2  8.2  5.5  3.3  17.7  16.0  13.8  ll.5 
R524  B  Liege  3.7  3.6  2.7  4.3  5.5  8.2  6.5  7.8 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  6.7  7.5  2.7  6.3  19.5  20.9  16.8  20.3 
R353  I  Marche  5.2  12.6  9.2  10.6  8.2  15.4  11.2  12.5 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  2.7  1.6  1.2  1.3  6.3  5.4  5.2  5.2 
R172  D  Trier  - - 0.1  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.8  1.1 
R222  F  Picardie  1.4  1.7  1.5  32.2  8.2  8.8  8.9  39.6 
R413  NL  Drenthe  1.2  0.3  3.4  0.4  2.1  1.2  4.3  1.6 
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.4  1.0  2.3  2.0  1.9 
R226  F  Bourgogne  1.8  2.0  0.3  - 7.4  7.9  6.5  6.1 
R471  NL  Utrecht  1.5  1.2  0.4  1.0  3.6  3.5  2.6  3.6 
R474  NL  Zeeland  0.1  0.6  - - 0.6  1.1  0.5  0.6 
R16B  D  GieBen  - 0.0  1.0  0.1  0.5  1.5  2.5  1.5 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  12.9  16.9  7.8  11.5  26.9  31.6  23.3  26.8 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  0.2  0.7  0.4  2.8  3.1  5.7  5.7  9.0 
R261  F  Aquitaine  9.7  5.4  2.9  7.5  20.0  16.1  14.1  18.6 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  1.5  1.7  2.0 
R192  D  Niederbayern  - - - - 0.4  0.9  1.0  1.1 
R224  F  Centre  0.7  0.9  0.7  4.3  8.1  8.6  8.9  12.4 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  1.6  1.3  1.2  1.4  6.9  6.9  7.1  7.2 
R153  D  Munster  0.5  1.1  0.1  1.0  3.3  7.2  7.9  9.6 
R171  D  Koblenz  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  1.0  1.9  1.9  2.2 
R351  I  Toscana  5.3  11.7  10.4  9.3  13.6  19.4  15.6  14.4 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  17.0  21.0  12.4  12.5  19.6  23.4  14.0  14.1 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  5.6  2.6  2.8  4.5  14.2  11.6  11.8  14.7 
R11  D  Schleswig-Holstein  0.7  0.5  1.5  0.9  2.9  5.2  6.5  6.8 
R332  I  Veneto  9.5  20.0  22.2  13.8  16.3  26.4  26.5  18.0 
R196  D  Unterfranken  - - 0.1  0.1  0.6  1.3  1.5  1.7 
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  7.3  9.0  3.5  4.3  8.1  9.8  4.0  4.8 
98 Table A.4, continued 
Original data 2  Modified data 3 
Code  Region Nuts 2 I 
1986  1  1987 1  1988 1  19861  1987  1  1988  1  1989  1989 
R36  I  Lazio  39.5  43.7  33.2  43.6  57.0  60.I  44.2  54.3 
R311  I  Piemonte  I7.5  20.0  29.6  31.9  29.0  30.8  36.9  39.0 
R313  I  Liguria  13.0  I1.8  I2.9  13.9  I7.7  I6.2  I5.9  I6.8 
RI94  D  Oberfranken  - 0.0  O.I  O.I  0.6  1.3  1.4  1.6 
R502  B  Brabant  1.0  3.6  5.2  3.9  3.4  9.8  10.3  8.7 
R27I  F  Rhone-Alpes  I4.9  7.8  6.I  8.5  28.5  22.0  21.I  23.4 
R16C  D  Kassel  O.I  0.4  0.0  - 1.0  2.7  2.3  2.2 
R75  UK  South East  13.5  20.5  22.8  28.3  65.5  93.5  91.3  87.3 
R242  F  Alsace  1.0  1.8  0.6  2.8  4.5  5.5  4.5  6.7 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  6.I  0.7  2.I  0.8  8.9  4.0  5.0  4.I 
R6  L  Luxembourg  2.4  1.8  1.0  2.5  2.4  1.8  1.0  2.5 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  48.7  65.8  59.0  48.7  53.8  70.6  62.2  51.8 
RI54  D  Detmold  1.2  1.4  3.4  0.7  2.8  4.9  7.9  5.6 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  3.2  3.I  1.7  3.0  10.5  10.8  9.3  I1.7 
RI55  D  Arnsberg  2.2  3.I  2.5  2.6  7.I  13.5  I5.9  I7.3 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  4.7  5.7  3.4  1.8  13.0  I4.4  I2.5  10.8 
RIA  D  Saarland  3.6  7.4  7.8  6.5  4.9  10.I  10.7  9.8 
RI83  D  Freiburg  O.I  O.I  - 0.4  1.2  2.4  2.4  3.0 
RI84  D  Tiibingen  - 0.0  - - 0.7  1.5  1.5  1.7 
RI97  D  Schwa  ben  - O.I  O.I  0.0  0.6  1.4  1.6  1.7 
R312  I  Valle d'  Aosta  0.5  2.2  1.7  3.9  0.6  2.3  1.7  3.9 
R511  B  Antwerpen  1.4  O.I  0.4  O.I  3.4  4.9  4.5  3.9 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  0.3  O.I  O.I  0.3  2.5  3.9  4.1  5.1 
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  0.1  0.4  O.I  0.0  1.2  3.1  2.8  3.4 
R152  D  Koln  1.2  3.5  1.0  .0.6  5.4  12.4  I2.5  13.2 
R13B  D  Hannover  O.I  O.I  2.4  1.0  2.9  5.0  7.6  7.1 
R32  I  Lombardia  52.2  53.5  4l.I  39.6  65.2  65.6  49.3  47.6 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  14.4  6.0  5.7  6.7  26.5  19.9  I8.2  20.9 
R182  D  Karlsruhe  - 0.9  0.2  0.3  1.5  4.2  3.5  4.0 
R15I  D  Dusseldorf  0.6  4.4  2.0  3.4  7.4  I8.9  20.7  23.8 
RI95  D  Mittelfranken  - - - - 0.9  2.0  2.2  2.4 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  16.7  10.8  8.6  9.4  18.7  I4.9  13.0  14.5 
RI81  D  Stuttgart  - 0.8  0.3  1.0  1.4  3.8  3.4  4.5 
RI9I  D  Oberbayern  - 2.0  - - 1.7  5.5  3.9  4.3 
R90I  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  6.3  4.7  1.3  1.2  12.4  Il.7  7.6  8.4 
RI4  D  Bremen  9.I  7.2  9.4  7.3  10.2  9.5  11.8  10.I 
RI6A  D  Darmstadt  1.6  1.5  2.2  1.0  3.4  6.3  7.0  5.6 
R21  F  Ile de France  Il.2  10.6  5.9  13.3  45.0  46.0  43.2  50.2 
R411  NL  Groningen  3.2  2.4  2.4  6.I  5.4  4.7  4.8  9.2 
R12  D  Hamburg  1.7  0.3  1.2  1.6  4.5  6.0  7.3  8.7 
EC(10)  1051.5  1168.7  1155.2  1392.2  1946.5  2263.2  2227.7  2278.0 
EC(12)  1283.I  1610.5  1647.9  2079.2  2516.4  3059.2  3045.1  3223.0 
I  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
2 
regional GOP per head. 
Obligations chargeable directly on Nuts 2-regions. 
3  Obligations chargeable on Nuts 2-regions directly as well  as indirectly by estimates. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
99 Table A.5 
European Investment Bank, loans by regions,  original data 1 
(MioECU) 
1986  1987 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
Infra- Infra- Total  Industry  structure  Total  Industry  structure 
RCll  p  Norte  16.0  1.0  15.0  31.4  14.8  16.6 
RC14  p  Alentejo  - - - 180.2  180.2  -
RC15  p  Algarve  - - - 18.4  15.3  3.1 
RA41  GR  Voreio Aigaio  - - - - - -
RC12  p  Centro  21.5  0.5  21.0  14.6  14.6  -
RA21  GR  lpeiros  1.7  2.8  - 1.1  1.1  -
RA13  GR  Dytiki Makedonia  29.4  1.5  15.0  18.6  0.6  18.0 
RA43  OR  Kriti  21.5  3.3  10.3  13.6  1.3  12.3 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  31.4  4.3  15.2  19.9  1.7  18.2 
RA22  OR  Ionia Nisia  1.6  2.5  - 1.0  1.0  -
RA14  OR  Thessalia  3.5  5.5  - 2.2  2.2  -
RA12  OR  Kentriki Makedonia  14.4  6.0  5.6  9.1  2.4  6.7 
RA42  OR  Notio Aigaio  0.2  0.3  - 0.1  0.1  -
RAll  GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  6.2  9.8  - 3.9  3.9  -
RA25  OR  Peleponnisos  4.3  6.8  - 2.7  2.7  -
RC13  p  Lis  boa e Vale do Tejo  - - - 1.8  1.8  -
RA3  OR  Attiki  101.5  121.7  13.4  64.3  48.3  16.0 
RB43  E  Extremadura  4.4  - 4.4  0.2  0.2  -
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - - - -
RA24  OR  Sterea Ellada  9.5  6.6  2.8  6.0  2.6  3.4 
RB61  E  Andalucia  18.2  7.4  10.8  56.9  6.1  50.8 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  6.6  1.6  5.0  2.2  2.2  -
RBll  E  Galicia  23.7  18.7  4.9  1.5  1.5  -
RB62  E  Murcia  1.8  - 1.8  1.9  1.9  -
R393  I  Calabria  16.3  15.8  0.5  70.1  42.6  27.5 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  4.6  2.4  2.2  1.9  1.3  0.6 
RB7  E  Canarias  0.5  0.5  - 30.3  30.3  -
RB13  E  Cantabria  - - - - - -
R392  I  Basilicata  25.3  13.6  11.7  14.0  6.3  7.7 
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  40.0  20.0  20.0  52.2  1.4  50.8 
R8  IRL  Ireland  214.3  19.1  195.1  178.6  6.5  172.1 
RB12  E  Asturias  - - - 4.2  4.2  -
R37  I  Campania  223.2  160.0  63.1  194.3  149.5  44.8 
RB24  E  Aragon  0.4  0.4  - 1.9  1.8  0.1 
R3A  I  Sicilia  168.7  83.5  85.1  164.1  47.7  116.4 
RB51  E  Cataluna  - - - 2.2  2.2  -
RB3  E  Madrid  18.2  18.2  - 1.7  1.7  -
R425  NL  Flevoland  - - - - - -
R391  I  Puglia  87.2  75.2  12.0  275.6  46.4  229.2 
R3B  I  Sardegna  111.0  88.8  22.3  140.1  116.1  23.9 
RB22  E  Navarra  - - - - - -
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  7.3  - 7.3  44.4  0.9  43.5 
RB23  E  Rioja  - - - 0.1  0.1  -
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  63.6  49.6  14.0  90.8  - 90.8 
R382  I  Molise  22.1  5.8  16.4  12.9  2.2  10.7 
R523  B  Hainaut  - - - - - -
R527  B  Namur  - - - - - -
R79  UK  Wales  44.4  3.5  40.9  45.0  - 45.0 
R283  F  Corse  4.4  2.4  2.1  - - -
R526  B  Luxembourg  - - - - - -
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1986  1987 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
Infra- Infra- Total  Industry  structure  Total  Industry  structure 
R381  I  Abruzzi  62.9  51.5  11.4  84.8  - 21.2 
R71  UK  North  336.0  - 336.0  190.6  - 190.6 
R412  NL  Friesland  - - - - - -
R424  NL  Gelder  land  - - - - - -
R77  UK  West Midlands  50.9  1.5  49.4  37.9  - 37.9 
RB53  E  Baleares  - - - - - -
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  130.1  0.6  129.6  70.7  - 70.7 
R263  F  Limo  us  in  3.8  1.3  2.5  0.8  0.8  -
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  17.9  14.3  3.6  43.8  7.5  36.3 
R78  UK  North West  87.3  24.9  62.4  107.0  3.4  103.6 
R13C  D  Liineburg  - - - - - -
R423  NL  Overijssel  - - - - - -
R7A  UK  Scotland  471.5  33.2  438.3  168.7  - 168.7 
R73  UK  East Midlands  1.8  1.8  - - - -
R452  NL  Limburg  18.1  14.8  3.3  18.0  14.9  3.1 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  2.2  2.1  0.2  . 38.0  4.5  33.5 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  23.3  8.4  15.0  120.2  11.4  108.8 
R76  UK  South West  19.2  0.7  18.5  50.1  - 50.1 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  3.9  3.8  0.2  6.5  6.0  0.4 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  9.6  1.6  8.0  58.1  0.2  57.8 
R272  F  Auvergne  13.1  1.6  11.6  2.1  1.3  0.9 
R352  I  Umbria  9.2  9.2  - 36.1  19.6  16.5 
R252  F  Bretagne  48.0  30.1  17.9  85.1  51.7  33.4 
R515  B  Limburg  46.1  46.1  - 23.1  23.1  -
R74  UK  East Anglia  55.1  - 55.1  3.6  - 3.6 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  - - - - - -
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  80.1  80.1  - - - -
R241  F  Lorraine  6.1  1.7  4.4  63.6  20.3  43.3 
R524  B  Liege  - - - - - -
R251  F  Pays de Loire  43.2  12.5  30.6  40.3  6.2  34.1 
R353  I  Marche  55.9  46.6  9.3  89.2  33.1  56.2 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  44.7  44.7  - 44.5  44.5  -
R172  D  Trier  - - - - - -
R222  F  Picardie  0.6  0.6  - 13.0  13.0  -
R413  NL  Dr  en  the  - - - - - -
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  - - - - - -
R226  F  Bourgogne  0.1  0.1  - 5.9  5.9  -
R471  NL  Utrecht  - - - - - -
R474  NL  Zeeland  - - - - - -
R16B  D  GieBen  - - - - - -
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  27.8  11.7  16.1  90.0  2.3  87.7 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  22.9  - 22.9  - - -
R261  F  Aquitaine  28.7  4.4  24.4  42.3  2.7  39.7 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  - - - - - -
R192  D  Niederbayern  - - - - - -
R224  F  Centre  1.0  1.0  - 0.4  0.4  -
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  0.2  0.2  - 6.5  6.5  -
R153  D  Munster  - - - 3.1  - 3.1 
R171  D  Koblenz  - - - - - -
R351  I  Toscana  195.9  51.3  144.6  78.9  28.2  50.6 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  19.4  12.0  7.5  30.2  15.6  14.7 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  - - - - - -
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  - - - 14.0  14.0  -
R332  I  Veneto  39.4  23.0  16.4  118.8  90.9  27.8 
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1986  1987 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2  Infra- Infra-
Total  Industry  structure  Total  Industry 
structure 
R196  D  Unterfranken  - - - - - -
R33I  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  78.8  73.6  5.2  72.5  62.2  10.3 
R36  I  Lazio  143.4  46.4  97.0  173.7  84.9  88.9 
R311  I  Piemonte  336.I  I47.5  I88.7  I94.3  45.3  I49.0 
R313  I  Liguria  8.8  6.8  2.0  49.4  33.3  I6.I 
RI94  D  Oberfranken  - - - - - -
R502  B  Brabant  - - - - - -
R27I  F  Rhone-Alpes  78.3  3.7  74.6  49.6  1.5  48.I 
RI6C  D  Kassel  - - - - - -
R75  UK  South East  100.3  - I00.3  225.9  - 225.9 
R242  F  Alsace  0.8  0.8  - 29.I  29.I  -
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  9.3  0.3  9.I  - - -
R6  L  Luxembourg  18.2  - I8.2  1.6  - 1.6 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  30.6  I6.7  13.9  90.6  25.2  65.4 
RI54  D  Detmold  - - - 0.6  - 0.6 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  - - - - - -
RI55  D  Arnsberg  - - - I5.4  - I5.4 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  1.4  1.4  - 3.3  3.I  0.2 
RIA  D  Saarland  25.7  - 25.7  42.4  - 42.4 
RI83  D  Freiburg  - - - - - -
R184  D  Ttibingen  - - - - - -
RI97  D  Schwaben  - - - - - -
R3I2  I  Vaile d'  Aosta  24.4  - 24.4  9.I  - 9.I 
R511  B  Antwerpen  - - - I4.0  I4.0  -
R13A  D  Braunschweig  - - - - - -
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  - - - - - -
R152  D  Koln  90.2  - 90.2  30.2  - 30.2 
RI3B  D  Hannover  47.8  - 47.8  96.4  - 96.4 
R32  I  Lombardia  229.9  137.I  92.8  288.8  195.6  93.3 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  I10.0  4.3  105.8  87.5  5.2  82.3 
RI82  D  Karlsruhe  - - - - - -
RI5I  D  Dusseldorf  89.9  - 89.9  42.8  - 42.8 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  - - - - - -
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  - - - - - -
R181  D  Stuttgart  59.8  - 59.8  - - -
R191  D  Oberbayern  - - - - - -
R901  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  78.5  - 78.5  196.8  - 196.8 
R14  D  Bremen  - - - - - -
R16A  D  Darmstadt  - - - - - -
R21  F  Ile de France  0.2  0.2  - 2.0  2.0  -
R411  NL  Groningen  - - - - - -
R12  D  Hamburg  - - - - - -
EC (10)  4743.9  1664.6  3088.6  4829.9  1414.6  3351.8 
EC (12)  4907.1  1735.3  3181.0  5277.9  1697.1  3517.3 
1  Credits chargeable directly on Nuts 2-regions. 
2  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional GDP per head. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
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European Investment Bank,  loans by regions,  modified data  1 
(MioECU) 
1986  1987 
Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
Infra- Infra-
Total  Industry 
structure 
Total  Industry 
structure 
RC11  p  Norte  49.0  12.7  36.3  69.9  30.3  39.5 
RC14  p  Alentejo  5.1  1.8  3.3  186.2  182.6  3.5 
RC15  p  Algarve  3.1  1.1  2.0  22.0  16.8  5.3 
RA41  GR  Voreio Aigaio  0.6  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.1  0.4 
RC12  p  Centro  37.8  6.3  31.6  33.7  22.3  11.3 
RA21  GR  Ipeiros  2.7  3.0  0.5  1.8  1.2  0.6 
RA13  GR  Dytiki Makedonia  30.3  1.7  15.5  19.2  0.7  18.5 
RA43  GR  Kriti  23.1  3.8  11.0  14.7  1.5  13.2 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  33.4  4.7  16.2  21.3  1.9  19.4 
RA22  GR  Ionia Nisia  2.1  2.6  0.3  1.4  1.1  0.3 
RA14  GR  Thessalia  5.6  6.0  1.0  3.7  2.4  1.3 
RA12  GR  Kentriki Makedonia  19.4  7.2  8.0  12.6  2.9  9.7 
RA42  GR  Notio Aigaio  0.9  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.4 
RAll  GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  7.9  10.2  0.8  5.1  4.1  1.0 
RA25  GR  Peleponnisos  6.0  7.2  0.8  3.9  2.9  1.0 
RC13  p  Lis boa e Vale do Tejo  31.7  11.3  20.5  38.8  16.7  22.0 
RA3  GR  At  tiki  112.2  124.2  18.5  71.7  49.3  22.4 
RB43  E  Extremadura  10.7  0.6  10.1  11.7  7.8  3.9 
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  0.7  0.1  0.7  1.3  0.9  0.4 
RA24  GR  Sterea Ellada  11.2  7.0  3.7  7.2  2.8  4.4 
RB61  E  Andalucia  57.4  11.4  46.0  128.0  53.3  74.7 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  16.3  2.6  13.8  19.9  13.9  5.9 
RBll  E  Galicia  40.1  20.4  19.6  31.3  21.2  10.0 
RB62  E  Murcia  7.6  0.6  7.0  12.5  8.9  3.6 
R393  I  Calabria  55.1  15.8  43.5  98.1  39.9  58.1 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  19.7  4.0  15.8  29.3  19.5  9.8 
RB7  E  Can  arias  8.9  1.4  7.5  45.4  40.3  5.1 
RB13  E  Cantabria  3.0  0.3  2.7  5.5  3.7  1.9 
R392  I  Basilicata  36.5  13.6  24.2  22.1  5.5  16.6 
RB52  E  Comunidad Valenciana  61.7  22.2  39.5  91.5  27.5  64.0 
R8  IRL  Ireland  215.1  19.1  195.9  179.8  6.5  173.3 
RB12  E  Asturias  6.5  0.7  5.9  16.1  12.1  4.0 
R37  I  Campania  326.8  160.0  177.9  268.9  142.4  126.6 
RB24  E  Aragon  7.3  1.1  6.3  14.6  10.2  4.4 
R3A  I  Sicilia  261.6  83.5  188.1  231.1  41.3  189.8 
RB51  E  Cataluna  35.1  3.6  31.5  65.8  44.4  21.4 
RB3  E  Madrid  46.5  21.1  25.4  53.0  35.7  17.3 
R425  NL  Flevoland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
R391  I  Puglia  160.3  75.3  93.0  328.3  41.4  286.9 
R3B  I  Sardegna  140.8  88.8  55.4  161.6  114.0  47.5 
RB22  E  Navarra  3.0  0.3  2.7  5.4  3.6  1.8 
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  19.9  1.3  18.7  67.4  16.2  51.3 
RB23  E  Rioja  1.5  0.2  1.3  2.8  1.9  0.9 
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  63.8  49.6  14.4  94.9  0.8  94.1 
R382  I  Molise  28.1  5.8  23.1  17.3  1.8  15.5 
R523  B  Hainaut  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.4 
R527  B  Namur  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
R79  UK  Wales  44.8  3.5  41.6  52.4  1.4  51.0 
R283  F  Corse  5.2  2.4  3.0  0.7  0.6  0.2 
R526  B  Luxembourg  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
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Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
Infra- Infra-
Total  Industry 
structure 
Total  Industry 
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R381  I  Abruzzi  85.6  51.4  36.6  101.3  62.0  39.1 
R71  UK  North  336.4  0.0  336.7  198.6  1.6  197.1 
R412  N.L  Friesland  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2 
R424  NL  Gelderland  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.0  0.6 
R77  UK  West Midlands  51.7  1.5  50.6  51.5  2.6  48.8 
RB53  E  Baleares  3.9  0.4  3.5  7.0  4.7  2.4 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  130.8  0.6  130.7  83.5  2.5  81.0 
R263  F  Limousin  6.1  1.3  5.1  3.0  2.5  0.5 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  24.4  14.3  11.1  50.0  12.3  37.7 
R78  UK  North West  88.2  24.9  63.9  123.6  6.6  116.9 
R13C  D  Li.ineburg  2.8  0.0  2.8  1.2  0.0  1.2 
R423  NL  Overijssel  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.3 
R7A  UK  Scotland  472.2  33.2  439.5  182.0  2.6  179.4 
R73  UK  East Midlands  2.4  1.8  0.9  10.4  2.0  8.3 
R452  NL  Limburg  18.4  14.8  3.6  18.4  14.9  3.5 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  6.6  2.1  5.2  43.1  8.7  34.5 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  35.6  8.4  29.2  132.0  20.4  111.5 
R76  UK  South West  19.9  0.7  19.6  62.2  2.3  59.8 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  18.4  3.8  15.4  17.5  9.7  7.8 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  17.0  1.6  16.6  65.2  5.7  59.5 
R272  F  Auvergne  17.3  1.6  16.4  6.1  4.3  1.8 
R352  I  Umbria  24.0  9.2  16.4  46.8  18.6  28.2 
R252  F  Bretagne  73.1  30.1  44.3  104.2  58.1  46.2 
R515  B  Limburg  46.3  46.1  0.2  23.3  23.1  0.2 
R74  UK  East Anglia  55.4  0.0  55.6  8.9  1.0  7.9 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.4 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  80.6  80.2  0.5  0.7  0.0  0.7 
R241  F  Lorraine  13.4  1.7  12.8  70.5  25.6  44.9 
R524  B  Liege  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.3 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  70.8  12.5  59.7  61.4  13.2  48.2 
R353  I  Marche  81.7  46.6  37.9  107.8  31.3  76.6 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  48.1  44.7  3.9  47.7  47.0  0.8 
R172  D  Trier  0.9  0.0  0.9  0.4  0.0  0.4 
R222  F  Picardie  6.2  0.6  6.4  19.6  18.4  1.2 
R413  NL  Dr  en the  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.4 
R226  F  Bourgogne  5.2  0.1  5.8  11.9  10.8  1.1 
R471  NL  Utrecht  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.3 
R474  NL  Zeeland  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
R16B  D  GieBen  1.9  0.0  1.9  0.8  0.0  0.8 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  40.8  11.7  31.0  102.5  11.9  90.5 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  27.1  0.0  27.1  1.8  0.0  1.8 
R261  F  Aquitaine  37.3  4.4  34.3  50.5  9.0  41.6 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  1.9  0.0  1.9  0.8  0.0  0.8 
R192  D  Niederbayern  2.0  0.0  2.0  0.9  0.0  0.9 
R224  F  Centre  8.4  1.0  8.5  9.1  7.5  1.6 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  4.5  0.2  4.9  11.5  10.6  1.0 
R153  D  Munster  4.7  0.0  4.7  5.1  0.0  5.1 
R171  D  Koblenz  2.6  0.0  2.6  1.2  0.0  1.2 
R351  I  Toscana  260.4  51.3  216.1  125.4  23.8  101.5 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  41.3  12.0  31.7  46.0  14.1  32.0 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  0.7  0.0  0.7  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  5.0  0.0  5.0  16.2  14.0  2.2 
R332  I  Veneto  118.5  22.9  104.1  175.8  85.5  90.2 
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Code  Region Nuts 2 2 
Infra- Infra- Total  Industry  structure  Total  Industry  structure 
RI96  D  Unterfranken  2.4  0.0  2.4  1.0  0.0  1.0 
R33I  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  94.7  73.6  22.9  84.0  61.I  22.9 
R36  I  Lazio  236.2  46.4  I99.9  240.6  78.5  I62.2 
R311  I  Piemonte  4I5.2  I47.4  276.4  251.3  39.9  2I1.5 
R313  I  Liguria  40.4  6.8  37.I  72.2  31.I  41.I 
RI94  D  Oberfranken  2.0  0.0  2.0  0.9  0.0  0.9 
R502  B  Brabant  0.5  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.0  0.7 
R27I  F  Rhone-Alpes  94.6  3.7  93.3  65.2  13.4  51.7 
RI6C  D  Kassel  2.3  0.0  2.3  1.0  0.0  1.0 
R75  UK  South East  102.8  O.I  I04.3  27I.I  8.8  262.3 
R242  F  Alsace  5.9  0.8  5.8  33.9  32.8  l.I 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  9.5  0.3  9.2  O.I  O.I  0.2 
R6  L  Luxembourg  I8.3  0.0  I8.3  1.7  0.0  1.7 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  101.5  I6.7  92.5  I41.7  20.3  I2I.4 
RI54  D  Detmold  3.5  0.0  3.5  2.1  0.0  2.I 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  0.5  0.0  0.5  0.8  0.0  0.8 
RI55  D  Arnsberg  7.I  0.0  7.1  I8.5  0.0  18.5 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  6.8  1.4  6.2  9.6  8.2  1.4 
RIA  D  Saarland  27.8  0.0  27.8  43.3  0.0  43.3 
RI83  D  Freiburg  3.7  0.0  3.7  1.6  0.0  1.6 
RI84  D  Tiibingen  3.0  0.0  3.0  1.3  0.0  1.3 
RI97  D  Schwaben  3.0  0.0  3.0  1.3  0.0  1.3 
R3I2  I  Valle d'Aosta  26.5  0.0  26.7  10.6  O.I  10.7 
R511  B  Antwerpen  0.4  0.0  0.4  I4.5  14.0  0.5 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  3.I  0.0  3.I  1.4  0.0  1.4 
RI73  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  3.5  0.0  3.5  1.5  0.0  1.5 
RI52  D  Koln  97.8  0.0  97.8  33.5  0.0  33.5 
R13B  D  Hannover  51.7  0.0  51.7  98.I  0.0  98.I 
R32  I  Lombardia  390.5  137.0  270.9  404.5  I84.5  220.I 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  I10.9  4.5  I06.4  88.0  4.8  83.2 
RI82  D  Karlsruhe  4.7  0.0  4.7  2.I  0.0  2.I 
RI5I  D  DUsseldorf  99.8  0.0  99.8  47.I  0.0  47.I 
RI95  D  Mittel  franken  3.0  0.0  3.0  1.3  0.0  1.3 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  4.0  0.0  4.0  1.7  0.0  1.7 
RI8I  D  Stuttgart  66.7  0.0  66.7  3.0  0.0  3.0 
RI91  D  Oberbayern  7.1  0.0  7.1  3.I  0.0  3.I 
R90I  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  79.I  O.I  78.9  I97.I  0.2  I97.4 
RI4  D  Bremen  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.6  0.0  0.6 
RI6A  D  Darmstadt  6.7  0.0  6.7  2.9  0.0  2.9 
R2I  F  lie de France  32.5  0.2  37.3  33.0  25.8  7.2 
R411  NL  Groningen  O.I  0.0  O.I  0.2  0.0  0.2 
RI2  D  Hamburg  3.I  0.0  3.1  1.4  0.0  1.4 
EC (10)  6166.5  I672.8  4639.0  6013.4  I574.4  4440.I 
EC (I2)  6643.3  I798.3  4990.6  6972.5  2I68.9  4804.5 
1  Credits chargeable on Nuts 2-regions directly as  well as indirectly by estimates. 
2  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional GOP per head. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
105 Code 
RC11 
RC14 
RC15 
RA41 
RC12 
RA21 
RA13 
RA43 
RA23 
RA22 
RA14 
RA12 
RA42 
RAll 
RA25 
RC13 
RA3 
RB43 
RB63 
RA24 
RB61 
RB42 
RBll 
RB62 
R393 
RB41 
RB7 
RB13 
R392 
RB52 
R8 
·RB12 
R37 
RB24 
R3A 
RB51 
RB3 
R425 
R391 
R3B 
RB22 
RB21 
RB23 
R7B 
R382 
R523 
R527 
106 
Table A.7 
Financial interventions of the EC for restructuring the coal and steel sector 
and the agricultural secto1 
(Mio ECU) 
European Coal and Steel  Europ. Agricult. Gui-
dance and Guarantee  Community Loans  Fund  Region,  Nuts 2 I 
Original data 2  Modified data 3  Investment Grants 
1986  I 
1987  1986  I 
1987  1986  I 
1987 
p  Norte  - - - - 4.0  9.5 
p  Alentejo  - - - - 2.3  4.3 
p  Algarve  - - - - 1.8  2.7 
GR  Voreio Aigaio  - - - - 0.1  0.1 
p  Centro  - - - - 9.1  11.7 
GR  lpeiros  - - - - 4.5  3.1 
GR  Dytiki Makedoni  - - - - 0.7  0.5 
GR  Kriti  - - - - 12.6  8.7 
GR  Dytiki Ellada  - - - - 4.9  3.4 
GR  Ioni Nisia  - - - - - -
GR  Thessalia  - - - - 6.8  4.7 
GR  Kentriki Makedonia  0.2  - 0.2  - 9.5  6.6 
GR  Notio Aigaio  - - - - - -
GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  - - - - 15.3  10.6 
GR  Peleponnisos  - - - - 10.8  7.5 
p  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  - - - - 13.5  6.5 
GR  Attiki  - - - - 2.6  1.8 
E  Extremadura  - - - - - 5.2 
E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - - - -
GR  Sterea Ellada  - - - - 5.8  4.0 
E  Andalucia  - - - - 28.6  10.0 
E  Castilla-La Mancha  - - - - 1.2  9.4 
E  Galicia  - 1.0  - 1.0  10.6  5.3 
E  Murcia  - - - - 3.7  3.2 
I  Calabria  - - - - 5.9  2.6 
E  Castilla-Leon  - - - - 2.6  5.8 
E  Canarias  - - - - 1.4  0.3 
E  Cantabria  - 1.0  - 1.0  0.9  0.3 
I  Basilicata  - - - - 6.7  2.4 
E  Comunidad Valencia  - - - - 10.0  5.3 
IRL  Ireland  0.9  - 0.9  - 29.5  26.3 
E  Asturias  - 1.0  - 1.0  0.7  1.7 
I  Campania  22.7  - 27.2  4.3  4.8  1.2 
E  Aragon  - 1.0  - 1.0  2.7  4.8 
I  Sicilia  - - - - 6.5  6.1 
E  Cataluna  - - - - 13.0  5.6 
E  Madrid  - - - - 4.8  0.7 
NL  Flevoland  - - - - - -
I  Puglia  138.6  - 166.1  26.5  10.7  2.5 
I  Sardegna  - - - - 1.6  2.9 
E  Navarra  - 1.0  - 1.0  1.9  1.7 
E  Pais Vasco  - 1.0  - 1.0  2.1  1.4 
E  Rioja  - - - - 1.1  1.6 
UK  Northern Ireland  - - - - 6.7  5.8 
I  Molise  - - - - 0.3  3.2 
B  Mainaut  - 0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.7 
B  Namur  - - - - - 0.4 Table A.  7,  continued 
European C,oal and Steel  Europ. Agricult. Gui-
dance and Guarantee  Community Loans  Fund  Code  Region,  Nuts  2 I 
Original data 2  Modified data 3  Investment Grants 
1986  I  1987  1986  I  1987  1986  I  1987 
R79  UK  Wales  7.2  19.7  22.5  48.5  1.5  0.2 
R283  F  Corse  - - - - 0.5  2.8 
R526  B  Luxembourg  - - - - - 0.5 
R381  I  Abruzzi  - - - - 2.2  4.9 
R71  UK  North  0.5  6.6  1.1  14.1  1.2  0.5 
R412  NL  Friesland  - - - - 0.2  -
R424  NL  Gelder  land  - - - - - 0.7 
R77  UK  West Midlands  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.6  1.6  0.3 
RB53  E  Baleares  - - - - 1.2  0.3 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  3.4  284.7  26.2  304.7  3.7  0.7 
R263  F  Limousin  - - - - 0.2  0.3 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  0.1  - 0.1  0.0  21.6  11.6 
R78  UK  North West  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.9  0.9 
R13C  D  Liineburg  - - - - 2.8  2.4 
R423  NL  Overijssel  - - - - - 0.7 
R7A  UK  Scotland  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.3  13.6  4.4 
R73  UK  East Midlands  1.0  0.6  0.4  2.0  2.3  3.1 
R452  NL  Limburg  - - - - 1.6  -
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  0.1  - 0.1  0.0  2.8  1.0 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  66.2  0.2  66.0  10.7  2.5  0.9 
R76  UK  South West  - - - - 2.3  0.4 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  - - - - 2.9  -
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  0.1  - 0.1  0.1  2.6  6.6 
R272  F  Auvergne  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  - -
R352  I  Umbria  0.3  - 0.4  0.1  4.2  0.6 
R252  I  Bretagne  - - - - 10.3  5.8 
R515  B  Limburg  0.2  1.0  0.2  1.9  0.9  0.9 
R74  UK  East Anglia  - - - - 3.1  3.3 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.9  1.4  1.5 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  - - - - 1.2  0.9 
R241  F  Lorraine  3.4  1.4  3.4  2.2  - -
R524  B  Liege  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.8  1.2  1.4 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  - - - - 6.3  3.3 
R353  I  Marc  he  - - - - 8.1  4.0 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  - - - - - 0.7 
R172  D  Trier  - - - - 2.2  0.3 
R222  F  Picardie  0.1  - 0.1  0.0  - 1.3 
R413  NL  Dr  en  the  - - - - - -
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  - - - - 1.9  4.0 
R226  F  Bourgogne  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  1.9 
R471  NL  Utrecht  - - - - 0.3  -
R474  NL  Zeeland  - - - - 1.0  1.6 
R168  D  Giel3en  - - - - - 0.1 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  6.3  0.2  6.3  1.2  9.0  8.2 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  86.4  17.2  121.9  48.6  0.7  1.0 
R261  F  Aquitaine  - - - - 9.8  2.9 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  - - - - - -
R192  D  Niederbayern  - - - - 0.3  0.9 
R224  F  Centre  - - - - 0.8  0.4 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  10.2  - 10.2  1.7  2.5  1.5 
R153  D  Munser  1.1  25.4  26.6  36.2  0.1  -
R171  D  Koblenz  - - - - 0.9  -
R351  I  Toscana  100.9  55.5  132.0  85.4  3.1  1.1 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  - - - - 1.4  4.7 
107 Table A.7, continued 
European Coal and Steel  Europ. Agricult. Gui-
dance and Guarantee  Community Loans 
Fund  Code  Region,  Nuts 2 I 
Original data 2  Modified data 3  Investment Grants 
1986  I  1987  1986  I  1987  1986  I  1987 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  - - - - 3.8  0.6 
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  - - - - 3.1  1.0 
R332  I  Veneto  0.1  - 0.1  0.0  6.2  5.5 
R196  D  Unterfranken  - - - - 1.8  1.4 
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  - - - - 3.3  2.8 
R36  I  Lazio  - - - - 19.9  2.7 
R311  I  Piemonte  0.1  48.4  9.6  57.7  2.0  1.6 
R313  I  Liguria  0.2  - 0.2  0.0  2.7  -
R194  s  Oberfranken  1.9  - 2.6  0.6  0.7  0.2 
R502  B  Brabant  - - - - 0.3  0.9 
R271  F  Rhone-Alpes  17.6  0.1  17.5  2.8  4.9  6.2 
R16C  D  Kassel  - - - - 0.5  0.5 
R75  UK  South-East  0.1  6.5  0.6  7.0  3.0  2.2 
R242  F  Alsace  - - - - 0.8  0.7 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  - - - - 1.5  1.1 
R6  L  Luxembourg  2.1  0.1  2.1  0.1  - 0.3 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  - - - - 10.7  5.4 
R154  D  Detmold  - - - - - 0.4 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  83.2  2.9  86.4  4.1  1.4  0.4 
R155  D  Amsberg  1.6  12.4  15.1  18.1  0.3  0.2 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  - - - - 1.5  0.1 
RIA  D  Saarland  5.1  37.5  19.7  50.4  0.1  -
R183  D  Freiburg  - - - - 1.1  0.1 
R184  D  TO bingen  - - - - 1.3  1.8 
R197  D  Schwaben  - - - - 0.2  0.7 
R312  I  Vaile d 'Aosta  0.1  - 0.1  0.0  - -
R511  B  Antwerpen  - 0.1  0.0  0.2  0.3  1.0 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  0.1  77.7  26.7  101.3  1.7  -
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  - - - - 2.7  3.4 
R152  D  Koln  0.5  0.3  1.3  0.6  1.2  0.9 
R138  D  Hannover  - - - - - -
R32  I  Lombardia  2.5  - 3.0  0.,5  5.1  7.2 
R903  DK  Vest for Storebaelt  - - - - 13.3  3.5 
R182  D  Karlsruhe  - - - - 0.7  0.3 
R151  D  DUsseldorf  104.0  21.8  225.1  73.3  1.0  0.9 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  - - - - - -
R1B  D  Berlin (West)  29.4  - 39.5  8.9  - -
R181  D  Stuttgart  - - - - 4.8  1.5 
R191  D  Oberbayem  - - - - - 3.0 
R901  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  - 3.9  3.7  3.7  0.9  0.1 
R14  D  Bremen  - - - - 3.4  -
R16A  D  Darmstadt  - - - - - 1.9 
R21  F  Ile de France  - 5.7  0.0  6.6  0.8  0.3 
R411  NL  Groningen  - - - - 0.2  -
R12  D  Hamburg  - - - - 1.0  -
EC (10)  699.6  631.7  1066.0  927.4  392.8  261.1 
EC (12)  699.6  637.7  1066.0  933.4  510.0  358.4 
1  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departments d'Outre-Mer, Acores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional  GDP per head.  - 2 Credits chargeable directly on Nuts 2-regions.  - 3 Credits chargeable on Nuts 2-regions directly as well  as 
indirectly by estimates. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio; DIW calculations. 
108 Table A.8 
European Coal and Steel Community, subsidies 
(MioECU) 
Original data 2  Modified data 3 
Code  Region Nuts 2 I 
I  1987  1  1988  1  1986  1  1987  1  1988  1  1986  1989  1989 
RCll  p  Norte  - 0.26  - - - 0.26  0.03  -
RC14  p  Alentejo  - - - - - - - -
RC15  p  Algarve  - - - - - - - -
RA41  OR  Voreio Aigaio  - - - - - - - -
RC12  p  Centro  - - - - - - - -
RA21  OR  lpeiros  - - - - - - - -
RA13  OR  Dytiki Makedonia  - - - - - - - -
RA43  OR  Kriti  - - - - - - - -
RA23  OR  Dytiki Ellada  - - - - - - - -
RA22  OR  Ionia Nisia  - - - - - - - -
RA14  OR  Thessalia  - - - - - - - -
RA12  OR  Kentriki Makedonia  - 0.29  0.05  - - 0.29  0.05  -
RA42  OR  Notio Aigaio  - - - - - - - -
RAll  OR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  - - - - - - - -
RA25  OR  Peleponnisos  - - - - - - - -
RC13  p  Lis boa e Vale do Tejo  - 0.01  2.26  - - 0.01  2.49  -
RA3  OR  At  tiki  - - 0.06  - - - 0.06  -
RB43  E  Extremadura  - - - - - - - -
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - - - - - -
RA24  OR  Sterea Ellada  - - - - - - - -
RB61  E  Andalucia  0.13  - - - 0.13  - 0.79  -
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  - - - - - - - -
RBll  E  Galicia  - - - - - - - -
RB62  E  Murcia  - - - - - - - -
R393  I  Calabria  - - - - - - - -
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  0.76  0.28  0.03  - 0.76  0.28  6.75  -
RB7  E  Canarias  - - - - - - - -
RB13  E  Cantabria  - 0.18  - - - 0.18  1.12  -
R392  I  Basilicata  - - - - - - - -
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  - 0.60  1.68  0.65  - 0.60  19.91  0.65 
R8  IRL  Ireland  0.12  - - - 0.12  - - -
RB12  E  Asturias  0.99  0.76  0.05  0.34  0.99  0.76  13.40  0.34 
R37  I  Campania  0.62  - 0.64  - 0.78  - 1.42  0.02 
RB24  E  Aragon  0.24  0.20  0.30  - 0.24  0.20  4.95  -
R3A  I  Sicilia  - - - - - - - -
RB51  E  Cataluna  - - - - - - - -
RB3  E  Madrid  0.50  1.08  0.52  - 0.50  1.08  13.68  -
R425  NL  Flevoland  - - - - - - - -
R391  I  Puglia  0.25  0.66  3.39  - 0.91  0.66  6.52  0.09 
R3B  I  Sardegna  0.07  0.23  - - 0.11  0.23  0.19  0.01 
RB22  E  Navarra  - - - - - - - -
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  0.16  0.31  0.98  0.24  0.16  0.31  11.56  0.24 
RB23  E  Rioja  - - - - - - - -
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  - - - - - - - -
R382  I  Molise  - - - - - - - -
R523  B  Hainaut  0.33  2.31  0.43  0.26  0.33  2.31  0.43  0.26 
R527  B  Namur  - - 0.32  - - - 0.32  -
R79  UK  Wales  - - - - - - - -
R283  F  Corse  - - - - - - - -
R526  B  Luxembourg  - - - - - - - -
R381  I  Abruzzi  - - - - - - - -
109 Table A.8, continued 
Original data 2  Modified data 3 
Code  Region  Nuts 2 I 
I  1987  1  1988  1  1986  1  1987  1  1988  1  1986  1989  1989 
R71  UK  North  - - 0.22  - 0.10  0.05  0.29  -
R412  NL  Friesland  - - - - - 0.49  - -
R424  NL  Gelderland  - - 0.27  - - - 0.27  -
R77  UK  West Midlands  - - - - - - - -
RB53  E  Baleares  - - - - - - - -
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  - - - - - - - -
R263  F  Limousin  - - - - - - - -
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  0.65  - - - 0.99  0.01  0.86  0.03 
R78  UK  North West  - - - - - - - -
R13C  D  Liineburg  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.03 
R423  NL  Overijssel  - - - - - - - -
R7A  UK  Scotland  - - - 0.02  0.01  - 0.01  0.02 
R73  UK  East Midlands  - - - - - - - -
R452  NL  Limburg  - - - - - - - -
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  - - - - - - - -
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  - 10.15  1.12  1.21  5.82  10.25  16.08  1.67 
R76  UK  South West  - - - - - - - -
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  - - - - - - - -
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  - - 0.03  - 0.05  - 0.14  -
R272  F  Auvergne  - - - - - - - -
R352  I  Umbria  - - - - - - - -
R252  F  Bretagne  - - - - - - - -
R515  B  Limburg  0.30  1.56  36.25  5.27  0.30  1.56  36.25  5.27 
R74  UK  East Anglia  0.07  - 0.17  - 0.29  0.11  0.31  -
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  0.03  - - - 0.03  - - -
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  - - - - - - - -
R241  F  Lorraine  3.70  6.36  3.67  2.35  11.78  6.51  24.45  2.98 
R524  B  Liege  2.69  3.23  3.28  - 2.69  3.23  3.28  -
R251  F  Pays de Loire  - 0.01  - - 0.01  0.01  0.01  -
R353  I  Marche  - - - - - - - -
R243  F  Franche-Comte  - 0.05  - - 0.02  0.05  0.05  -
R172  D  Trier  - - - - - - - -
R222  F  Picardie  - - - - - - - -
R413  NL  Dr  en  the  - - - - - 0.64  - -
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  - - - - - - - -
R226  F  Bourgogne  - 0.73  0.75  0.16  0.77  0.75  2.72  0.22 
R471  NL  Utrecht  0.23  - - - 0.23  - - -
R474  NL  Zeeland  - - - - - - - -
R16B  D  GieBen  0.25  - - - 0.25  - - -
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  - - 1.67  - 0.78  0.01  3.68  0.06 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  1.36  1.09  1.96  3.30  1.36  1.09  1.96  3.30 
R261  F  Aquitaine  - - - - - - - -
R193  D  Oberpfalz  0.61  0.64  0.60  2.86  1.53  0.64  0.60  2.86 
R192  D  Niederbayern  - - - - - - - -
R224  F  Centre  - 0.02  - - 0.01  0.02  0.02  -
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  - 0.15  - - 0.06  0.15  0.16  -
R153  D  MUnster  11.48  8.80  2.29  2.51  11.93  9.95  2.29  3.59 
R171  D  Koblenz  0.01  0.04  0.84  - 0.01  0.04  0.84  -
R351  I  Toscana  0.05  0.28  1.19  - 0.30  0.28  2.39  0.04 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  0.54  - 0.78  0.61  0.79  - 1.99  0.64 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  0.07  0.09  0.12  - 0.07  0.09  0.13  -
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  0.45  - - - 0.45  - - -
R332  I  Veneto  - - 0.36  - 0.05  - 0.58  0.01 
R196  D  Unterfranken  - - - - 0.10  - - -
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  - - 0.04  - 0.01  - 0.07  -
110 Table A.B,  continued 
Original data 2  Modified data 3 
Code  Region Nuts 2 I 
I 
1987  1  1988  1  I 
1987  1  1988  1  1986  1989  1986  1989 
R36  I  Lazio  4.06  5.77  4.73  - 6.53  5.77  16.47  0.35 
R311  I  Piemonte  2.22  1.32  1.03  0.66  2.98  1.32  4.66  0.77 
R313  I  Liguria  8.20  1.86  3.79  0.76  10.32  1.86  13.88  1.06 
R194  D  Oberfranken  - - - - - - - -
R502  B  Brabant  0.28  1.11  0.10  - 0.28  1.11  0.10  -
R271  F  Rhone-Alpes  0.17  0.41  2.71  1.43  2.11  0.44  7.68  1.58 
R16C  D  Kassel  - - - - - - - -
R75  UK  South East  - - - - - - - -
R242  F  Alsace  - - - - - - - -
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  - - - - - - - -
R6  L  Luxembourg  2.05  3.73  4.60  0.24  2.05  3.73  4.60  0.24 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  - - - - - - - -
R154  D  Detmold  0.23  - 0.48  0.07  0.24  0.03  0.48  0.10 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  2.58  0.69  6.24  0.11  2.58  0.72  6.33  0.11 
R155  D  Arnsberg  29.47  12.49  34.24  13.86  31.03  16.54  34.24  17.69 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  - - - - - - - -
RIA  D  Saarland  10.25  6.22  1.76  2.33  10.25  6.22  1.76  2.33 
R183  D  Freiburg  - 0.58  - - - 0.58  - -
R184  D  Ttibingen  - - - - - - - -
R197  D  Schwaben  0.44  - - - 0.51  - - -
R312  I  Valle d'  Aosta  0.15  0.04  - - 0.18  0.04  0.12  -
R511  B  Antwerpen  - - - - - - - -
R13A  D  Braunschweig  0.93  2.81  1.05  0.59  0.93  2.81  1.05  0.59 
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  0.15  - - - 0.15  - - -
R152  D  Koln  3.80  2.85  1.90  2.84  4.01  3.38  1.90  3.34 
R13B  D  Hannover  0.15  0.17  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.17  0.15  0.15 
R32  I  Lombardia  2.20  1.74  4.05  1.35  3.99  1.74  12.54  1.60 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  - - - - - - - -
R182  D  Karlsruhe  - - - - - - - -
R151  D  Dusseldorf  26.37  21.89  37.77  4.40  28.06  26.27  37.77  8.53 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  - - - - - - - -
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  - - - - - - - -
R181  D  Stuttgart  0.14  - - - 0.14  - - -
R191  D  Oberbayern  - - - - - - - -
R901  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  - 0.12  0.04  - - 0.12  0.04  -
R14  D  Bremen  1.02  0.73  0.87  1.21  1.02  0.73  0.87  1.21 
R16A  D  Darmstadt  0.30  0.43  - - 0.30  0.43  - -
R21  F  lie de France  4.22  4.10  3.47  - 10.82  4.22  20.43  0.51 
R411  NL  Groningen  - - - - - 0.49  - -
R12  D  Hamburg  0.06  - - - 0.06  - - -
EC (10)  123.39  105.80  169.52  48.58  161.80  118.19  273.53  61.26 
EC (12)  126.17  109.48  175.34  49.81  164.58  121.87  348.21  62.49 
1  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
2 
regional GDP per head. 
Subsidies chargeable directly on Nuts 2-regions. 
3  Subsidies chargeable on Nuts 2-regions directly as well as indirectly by estimates. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
111 Table A.9 
EAGGF guarantee payments for selected products by regions 1 1986-89 
(MioECU) 
Cereals  Fruits  Sheep 
Code  Region,  Nuts 2 2  . and  Sugar  Olive- Oleag- and  Wine  Tobacco  Milk  Cattle  and 
oil  inous  Vegeta- (Meat)  Goats  Rice  bles  3  (Meat) 
RCll  p  Norte  -0.1  - 5.0  - 1.6  - 0.5  2.0  -1.1  22.9 
RC14  p  Alentejo  -0.1  - 11.7  228.7  0.8  - 5.6  0.6  -0.5  34.2 
RC15  p  Algarve  -0.0  - 0.4  - 0.7  - - 0.1  -0.1  1.6 
RA41  GR  Voreio Aigaio  4.4  - 111.0  0.0  5.3  1.3  - 14.6  2.7  17.8 
RC12  p  Centro  -0.1  - 6.2  - 34.6  - 13.4  0.9  -0.6  19.0 
RA21  GR  Ipeiros  21.6  - 36.3  0.6  16.6  0.3  21.6  41.0  3.6  61.6 
RA13  GR  Dytiki Makedonia  50.8  6.0  0.0  0.1  4.2  1.0  84.0  29.5  8.9  28.5 
RA43  GR  Kriti  2.6  - 267.8  0.0  35.2  14.5  - 35.0  2.1  56.3 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  48.4  - 92.6  2.4  40.3  8.6  322.9  46.5  5.1  82.5 
RA22  GR  Ionia Nisia  0.9  - 78.5  0.0  7.0  2.6  - 7.4  2.6  10.4 
RA14  GR  Thessalia  159.5  23.0  55.1  30.3  28.0  2.6  200.2  67.2  13.0  68.4 
RA12  GR  Kentriki Makedonia  192.9  47.9  36.3  18.1  75.7  2.2  660.5  81.8  45.4  59.1 
RA42  GR  Notio Aigaio  3.5  - 26.7  0.0  7.3  2.7  - 12.9  6.6  19.0 
RA11  GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  143.5  40.4  19.9  12.8  13.2  1.8  150.8  30.3  17.5  39.7 
RA25  GR  Peleponnisos  16.3  - 297.1  0.0  64.0  10.6  65.5  41.7  4.3  75.9 
RC13  p  Lis boa e Vale do Tejo  -0.0  - 6.0  17.2  17.5  - 4.4  0.6  -0.6  15.7 
RA3  GR  Attiki  4.3  - 42.9  - 9.4  4.8  - 17.3  3.0  13.9 
RB43  E  Extremadura  38.1  7.8  48.1  27.4  4.5  29.6  121.5  5.0  5.2  87.1 
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - - - - - - - -
RA24  GR  Sterea Ellada  82.9  3.2  157.9  8.4  30.5  3.5  112.5  38.5  3.2  69.9 
RB61  E  Andalucia  109.9  106.7  236.8  17L8  27.4  95.1  28.8  18.4  8.2  66.2 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  93.6  18.3  52.9  80.9  2.5  236.2  3.7  11.5  4.8  167.5 
RB11  E  Galicia  16.0  - - - 2.2  41.2  0.2  43.5  17.3  9.4 
RB62  E  Murcia  4.8  - 2.3  0.0  19.6  15.9  - 1.5  0.9  27.9 
R393  I  Calabria  66.5  23.1  381.2  0.3  108.1  16.1  - 59.5  46.0  18.6 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  179.9  184.5  2.2  43.3  1.7  21.8  6.3  34.5  23.3  186.1 
RB7  E  Can  arias  0.2  - - - 11.5  19.3  0.8  2.8  1.1  2.8 
RB13  E  Cantabria  0.2  - - - 0.1  0.2  - 10.5  5.3  1.8 
R392  I  Basilicata  127.6  25.3  76.6  0.4  31.0  6.2  3.2  21.3  15.7  14.4 
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  13.3  0.0  17.8  4.2  22.2  36.5  1.0  2.5  0.8  19.8 
R8  IRL  Ireland  204.7  129.1  - 0.0  11.8  - - 916.5  718.8  198.6 
RB12  E  Asturias  0.4  - - - 0.4  0.3  0.1  17.1  6.3  3.5 
R37  I  Campania  103.4  4.6  189.0  1.1  215.9  36.7  608.4  117.2  73.8  11.9 
RB24  E  Aragon  69.6  1.9  10.0  10.4  4.2  15.9  - 2.8  4.1  107.9 
R3A  I  Sicilia  202.5  - 359.0  0.5  442.4  165.7  0.6  84.9  66.9  38.7 
RB51  E  Cataluna  43.9  - 22.2  5.6  12.8  38.6  0.5  16.1  12.4  55.2 
RB3  E  Madrid  7.2  0.2  4.3  0.7  0.5  5.8  - 2.5  0.3  10.1 
R425  NL  Flevoland  14.8  95.0  - 189.4  7.7  - - 35.7  7.4  1.0 
R391  I  Puglia  298.1  94.3  788.8  37.1  148.8  162.6  153.8  77.4  40.0  17.3 
R3B  I  Sardegna  55.2  26.9  78.5  1.1  45.4  30.9  - 142.7  62.5  84.9 
RB22  E  Navarra  23.2  0.1  0.6  1.4  1.5  9.6  1.7  3.7  1.9  19.6 
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  4.8  5.8  0.0  0.1  1.0  18.0  0.2  8.3  2.2  6.4 
RB23  E  Rioja  7.1  10.1  0.5  0.0  1.5  35.0  0.0  0.5  0.7  10.0 
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  22.9  - - 2.6  3.4  - - 216.3  169.0  54.1 
R382  I  Molise  79.2  8.4  28.7  29.2  5.6  7.2  3.7  19.5  10.8  4.4 
R523  B  Hainaut  47.0  120.8  - 108.7  3.8  - 1.1  83.9  62.5  1.6 
R527  B  Namur  31.1  51.7  - 587.5  1.6  - 0.1  42.0  46.4  1.2 
R79  UK  Wales  30.8  - - 3.2  2.2  - - 283.3  134.6  231.2 
R283  F  Corse  1.3  - 1.8  0.6  7.7  18.2  - 5.5  3.9  3.5 
R526  B  Luxembourg  6.4  0.7  - 19.5  0.6  - 0.1  41.6  69.5  1.1 
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Cereals 
Fruits  Sheep 
Code  Region, Nuts 2 2  and  Sugar 
Olive- Oleag- and  Wine  Tobacco  Milk 
Cattle  and 
oil  inous  Vegeta- (Meat)  Goats  Rice  bles 3  (Meat) 
R381  I  Abruzzi  61.1  32.3  103.2  6.5  27.1  62.3  48.1  42.0  29.0  17.4 
R71  UK  North  85.0  - - 41.2  2.6  - - 180.6  85.1  112.5 
R412  NL  Friesland  3.0  21.7  - 14.9  2.0  - - 404.1  70.6  16.8 
R424  NL  Gelder  land  3.8  21.9  - 0.6  13.1  - - 437.2  199.2  9.1 
R77  UK  West Midlands  160.2  55.6  - 59.0  16.5  - - 266.0  116.5  78.7 
RB53  E  Baleares  1.4  - 2.5  0.2  2.0  1.3  - 2.5  1.2  6.8 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  254.3  78.7  - 134.2  14.8  - - 139.7  80.2  68.9 
R263  F  Limousin  31.4  - - 2.4  5.9  1.3  13.5  38.4  145.0  70.4 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  36.5  - 4.4  38.8  63.0  590.4  0.8  23.7  18.2  30.3 
R78  UK  North West  29.9  2.9  - 9.5  16.3  - - 235.8  56.3  27.0 
R13C  D  Liineburg  123.1  133.8  - 112.0  18.5  - 1.1  379.3  156.6  2.9 
R423  NL  Overijssel  0.8  9.7  - 0.4  0.6  - - 411.2  94.1  3.6 
R7A  UK  Scotland  263.7  - - 101.4  6.9  - - 224.4  206.9  226.3 
R73  UK  East Midlands  332.3  140.1  - 218.0  26.7  - - 145.1  102.1  49.4 
R452  NL  Limburg  7.3  61.1  - 0.3  32.6  - - 106.5  37.6  2.1 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  133.5  37.3  - 19.1  13.6  - 0.5  578.7  227.4  14.1 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  272.2  296.6  - 10.4  16.1  - 3.4  267.7  91.9  5.9 
R76  UK  South West  227.8  2.9  - 36.8  14.7  - - 656.1  176.7  108.1 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  316.4  - - 312.2  7.2  153.5  28.9  195.3  153.9  110.8 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  379.7  - - 289.0  36.7  87.7  64.9  229.0  195.5  144.5 
R272  F  Auvergne  105.2  14.2  - 39.2  5.3  5.8  6.6  203.2  178.7  48.5 
R352  I  Umbria  68.7  11.3  55.1  71.9  6.1  19.0  231.8  19.2  24.4  7.4 
R252  F  Bretagne  261.8  - - 44.6  28.9  - 0.5  1023.3  393.9  11.8 
R515  B  Limburg  10.5  28.6  - 2.3  16.9  - - 42.3  29.4  0.8 
R74  UK  East Anglia  302.3  341.6  - 112.8  35.8  - - 42.4  48.4  11.6 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  15.6  26.4  - 0.6  14.5  - 0.5  100.9  73.7  1.8 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  9.7  69.5  - 13.7  43.3  - - 424.2  147.5  5.8 
R241  F  Lorraine  176.6  1.2  - 119.3  6.0  1.1  1.1  263.5  106.7  12.8 
R524  B  Liege  25.9  59.4  - 36.3  4.2  - - 102.4  53.8  1.2 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  299.9  2.2  - 128.2  42.1  85.6  27.3  760.5  478.0  31.2 
R353  I  Marche  191.2  151.3  16.4  56.9  19.4  36.4  3.8  24.1  40.3  4.8 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  58.3  4.1  - 27.6  3.4  5.8  0.3  213.7  67.4  5.9 
R172  D  Trier  25.9  0.6  - 20.1  1.8  26.7  1.1  87.5  32.2  1.3 
R222  F  Picardie  485.1  806.8  - 60.4  13.3  10.7  4.8  189.3  79.0  10.1 
R413  NL  Dr  en  the  5.2  69.1  - 3.6  2.9  - - 162.6  38.2  2.9 
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  26.8  61.4  - 4.6  37.0  - 14.1  111.6  87.9  3.0 
R226  F  Bourgogne  312.8  37.1  - 193.9  10.7  99.3  0.4  93.1  211.9  34.1 
R471  NL  Utrecht  0.1  0.6  - - 6.8  - - 142.3  29.6  4.6 
R474  NL  Zeeland  24.6  83.7  - 268.0  9.6  - - 21.1  10.2  3.6 
R16B  D  GieBen  46.0  7.7  - 57.3  1.3  - - 68.9  34.1  2.1 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  52.6  - 15.6  24.8  127.6  205.5  - 9.8  5.4  44.5 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  133.9  8.4  - 49.6  6.5  - 0.9  603.2  233.3  2.7 
R261  F  Aquitaine  357.6  - - 94.4  58.5  284.1  146.9  138.0  147.8  45.1 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  79.0  36.1  - 81.8  1.9  - - 202.9  74.7  0.9 
R192  D  Niederbayern  142.9  138.2  - 82.8  4.9  - - 221.5  120.2  1.7 
R224  F  Centre  783.8  134.5  - 418.7  32.1  57.3  10.7  101.7  89.4  37.6 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  437.9  424.0  - 214.0  5.0  143.4  7.3  134.4  66.1  12.9 
R153  D  Miinster  118.4  6.7  - 15.3  7.7  - - 156.0  98.2  2.1 
R171  D  Koblenz  58.9  10.1  - 85.8  3.9  21.1  - 66.9  36.6  2.9 
R351  I  Toscana  160.3  34.9  158.5  115.2  26.5  68.4  64.3  57.8  40.0  21.9 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  48.8  23.1  0.1  267.4  6.9  20.6  2.7  73.0  35.7  0.3 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  12.1  43.4  - 3.9  194.6  - - 186.6  31.1  9.4 
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  229.8  69.8  - 674.8  15.7  - 4.4  506.4  191.9  10.0 
R332  I  Veneto  226.8  212.6  10.1  601.7  87.2  155.2  144.7  287.6  204.0  1.6 
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Cereals  Fruits  Sheep 
Code  Region,  Nuts 2 2  and  Sugar  Olive- Oleag- and  Wine  Tobacco  Milk  Cattle  and 
oil  inous  Vegeta- (Meat)  Goats  Rice  bles  3  (Meat) 
R196  D  Unterfranken  105.2  123.9  - 199.7  5.7  39.4  - 63.3  53.0  1.4 
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  0.4  - 0.7  - 59.0  28.4  0.2  97.4  33.6  2.2 
R36  I  Lazio  134.1  33.9  180.0  38.4  87.0  73.8  41.6  164.8  66.1  26.5 
R311  I  Piemonte  326.6  27.4  - 133.2  51.1  71.5  2.7  217.7  251.7  5.8 
R313  I  Liguria  1.6  - 45.7  - J7.3  4.3  - 14.1  4.8  1.0 
R194  D  Oberfranken  58.9  5.5  - 85.1  2.6  - 0.0  130.5  50.0  1.7 
R502  B  Brabant  41.4  93.0  - 7.2  26.0  - - 38.2  39.4  1.8 
R271  F  Rhone-Alpes  186.6  1.1  1.6  84.2  51.2  128.5  52.3  313.3  160.3  36.3 
R16C  D  Kassel  86.9  32.8  - 144.0  5.8  - - 115.1  49.1  2.4 
R75  UK  South East  428.8  17.4  - 211.8  71.0  - - 213.6  111.6  59.1 
R242  F  Alsace  105.3  18.9  - 33.8  7.3  44.8  70.1  58.1  27.4  2.9 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  176.3  184.7  - 47.1  3.5  - - 71.9  35.6  0.7 
R6  L  Luxembourg  12.3  - - 0.0  0.5  6.2  - 56.1  20.4  -
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  285.1  483.0  1.9  306.0  206.5  120.5  1.0  459.2  199.9  4.3 
R154  D  Detmold  110.9  34.0  - 90.3  10.1  - - 119.2  52.8  1.7 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  7.7  41.3  - 16.4  8.3  - - 138.5  23.2  17.2 
R155  D  Arnsberg  61.4  19.0  - 70.0  6.6  - - 95.4  44.1  4.3 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  214.6  115.2  - 47.0  6.4  - 0.1  177.4  101.3  11.5 
RIA  D  Saarland  12.6  - - 10.0  3.9  0.4  - 21.8  10.8  1.5 
R183  D  Freiburg  52.6  2.3  - 54.5  16.9  79.7  15.5  98.3  56.4  3.1 
R184  D  Tiibingen  66.7  4.0  - 97.6  11.9  2.5  - 222.9  102.7  4.1 
R197  D  Schwa  ben  72.8  52.1  - 39.7  2.5  - - 401.7  161.7  3.1 
R312  I  Vaile d'  Aosta  0.1  - - - 0.4  0.5  - 10.9  5.0  0.3 
R511  B  Antwerpen  1.5  3.1  - - 38.6  - - 84.7  54.4  1.4 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  136.1  271.7  - 71.4  6.5  - 0.2  77.9  33.5  2.2 
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  62.2  110.4  - 44.4  12.2  119.2  40.7  29.7  18.5  5.2 
R152  D  Koln  79.7  235.9  - 6.2  17.0  - - 137.6  48.7  9.3 
R13B  D  Hannover  155.4  215.7  - 103.4  9.4  - 1.7  146.3  68.7  3.0 
R32  I  Lombardia  322.1  109.1  4.3  382.8  26.7  29.8  10.3  797.3  355.5  6.2 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  539.2  56.2  - 229.0  16.0  - - 985.6  233.1  4.4 
R182  D  Karlsruhe  53.8  31.1  - 62.0  14.1  19.3  25.2  41.2  29.3  3.5 
R151  D  Dusseldorf  55.9  118.6  - 11.3  13.6  - - 119.8  47.3  8.4 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  76.6  29.4  - 52.9  3.0  1.8  9.6  158.8  79.6  4.0 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  0.2  - - - 4.0  - - 0.3  0.2  1.0 
R181  D  Stuttgart  104.0  86.7  - 128.8  25.5  80.9  1.3  154.2  96.1  8.2 
R191  D  Oberbayern  122.4  49.6  - 131.8  4.2  - - 475.1  202.0  4.2 
R901  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  40.2  1.4  - 20.8  0.9  - - 14.5  9.4  0.3 
R14  D  Bremen  0.7  0.2  - 1.0  1.6  - - 4.9  3.o·  0.1 
R16A  D  Darmstadt  61.9  64.6  - 42.1  9.4  11.3  0.3  61.9  36.3  7.9 
R21  F  Ile de France  277.1  209.7  - 81.7  16.8  0.1  1.1  6.4  7.4  1.6 
R411  NL  Groningen  26.6  73.0  - 224.4  1.9  - - 120.6  27.3  6.6 
R12  D  Hamburg  2.2  0.1  - 5.2  8.0  - - 2.7  2.4  0.3 
EC (10)  14707.0  7469.5  3723.5  9767.4  3487.0  3504.2  3498.6  21132.0  10441.9  3054.4 
EC (12)  15320.2  7805.0  4153.0  10359.5  3658.0  4124.4  3687.3  21319.9  10534.9  3936.0 
1  Payments  for  individual  products,  distributed  according  to  their regional  production.  With  respect  to  subsidies  paid  to  producers,  EC 
payments to individual Member States were further distributed regionally, in all other cases, the EC payments were distributed directly to 
EC regions.  The regionalization of payments to Spain and Portugal was calculated separately. 
2  For United Kingdom  Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional  GDP per head. 
3  Without pineapples. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  EAGGF Financial Reports;  DIW calculations. 
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RC11  p  Norte  - 1.1  6.5  11.3  12.0  6.1  30.9 
RC14  p  Alentejo  - 15.6  87.5  89.2  89.6  317.6  281.8 
RC15  p  Algarve  - 0.1  0.6  1.0  1.1  10.7  2.8 
RA41  GR  Voreio Aigaio  23.8  37.4  41.3  35.5  47.9  442.7  185.9  163.8  162.1 
RC12  p  Centro  - 7.1  16.5  22.2  27.8  151.1  73.5 
RA21  GR  lpeiros  53.5  53.1  48.5  60.1  66.2  4.7  281.5  193.1  228.0 
RA13  GR  Dytiki Makedonia  57.3  55.9  51.2  52.2  60.7  294.9  277.2  225.3  219.9 
RA43  GR  Kriti  86.6  99.3  108.0  94;8  126.0  16.3  514.7  - 32.1  428.1 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  184.4  172.5  157.5  182.2  209.9  789.5  906.4  48.8  722.1 
RA22  GR  Ionia Nisia  26.6  26.3  29.1  24.4  33.2  493.5  139.7  310.2  113.1 
RA14  GR  Thessalia  261.6  368.5  274.0  327.8  380.5  309.4  1612.3  613.7  1350.7 
RA12  GR  Kentriki Makedonia  387.8  384.0  338.9  363.5  411.8  206.0  1886.0  548.1  1498.2 
RA42  GR  Notio Aigaio  18.7  19.4  18.7  20.0  23.6  440.5  100.6  373.9  81.9 
RA11  GR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  142.5  119.0  117.8  144.2  145.4  1640.0  668.9  137.9  526.4 
RA25  GR  Peleponnisos  138.2  139.3  145.2  133.7  177.0  8.8  733.4  231.2  595.2 
RC13  p  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  - 5.1  15.4  19.1  21.4  317.6  61.0 
RA3  GR  Attiki  21.9  24.6  25.6  24.7  30.6  215.8  127.4  135.3  105.5 
RB43  E  Extremadura  - 17.7  44.2  167.1  158.1  1134.8  387.1 
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  - - - - - 533.2  -
RA24  GR  Sterea Ellada  128.2  189.9  163.7  179.1  222.4  63.5  883.4  1083.3  755.1 
RB61  E  Andalucia  - 168.3  161.3  482.8  601.6  3.2  1414.1 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  - 12.5  85.1  319.2  268.7  1083.6  685.5 
RB11  E  Galicia  - 3.8  17.8  66.5  56.3  180.2  144.5 
RB62  E  Murcia  - 13.1  16.2  40.2  47.5  348.5  117.0 
R393  I  Calabria  169.0  141.0  198.2  173.0  236.6  350.9  917.9  333.3  748.8 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  - 16.4  125.8  305.5  262.5  395.9  710.3 
RB7  E  Can  arias  - 0.4  6.7  17.5  15.7  46.5  40.3 
RB13  E  Cantabria  - 0.7  2.4  8.3  8.6  402.0  19.9 
R392  I  Basilicata  63.8  68.8  85.4  85.2  95.2  993.4  398.4  756.9  334.6 
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  - 19.6  20.8  58.2  64.7  201.7  163.2 
R8  IRL Ireland  537.1  571.5  501.5  622.4  568.0  336.3  2800.6  421.2  2263.4 
RB12  E  Asturias  - 1.1  3.7  13.2  13.4  278.5  31.4 
R37  I  Campania  307.3  284.4  353.2  359.9  423.6  309.6  1728.4  543.0  1421.1 
RB24  E  Aragon  - 5.5  26.3  111.3  96.3  212.3  239.4 
R3A  I  Sicilia  356.0  300.4  389- .0  315.6  411.8  553.9  1772.8  239.5  1416.8 
RB51  E  Cataluna  - 7.3  28.3  102.1  97.9  146.3  235.6 
RB3  E  Madrid  - 0.9  3.7  15.6  13.5  279.8  33.8 
R425  NL  Flevoland  72.8  91.8  109.7  100.3  89.8  428.9  464.4  157.2  391.6 
R391  I  Puglia  438.0  347.8  485.1  470.7  575.8  847.9  2317.4  642.2  1879.4 
R3B  I  Sardegna  118.7  123.5  125.2  147.9  156.5  1220.6  671.9  995.6  553.2 
RB22  E  Navarra  - 1.6  7.1  32.6  25.3  109.7  66.5 
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  - 0.9  7.9  22.3  17.9  9.4  49.0 
RB23  E  Rioja  - 0.9  11.2  31.5  23.5  335.0  67.2 
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  133.3  130.9  108.3  132.6  123.1  471.7  628.2  117.4  494.9 
R382  I  Molise  43.7  44.0  52.9  54.2  54.9  354.7  249.6  620.6  205.9 
R523  B  Hainaut  100.4  116.6  109.7  122.0  109.5  203.3  558.2  96.4  457.8 
R527  B  Namur  111.4  185.0  199.7  225.1  201.3  281.5  922.4  584.1  811.0 
R79  UK  Wales  162.6  169.8  140.4  202.8  198.8  14.8  874.4  980.9  711.8 
R283  F  Corse  9.7  9.1  9.0  14.0  13.0  207.2  54.9  282.2  45.1 
R526  B  Luxembourg  36.2  37.0  28.1  41.7  38.1  875.8  181.2  220.9  145.0 
R381  I  Abruzzi  100.5  91.7  115.4  117.2  126.6  154.7  551.3  534.9  450.8 
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R71  UK  North  133.9  139.7  124.3  137.8  130.2  324.6  665.9  888.0  532.0 
R412  NL  Friesland  152.7  149.8  132.3  156.3  138.8  332.5  730.0  485.2  577.3 
R424  NL  Gelderland  209.3  216.4  169.4  199.2  181.0  332.8  975.2  338.5  765.9 
R77  UK  West Midlands  190.5  204.0  187.5  213.7  195.5  406.9  991.1  264.2  800.6 
RB53  E  Baleares  - 0.5  2.3  8.0  8.5  213.4  19.3 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  167.7  197.3  204.7  226.5  205.6  203.2  1001.9  824.6  834.2 
R263  F  Limousin  72.7  89.4  71.5  84.1  83.2  481.1  400.9  310.2 .  328.3 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  178.2  133.0  143.2  310.6  254.8  109.2  1019.8  207.0  841.6 
R78  UK  North West  111.4  104.9  90.8  107.3  97.3  603.0  511.7  933.2  400.3 
R13C  D  Ltineburg  224.1  259.9  255.7  271.0  237.0  514.4  1247.8  23.6  1023.7 
R423  NL  Overijssel  149.2  144.3  130.6  156.7  138.4  551.8  719.1  404.4  570.0 
R7A  UK  Scotland  223.0  256.9  250.8  295.2  276.7  160.2  1302.6  291.7  1079.6 
R73  UK  East Midlands  225.8  265.3  277.9  282.1  254.7  231.7  1305.8  233.3  1080.0 
R452  NL  Limburg  72.4  68.8  70.9  76.7  72.1  818.5  360.8  178.2  288.4 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  267.4  288.2  254.8  314.0  273.8  307.1  1398.3  4.6  1130.8 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  233.1  269.5  265.4  292.0  254.0  424.1  1314.0  832.9  1080.9 
R76  UK  South West  330.6  323.1  297.5  353.7  313.7  260.3  1618.6  248.4  1288.0 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  266.1  310.9  331.4  382.9  329.4  951.2  1620.6  96.9  1354.5 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  303.7  370.7  386.3  411.1  364.3  1060.6  1836.0  384.6  1532.3 
R272  F  Auvergne  147.8  170.1  163.2  167.5  150.7  1474.0  799.4  65.1  651.5 
R352  I  Umbria  120.9  105.3  134.2  144.5  156.2  313.3  661.0  507.7  540.2 
R252  F  Bretagne  478.4  514.1  481.5  550.8  485.8  768.0  2510.6  239.2  2032.2 
R515  B  Limburg  34.6  39.0  35.5  35.3  33.6  310.2  178.1  112.0  143.5 
R74  UK  East Anglia  219.3  235.2  250.0  256.0  233.1  540.9  1193.5  145.8  974.3 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  67.1  77.0  63.1  67.0  62.8  436.9  337.0  675.0  269.9 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  215.4  213.5  190.8  219.6  202.2  634.0  1041.6  872.4  826.2 
R241  F  Lorraine  148.3  179.4  159.1  209.1  176.0  730.8  871.8  248.7  723.5 
R524  B  Liege  64.1  82.5  74.6  79.5  71.5  819.7  372.3  232.6  308.2 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  455.9  498.1  474.2  558.6  490.6  810.4  2477.4  12.1  2021.4 
R353  I  Marche  109.9  132.3  147.2  152.4  142.4  803.1  684.2  543.2  574.3 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  108.7  110.0  102.1  106.2  91.1  212.1  518.1  8.9  409.4 
R172  D  Trier  59.2  52.7  48.8  58.7  49.5  944.9  268.9  50.2  209.7 
R222  F  Picardie  393.8  421.8  450.6  498.8  435.5  569.7  2200.5  31.8  1806.7 
R413  NL  Dr  en  the  95.5  89.2  89.0  96.7  84.6  208.2  454.9  140.1  359.5 
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  104.1  113.4  95.9  106.3  104.0  72.8  523.7  239.0  419.5 
R226  F  Bourgogne  248.6  273.6  280.8  272.5  232.2  739.7  1307.8  201.5  1059.1 
R471  NL  Utrecht  54.0  51.9  44.5  52.9  47.2  1324.0  250.6  972.3  196.6 
R474  NL  Zeeland  76.9  77.6  155.0  154.8  124.8  180.0  589.2  101.5  512.3 
R16B  D  GieBen  42.7  55.2  56.7  64.6  55.2  508.2  274.4  236.8  231.7 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  133.8  109.8  111.1  148.8  140.2  704.5  643.8  264.0  510.0 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  263.8  312.9  271.1  306.2  268.7  82.1  1422.7  101.6  1158.9 
R261  F  Aquitaine  318.4  329.4  345.6  363.5  317.8  908.4  1674.7  226.2  1356.3 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  111.9  119.4  119.7  142.9  122.5  496.1  616.3  339.2  504.4 
R192  D  Niederbayern  174.1  199.0  180.7  207.5  183.4  326.6  944.9  29.2  770.7 
R224  F  Centre  332.6  409.2  478.8  505.3  416.7  454.4  2142.6  35.6  1810.0 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  340.0  402.1  422.5  435.2  371.9  581.9  1971.7  637.6  1631.6 
R153  D  Munster  99.2  120.5  112.8  127.7  111.3  379.3  571.4  55.5  472.2 
R171  D  Koblenz  62.4  70.5  75.4  86.8  73.5  1610.1  368.5  20.5  306.1 
R351  I  Toscana  172.7  163.0  216.2  198.6  207.9  273.7  958.3  274.9  785.7 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  84.4  103.1  145.4  134.7  117.6  160.7  585.2  195.7  500.8 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  164.7  135.9  128.3  132.6  137.0  392.4  698.5  212.2  533.8 
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  390.8  507.2  426.0  461.9  397.8  102.5  2183.7  7.6  1792.9 
R332  I  Veneto  350.5  439.7  541.2  557.2  506.7  320.9  2395.3  276.2  2044.8 
R196  D  Unterfranken  100.7  132.0  159.7  178.0  152.8  101.3  723.3  3.1  622.6 
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  62.6  58.9  58.5  59.8  56.6  389.4  296.4  160.9  233.8 
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R36  I  Lazio  2I2.8  I90.3  231.0  224.3  239.8  I50.4  I098.I  139.7  885.3 
R311  I  Piemonte  231.5  286.5  300.5  289.7  275.5  6I9.8  1383.7  385.8  1152.2 
R313  I  Liguria  26.6  I7.5  26.0  22.I  28.6  221.2  I20.8  2.8  94.2 
RI94  D  Oberfranken  74.I  85.7  89.3  I00.5  85.4  472.8  435.I  I42.2  361.0 
R502  B  Brabant  65.4  69.5  68.4  71.8  67.3  249.I  342.4  554.5  277.0 
R27I  F  Rhone-Alpes  271.6  268.5  279.6  287.5  254.5  360.4  1361.7  I8.I  I090.2 
RI6C  D  Kassel  84.9  111.9  I13.4  I27.6  I09.5  2I7.9  547.4  284.6  462.5 
R75  UK  South East  262.I  304.8  308.9  310.3  281.5  45.7  I467.6  379.I  I205.5 
R242  F  Alsace  88.4  95.9  97.2 '  103.I  92.4  769.0  477.0  8.7  388.6 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hovedst  I26.7  I48.9  I61.3  I80.6  I49.4  559.7  766.8  43.5  640.I 
R6  L  Luxembourg  24.0  25.3  23.5  27.I  23.0  1539.2  I23.0  379.7  99.0 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  455.9  5I6.7  566.6  582.2  537.1  I266.2  2658.5  515.6  2202.6 
RI54  D  Detmold  93.4  I13.I  118.I  I26.8  I09.2  422.8  560.6  642.4  467.2 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  67.9  67.3  67.9  77.8  70.2  1331.4  351.2  279.5  283.2 
RI55  D  Arnsberg  67.9  84.5  79.3  88.6  76.8  72.I  397.2  722.9  329.2 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  I67.0  I92.5  I81.4  213.2  I83.7  233.6  937.7  689.3  770.7 
RIA  D  Saarland  13.6  I6.7  I5.4  I7.8  I5.6  397.9  79.I  40.3  65.5 
RI83  D  Freiburg  80.1  89.0  91.2  I21.7  I04.6  367.4  486.5  329.7  406.4 
RI84  D  Tiibingen  128.3  I43.3  135.2  I47.0  I28.2  372.5  682.0  97.6  553.7 
RI97  D  Schwa  ben  201.0  2I6.2  I85.8  I99.6  I72.9  307.5  975.5  I54.2  774.5 
R3I2  I  Valle d'  Aosta  5.4  5.3  4.I  4.5  4.0  486.8  23.3  39I.4  17.9 
R511  B  Antwerpen  50.5  58.6  51. I  47.2  46.7  70.I  254.0  209.2  203.5 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  136.7  I59.6  I75.3  I69.5  I48.7  I64.4  789.8  0.7  653.I 
RI73  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  I24.0  10I.4  I10.8  139.0  I21.6  I045.4  597.0  61.9  472.9 
RI52  D  KOln  I29.7  I40.4  139.5  I50.0  135.I  56.9  694.7  330.0  565.0 
R13B  D  Hannover  I63.8  192.5  203.4  202.0  I76.6  293.9  938.3  78.7  774.5 
R32  I  Lombardia  433.6  513.7  569.9  579.3  522.7  I428.3  26I9.2  402.0  2I85.6 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  505.3  570.8  564.0  653.8  561.8  I5I7.I  2855.7  I75.1  2350.4 
RI82  D  Karlsruhe  59.8  74.9  71.4  83.7  74.9  I270.9  364.6  353.6  304.8 
RI5I  D  DUsseldorf  93.1  103.6  98.2  105.8  95.5  1110.7  4%.2  207.3  403.1 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  %.0  108.I  I05.3  I24.8  108.8  27.8  543.0  7.I  447.0 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  1.6  2.0  1.2  1.3  1.6  434.9  7.6  1073.0  6.0 
RI8I  D  Stuttgart  I44.9  I74.7  I73.8  209.3  I81.4  274.3  884.2  - 739.3 
RI9I  D  Oberbayern  256.3  284.7  248.4  281.I  248.4  I40.5  13I9.0  21.6  I062.7 
R90I  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  I7.0  23.9  22.6  25.4  22.2  409.6  11l.I  587.0  94.I 
RI4  D  Bremen  2.7  3.3  2.8  3.I  2.9  904.0  I4.9  107.I  I2.I 
R16A  D  Darmstadt  64.7  74.4  76.7  86.6  76.0  481.8  378.4  38.2  313.7 
R21  F  Ile de France  125.I  I47.5  170.1  189.6  160.4  595.1  792.8  4.8  667.7 
R411  NL  Groningen  122.9  I84.2  133.4  126.8  108.4  I164.6  675.7  74.5  552.8 
R12  D  Hamburg  5.6  5.6  5.1  5.7  5.8  155.1  27.8  103.0  22.2 
EC (10)  19493.6  21272.4  21532.1  23504.6  21978.5  62298.1  107781.2 
EC (12)  19493.6  21572.5  22229.5  25449.2  23910.4  43802.0  93161.6 
1  Payments for individual products (without fishery products and pineapple), distributed according to their regional production. With respect 
to subsidies  paid to producers,  EC payments to individual Member States were  further distributed regionaly in all  other cases,  the EC 
payments were distributed directly to EC regions. The regionalization of payments to Spain and Portugal was calculated separately. 
2  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional GDP per head. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  EAGGF Financial Reports; DIW calculations. 
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EAGGF 
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ment  gations  Funds  Credits  dies 
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Grants 
ment 
Total  Grants 
RCll  p  Norte  242.2  122.2  13.5  377.9  0.0  0.3  118.9  497.1  7.6  504.7 
RC14  p  Alentejo  124.4  48.5  6.6  179.5  0.0  0.0  191.3  370.8  103.0  473.8 
RC15  p  Algarve  46.4  12.7  4.5  63.6  0.0  0.0  25.2  88.8  0.7  89.5 
RA41  OR  Voreio Aigaio  0.8  3.4  0.2  4.4  0.0  0.0  1.1  5.5  78.7  84.2 
RC12  p  Centro  166.8  76.0  20.8  263.6  0.0  0.0  71.5  335.1  23.6  358.7 
RA21  OR  lpeiros  176.7  5.2  7.6  189.5  0.0  0.0  4.5  194.0  101.6  295.6 
RA13  OR  Dytiki Makedonia  28.9  6.1  1.2  36.2  0.0  0.0  49.5  85.7  107.1  192.8 
RA43  OR  Kriti  143.9  6.8  21.3  172  0.0  0.0  37.8  209.8  207.3  417.1 
RA23  GR  Dytiki Ellada  0  26.1  8.3  34.4  0.0  0.0  54.7  89.1  330.0  419.1 
RA22  OR  Ionia Nisia  0  2.0  0  2  0.0  0.0  3.5  5.5  55.5  61.0 
RA14  OR  Thessalia  118.3  15.6  11.5  145.4  0.0  0.0  9.2  154.6  642.4  797.0 
RA12  OR  Kentriki Makedonia  71.4  42.0  16.1  129.5  0.0  0.3  31.9  161.7  722.9  884.6 
RA42  OR  Notio Aigaio  2  5.1  0  7.1  0.0  0.0  1.5  8.6  38.2  46.8 
RAil  OR  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  74.1  19.1  2.5"'.9  119.1  0.0  0.0  13.0  132.1  236.8  368.9 
RA25  OR  Peleponnisos  1.1  11.0  18.3  30.4  0.0  0.0  9.9  40.3  284.6  324.9 
RC13  p  Lis boa e Vale do Tejo  72  299.0  20  391  0.0  0.0  70.6  461.6  20.5  482.1 
RA3  OR  Attiki  0  158.8  4.4  163.2  0.0  0.0  183.9  347.1  50.2  397.3 
RB43  E  Extremadura  97.4  27.8  5.2  130.4  0.0  0.0  22.4  152.8  61.9  214.7 
RB63  E  Ceuta y Melilla  0  3.3  0  3.3  0.0  0.0  2.0  5.3  0.0  5.3 
RA24  OR  Sterea Ellada  0  12.3  9.8  22.1  0.0  0.0  18.4  40.5  353.6  394.1 
RB61  E  Andalucia  526.1  176.2  38.6  740.9  0.0  0.1  185.4  926.4  329.7  1256.1 
RB42  E  Castilla-La Mancha  174.6  34.0  10.6  219.2  0.0  0.0  36.2  255.4  97.6  353.0 
RBll  E  Galicia  83.2  55.0  15.9  154.1  0.0  0.0  71.4  225.5  21.6  247.1 
RB62  E  Murcia  63.1  23.4  6.9  93.4  0.0  0.0  20.1  113.5  29.2  142.7 
R393  I  Calabria  104.3  57.3  8.5  170.1  0.0  0.0  153.2  323.3  339.2  662.5 
RB41  E  Castilla-Leon  227.6  53.5  8.4  289.5  0.0  1.0  49.1  339.6  142.2  481.8 
RB7  E  Can  arias  25.6  38.5  1.7  65.8  0.0  0.0  54.3  120.1  7.1  127.2 
RB13  E  Cantabria  0  8.7  1.2  9.9  0.0  0.2  8.6  18.6  3.1  21.7 
R392  I  Basilicata  202.9  38.3  9.1  250.3  0.0  0.0  58.6  308.9  154.2  463.1 
RB52  E  Comunidad V  alenciana  0  61.5  15.3  76.8  0.0  0.6  153.2  230.6  40.3  270.9 
R8  IRL  Ireland  290.4  451.2  55.8  797.4  0.2  0.1  394.9  1192.6  1073.0  2265.6 
RB12  E  Asturias  92.6  18.1  2.4  113.1  0.0  1.8  22.6  137.5  4.8  142.3 
R37  I  Campania  953.8  135.7  6  1095.5  31.5  0.8  595.7  1723.6  637.6  2361.2 
RB24  E  Aragon  5.7  18.6  7.5  31.8  0.0  0.4  21.9  54.1  31.8  85.9 
R3A  I  Sicilia  225.6  114.8  12.6  353  0.0  0.0  492.7  845.7  689.3  1535.0 
RB51  E  Cataluna  0  125.5  18.6  144.1  0.0  0.0  100.9  245.0  35.6  280.6 
RB3  E  Madrid  0  78.4  5.5  83.9  0.0  1.6  99.5  185.0  4.6  189.6 
R425  NL  Flevoland  0  1.5  0  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.6  201.5  203.1 
R391  I  Puglia  53.5  94.2  13.2  160.9  192.6  1.6  488.6  843.7  832.9  1676.6 
R3B  I  Sardegna  62.3  64.8  4.5  131.6  0.0  0.3  302.4  434.4  248.7  683.1 
RB22  E  Navarra  0  9.5  3.6  13.1  0.0  0.0  8.4  21.5  8.7  30.2 
RB21  E  Pais Vasco  0  63.4  3.5  66.9  0.0  0.5  87.3  154.7  8.9  163.6 
RB23  E  Rioja  0  3.6  2.7  6.3  0.0  0.0  4.3  10.6  12.1  22.7 
R7B  UK  Northern Ireland  124.6  187.1  12.5  324.2  0.0  0.0  158.7  482.9  239.2  722.1 
R382  I  Molise  32.9  7.6  3.5  44  0.0  0.0  45.4  89.4  96.9  186.3 
R523  B  Hainaut  0  20.6  0.9  21.5  0.2  2.6  0.7  25.0  226.2  251.2 
R527  B  Namur  0.7  5.2  0.4  6.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  6.5  384.6  391.1 
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R79  UK  Wales  155.7  47.8  1.7  205.2  71.0  0.0  97.3  373.4  310.2  683.6 
R283  F  Corse  19.4  3.2  3.3  25.9  0.0  0.0  5.9  31.8  18.1  49.9 
R526  B  Luxembourg  6.4  2.7  0.5  9.6  0.0  0.0  0.1  9.7  65.1  74.8 
R381  I  Abruzzi  75.4  39.9  7.1  122.4  0.0  0.0  186.9  309.3  207.0  516.3 
R71  UK  North  158  79.8  1.7  239.5  15.2  0.2  535.1  789.9  264.0  1053.9 
R412  NL  Friesland  12.7  4.8  0.2  17.7  0.0  0.5  0.3  18.5  282.2  300.7 
R424  NL  Gelderland  0  14.5  0.7  15.2  0.0  0.0  1.0  16.2  385.8  402.0 
R77  UK  West Midlands  165.1  104.8  1.9  271.8  0.8  0.0  103.1  375.7  391.4  767.1 
RB53  E  Baleares  0  8.7  1.5  10.2  0.0  0.0  10.9  21.1  2.8  23.9 
R72  UK  Yorkshire and Humberside  108.3  90.5  4.4  203.2  330.9  0.0  214.3  748.4  402.0  1150.4 
R263  F  Limousin  36.4  9.6  0.5  46.5  0.0  0.0  9.1  55.6  160.9  216.5 
R281  F  Languedoc-Roussillon  44.3  29.3  33.2  106.8  0.1  1.0  74.5  182.4  276.2  458.6 
R78  UK  North West  129.3  144.5  1.8  275.6  0.2  0.0  211.8  487.6  195.7  683.3 
R13C  D  Uineburg  7.7  4.0  5.2  16.9  0.0  0.1  4.1  21.1  515.6  536.7 
R423  NL  Overijssel  0  14.9  0.7  15.6  0.0  0.0  0.6  16.2  274.9  291.1 
R7A  UK  Scotland  265  124.7  18  407.7  0.3  0.0  654.2  1062.3  507.7  1570.0 
R73  UK  East Midlands  8  42.5  5.4  55.9  2.4  0.0  12.7  71.1  543.2  614.3 
R452  NL  Limburg  26.9  14.6  1.6  43.1  0.0  0.0  36.7  79.8  139.7  219.5 
R225  F  Basse-Normandie  5.9  18.2  3.8  27.9  0.1  0.0  49.7  77.7  543.0  620.7 
R23  F  Nord-Pas de Calais  80.5  75.5  3.4  159.4  76.7  16.1  167.6  419.8  534.9  954.7 
R76  UK  South West  78.3  36.9  2.7  117.9  0.0  0.0  82.1  200.0  620.6  820.6 
R253  F  Poitou-Charentes  27.4  24.3  2.9  54.6  0.0  0.0  35.9  90.5  642.2  732.7 
R262  F  Midi-Pyrenees  80.7  24.3  9.2  114.2  0.2  0.1  82.2  196.7  756.9  953.6 
R272  F  Auvergne  41.8  18.9  0  60.7  0.2  0.0  23.3  84.3  333.3  417.6 
R352  I  Umbria  3.3  13.3  4.8  21.4  0.4  0.0  70.7  92.6  239.5  332.1 
R252  F  Bretagne  37.7  32.2  16.1  86  0.0  0.0  177.3  263.3  995.6  1258.9 
R515  B  Limburg  25.4  7.5  1.8  34.7  2.1  1.9  69.6  108.3  74.5  182.8 
R74  UK  East Anglia  0  12.3  6.4  18.7  0.0  0.4  64.3  83.4  485.2  568.6 
R518  B  Oost-Vlaanderen  0  6.5  2.9  9.4  1.1  0.0  0.8  11.2  140.1  151.3 
R451  NL  Noord-Brabant  0  17.9  2.1  20  0.0  0.0  81.3  101.3  404.4  505.7 
R241  F  Lorraine  98.1  33.7  0  131.8  5.5  18.3  83.9  239.5  338.5  578.0 
R524  B  Liege  8.6  13.7  2.6  24.9  0.9  5.9  0.6  32.3  157.2  189.5 
R251  F  Pays de Loire  35.3  40.5  9.6  85.4  0.0  0.0  132.2  217.6  972.3  1189.9 
R353  I  Marche  18.2  23.7  12.1  54  0.0  0.0  189.5  243.5  279.5  523.0 
R243  F  Franche-Comte  3.1  11.7  0.7  15.5  0.0  0.1  95.9  111.4  212.2  323.6 
R172  D  Trier  4.3  1.0  2.5  7.8  0.0  0.0  1.3  9.1  101.5  110.6 
R222  F  Picardie  5.1  17.0  1.3  23.4  0.1  0.0  25.8  49.3  872.4  921.7 
R413  NL  Dr  en  the  0  3.3  0  3.3  0.0  0.6  0.2  4.2  178.2  182.4 
R519  B  West-Vlaanderen  8.6  3.3  5.9  17.8  0.0  0.0  0.6  18.4  209.2  227.6 
R226  F  Bourgogne  5.8  15.3  2.3  23.4  0.6  1.5  17.1  42.6  554.5  597.1 
R471  NL  Utrecht  0  7.1  0.3  7.4  0.0  0.2  0.5  8.2  96.4  104.6 
R474  NL  Zeeland  0  1.7  2.6  4.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  4.5  232.6  237.1 
R16B  D  Gief3en  2.6  2.0  0.1  4.7  0.0  0.3  2.7  7.6  112.0  119.6 
R282  F  Provence-Alpes-Cote d'  Azur  21.6  58.5  17.2  97.3  7.5  0.8  143.2  248.8  220.9  469.7 
R13D  D  Weser-Ems  23.2  8.8  1.7  33.7  170.4  2.5  28.9  235.4  584.1  819.5 
R261  F  Aquitaine  41.3  36.1  12.7  90.1  0.0  0.0  87.7  177.8  675.0  852.8 
R193  D  Oberpfalz  2  2.4  0  4.4  0.0  2.2  2.7  9.3  239.0  248.3 
R192  D  Niederbayern  17.6  1.3  1.2  20.1  0.0  0.0  2.9  23.0  379.7  402.7 
R224  F  Centre  0.5  16.7  1.2  18.4  0.0  0.0  17.5  35.9  888.0  923.9 
R221  F  Champagne-Ardenne  13  13.8  4  30.8  11.9  0.2  16.0  58.9  824.6  883.5 
R153  D  Munster  8.1  10.5  0.1  18.7  62.8  21.9  9.8  113.2  233.3  346.5 
R171  D  Koblenz  2.1  2.9  0.9  5.9  0.0  0.1  3.8  9.7  145.8  155.5 
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R351  I  Toscana  16.2  33.0  4.2  53.4  217.3  0.6  385.8  657.1  379.1  1036.2 
R333  I  Friuli-Venezia Giulia  0  43.0  6.1  49.1  0.0  0.8  87.2  137.1  248.4  385.5 
R473  NL  Zuid-Holland  0  25.9  4.4  30.3  0.0  0.2  1.8  32.3  264.2  296.5 
Rll  D  Schleswig-Holstein  13.5  8.1  4.1  25.7  0.0  0.5  21.2  47.3  933.2  980.5 
R332  I  Veneto  5.3  42.6  11.7  59.6  0.1  0.1  294.2  354.0  980.9  1334.9 
R196  D  Unterfranken  1.3  1.9  3.2  6.4  0.0  0.1  3.4  9.9  291.7  301.6 
R331  I  Trentino-Alto Adige  0  17.9  6.1  24  0.0  0.0  178.7  202.7  117.4  320.1 
R36  I  Lazio  57.5  117.1  22.6  197.2  0.0  12.3  476.9  686.4  421.2  1107.6 
R311  I  Piemonte  6.7  59.8  3.6  70.1  67.3  4.3  666.5  808.2  587.0  1395.2 
R313  I  Liguria  1  33.9  2.7  37.6  0.3  12.2  112.6  162.7  43.5  206.2 
R194  D  Oberfranken  9.7  1.8  0.9  12.4  3.1  0.0  2.9  18.4  175.1  193.5 
R502  B  Brabant  2.1  13.2  1.2  16.5  0.0  1.4  1.3  19.1  137.9  157.0 
R271  F  Rhone-Alpes  20.9  50.5  11.1  82.5  20.3  2.6  159.8  265.1  548.1  813.2 
R16C  D  Kassel  10.8  3.6  1  15.4  0.0  0.0  3.3  18.7  225.3  244.0 
R75  UK  South East  0  159.0  5.2  164.2  7.6  0.0  373.9  545.7  613.7  1159.4 
R242  F  Alsace  4.4  10.0  1.5  15.9  0.0  0.0  39.8  55.7  193.1  248.8 
R902  DK  Ost For Storebaelt, Ex.Hov.  3.2  12.9  2.6  18.7  0.0  0.0  9.6  28.3  310.2  338.5 
R6  L  Luxembourg  6.7  4.2  0.3  11.2  2.2  5.8  20.0  39.2  48.8  88.0 
R34  I  Emilia-Romagna  0  124.4  16.1  140.5  0.0  0.0  243.2  383.7  1083.3  1467.0 
R154  D  Detmold  0  7.7  0.4  8.1  0.0  0.3  5.7  14.0  231.2  245.2 
R472  NL  Noord-Holland  0  21.3  1.8  23.1  90.5  3.3  1.3  118.3  135.3  253.6 
R155  D  Arnsberg  2.7  20.6  0.5  23.8  33.2  47.6  25.5  130.1  163.8  293.9 
R223  F  Haute-Normandie  4  27.3  1.6  32.9  0.0  0.0  16.4  49.3  373.9  423.2 
RIA  D  Saarland  14.6  15.0  0.1  29.7  70.1  16.5  71.1  187.3  32.1  219.4 
R183  D  Freiburg  0  3.6  1.2  4.8  0.0  0.6  5.3  10.6  180.2  190.8 
R184  D  TO bingen  0  2.1  3.1  5.2  0.0  0.0  4.3  9.5  278.5  288.0 
R197  D  Schwaben  0  2.0  0.9  2.9  0.0  0.5  4.3  7.8  402.0  409.8 
R312  I  Valle d'  Aosta  0  2.8  0  2.8  0.1  0.2  37.1  40.2  9.4  49.6 
R511  B  Antwerpen  3.9  8.3  1.3  13.5  0.2  0.0  14.9  28.6  109.7  138.3 
R13A  D  Braunschweig  15.4  6.4  1.7  23.5  128.0  3.7  4.4  159.7  335.0  494.7 
R173  D  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  12.8  4.4  6.1  23.3  0.0  0.2  5.1  28.5  212.3  240.8 
R152  D  Koln  8.2  17.8  2.1  28.1  1.9  7.4  131.3  168.7  279.8  448.5 
R13B  D  Hannover  4.7  7.9  0  12.6  0.0  0.3  149.8  162.7  395.9  558.6 
R32  I  Lombardia  7.5  130.9  12.3  150.7  3.5  5.7  795.0  954.9  1083.6  2038.5 
R903  DK  Vest For Storebaelt  25  46.5  16.8  88.3  0.0  0.0  198.9  287.2  1134.8  1422.0 
R182  D  Karlsruhe  1.7  5.6  1  8.3  0.0  0.0  6.8  15.1  146.3  161.4 
R151  D  DUsseldorf  13.8  26.3  1.9  42  298.3  54.3  147.0  541.6  201.7  743.3 
R195  D  Mittelfranken  2  2.9  0  4.9  0.0  0.0  4.3  9.2  213.4  222.6 
RIB  D  Berlin (West)  22.2  33.6  0  55.8  48.4  0.0  5.7  109.9  3.2  113.1 
R181  D  Stuttgart  0  5.2  6.3  11.5  0.0  0.1  69.6  81.3  348.5  429.8 
R191  D  Oberbayern  4.1  7.2  3  14.3  0.0  0.0  10.2  24.5  533.2  557.7 
R901  DK  Hovedstadsregionen  0  24.1  1  25.1  7.4  0.1  276.2  308.8  46.5  355.3 
R14  D  Bremen  10.5  19.6  3.4  33.5  0.0  1.8  1.8  37.1  6.1  43.2 
R16A  D  Darmstadt  1  9.6  1.9  12.5  0.0  0.7  9.6  22.8  151.1  173.9 
R21  F  Ile de France  0  91.0  1.1  92.1  6.6  15.0  65.5  179.2  317.6  496.8 
R411  NL  Groningen  8.5  10.1  0.2  18.8  0.0  0.5  0.3  19.6  317.6  337.2 
R12  D  Hamburg  0  10.4  1  11.4  0.0  0.1  4.5  15.9  10.7  26.6 
EC (10)  4908.8  4209.7  653.9  9772.4  1992.5  280.0  12179.9  24224.8  42804.5  67029.3 
EC (12)  6856.5  5575.8  868.4  13300.7  1992.5  286.5  13615.8  29195.5  43801.9  72997.4 
1  For United Kingdom Nuts  1;  without Departements d'Outre-Mer,  A~ores and Madeira. The regions were put in order according to their 
regional GOP per head. 
Sources:  Eurostat, database Regio;  DIW calculations. 
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Regional concentration of income and EC financial flows 
Income, EC 10,  1988 
ERDF investment grants 
Original data 
EC 12,  total 1986 
EC 12,  total 1990 
EC 10,  total1989-90 
EC 10,  total 1985-87 
EC 10,  infrastructure 1985-87 
EC 10,  industry 1985-87 
Modified data 
EC 12,  infrastructure 1986-87 
EC  12,  industry 1986-87 
ESF obligations 
Original data, EC  10,  1985 - 89 
Modified data, EC 10,  1985-89 
EAGGF guidance investment grants 
Original data 
EC 12,  1987 
EC 10,  1985-87 
ECSC loans 
Original data 
EC 12,  1986-87 
Modified data, EC 10,  1985-87 
ECSC subsidies 
Original data 
EC  12,  1986 
EC 12,  1989 
Modified data 
EC 12,  1986-89 
EIB loans 
Original data 
EC 12,  total 1986-87 
EC 10, total 1985-87 
EC 10, infrastructure 1985-87 
EC 10, industry 1985 - 87 
CEC contribution to R&D contracts 
EC  10,  1983-90 
121 CAP guarantee payments 
EC 12,  cereals and rice  1986-89 
EC 10,  cereals and rice  1985 - 89 
EC 10,  sugar 1985 - 89 
EC 12,  olive-oil  1986-89 
EC 12,  oleaginous 1986-89 
EC 10,  fruits and vegetables 1985-89 
EC 12,  wine 1986-89 
EC 12,  wine  1986 
EC 12,  wine  1989 
EC 12,  tobacco 1986-89 
EC 12,  milk  1986-89 
EC 10,  milk 1985-89 
EC 10,  cattle (meat) 1985-89 
EC 10,  sheep and goats (meat) 1985-89 
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159  . Appendix C 
Community and national authorities, agencies and institutions contacted 
in  the course of work on this study: 
1.  Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 
DG II 
Directorate B:  Economic evaluation of Community policies 
DGV 
Directorate D:  European Social Fund 
DG VI 
Directorate F1:  Rural development I 
Directorate G:  European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
DGX 
Directorate A:  Audiovisual 
DG XII 
Directorate A:  Scientific and technological policy 
Directorate B:  Means of action 
DGXVI 
Directorate B:  Operations  in  regions  whose  development  is  lagging  behind  (Objective  1):  Greece,  Ireland, 
Northern Ireland and Portugal 
Directorate E:  Financial management and communication 
DG XXII 
Directorate: Coordination, monitoring and assessment of structural policies 
2.  European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg 
Directorate: Budgets; Agricultural policy 
Directorate: Structures 
3.  Statistical Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg 
Directorate A:  Dissemination and computer processing 
Directorate F:  Agricultural, fisheries  and environmental statistics 
4.  Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Bonn 
Subdivision 21:  Coordination and principles of planning 
Department 212:  Plant production, statistics, planning 
Department 215:  Market observation, animal products 
Department 414:  Food industry, market intervention (general), stocks 
Department 714:  EC budget, EC agricultural funding 
5.  Federal Office for Agricultural Market Organization (BALM), Frankfurt/Main Plant production division, stocks 
department 
161 6.  Federal Office for Food and Forestry (BEF),  Frankfurt/Main 
Department I: Budgets 
Department 2:  Planning 
7.  Federal Audit Office, Frankfurt/Main 
Agricultural department 
162 European Communities - European Parliament 
The regional impact of Community policies 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
1991  - 162 pp. - 21.0  x  29.7 em 
ISBN 92-823-0328-4 
Catalogue number: AX-71-91-445-EN-C 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: ECU 10 Venta y suscripciones  •  Salg og abonnement •  Verkauf und Abonnement •  nwA~o&lc:; KOI  ouv~potJtc:; 
Sales and subscriptions •  Vente et abonnements  •  Vendita e abbonamenti 
BELGIQUE I  BELGIE: 
Moniteur beige I 
Belgisch Staatsblad 
Rue de Louvain 42 I  Leuvenseweg 42 
1 000 Bruxelles I  1  000 Brussel 
Tel. (02) 512 00 26 
Fax 511  01  84 
CCP I  Postrekening 000-2005502-27 
Autres distributeurs I 
Overige verkooppunten 
Librairie europeenne/ 
Europese Boekhandel 
Avenue Albert Jonnart 50 I 
Albert Jonnartlaan 50 
1200 Bruxelles I  1200 Brussel 
Tel. (02) 734 02 81 
Fax 735 08 60 
Jean De Lannoy 
Avenue du Roi 202 IKoningslaan 202 
1  060 Bruxelles I  1060 Brussel 
Tel. (02) 538 51  69 
Telex 63220 UNBOOK B 
Fax (02) 538 08 41 
CREDOC 
Rue de Ia Montagne 34 I Bergstraat 34 
Bte 11  I  Bus 11 
1 000 Bruxelles I  1  000 Brussel 
DAN  MARK 
J. H. Schultz Information A/S 
EF-Publikationer 
Ottiliavej 18 
2500 Valby 
Tlf. 36 44 22 66 
Fax 36 44 01  41 
Girokonto 6 00 08 86 
BR DEUTSCHLAND 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
Breite StraBe 
Postfach 1  0 80 06 
5000 Kbln 1 
Tel. (02 21) 20 29-0 
Telex ANZEIGER BONN 8 882 595 
Fax 20 29 278 
GREECE 
G.C. Eleftheroudakis SA 
International Bookstore 
Nikis Street 4 
1 0563 Athens 
Tel. (01) 322 63 23 
Telex 219410 ELEF 
Fax 323 98 21 
ESPANA 
Boletin Oficial del Estado 
Trafalgar, 27 
28010 Madrid 
Tel.  (91)  4482135 
Mundi-Prensa Libros, S.A. 
Castell6, 37 
28001  Madrid 
Tel.  (91)  431 33 99 (Libras) 
431  32 22 (Suscripciones) 
435 36 37 (Direcci6n) 
Telex 49370-MPLI-E 
Fax (91) 575 39 98 
Sucursal: 
Librerfa lntemacional AEDOS 
Consejo de Ciento, 391 
08009 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 301  86 15 
Fax (93) 317 01  41 
Llibreria de Ia Generalitat 
de Catalunya 
Rambla dels Estudis, 118 (Palau Moja) 
08002 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 302 68 35 
302 64 62 
Fax (93) 302 12 99 
Verkoop en abonnementen  •  Venda e assinaturas 
FRANCE 
Journal official 
Service des publications 
des Communautes europeennes 
26, rue Desaix 
75727 Paris Cedex 15 
Tel. (1)  40 58 75 oo 
Fax (1)  40 58 75 74 
IRELAND 
Government Publications 
Sales Office 
Sun Alliance House 
Molesworth Street 
Dublin 2 
Tel. (1)  71  03 09 
or by post 
Government Stationery Office 
EEC Section 
6th floor 
Bishop Street 
Dublin 8 
Tel. (1)  78 16 66 
Fax (1) 78 06 45 
IT  ALIA 
Licosa Spa 
Via Benedetto Fortini, 120110 
Casella postale 552 
50125 Firenze 
Tel. (055) 64 54 15 
Fax 6412 57 
Telex 570466 LICOSA I 
CCP 343 509 
Subagenti: 
Libreria scientifica 
Lucio de Biasio - AEIOU 
Via Meravigli, 16 
20123 Milano 
Tel. (02) 80 76 79 
Herder Editrice e  Libreria 
Piazza Montecitorio, 117-120 
00186 Roma 
Tel. (06) 679 46 281679 53 04 
Libreria giuridica 
Via XII  Ottobre, 1721R 
16121 Genova 
Tel. (01 0) 59 56 93 
GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG 
Messageries Paul Kraus 
11, rue Christophe Plantin 
2339 Luxembourg 
Tel. 499 88 88 
Telex 2515 
Fax 499 88 84 44 
CCP 49242-63 
NEDERLAND 
SOU Overheidsinformatie 
Externe Fondsen 
Postbus 20014 
2500 EA 's-Gravenhage 
Tel. (070) 37 89 911 
Fax (070) 34 75 778 
PORTUGAL 
lmprensa Nacional 
Casa da Maeda, EP 
Rua D.  Francisco Manuel de Melo, 5 
1 092 Lisboa Codex 
Tel. (01) 69 34 14 
Distribuidora de Livros 
Bertrand, Ld.
8 
Grupo Bertrand, SA 
Rua das Terras dos Vales, 4-A 
Apartado 37 
2700 Amadora Codex 
Tel. (01) 49 59 050 
Telex 15798 BERDIS 
Fax 49 60 255 
UNITED KINGDOM 
HMSO Books (PC 16) 
HMSO Publications Centre 
51  Nine Elms Lane 
London SW8 5DR 
Tel. (071) 873 2000 
Fax GP3 873 8463 
Telex2971138 
OSTER  REICH 
Manz'sche Verlags-
und UniversiUitsbuchhandlung 
Kohlmarkt 16 
1014 Wien 
Tel. (0222) 531  61-0 
Telex 11  25 00 BOX A 
Fax (0222) 531  61-81 
SUOMI 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 
Keskuskatu 1 
PO Box 128 
00101  Helsinki 
Tel. (0)  121  41 
Fax (0)  121  44 41 
NORGE 
Narvesen information center 
Bertrand Narvesens vei 2 
PO Box 6125 Etterstad 
0602 Oslo 6 
Tel. (2)  57 33 00 
Telex 79668 NIC N 
Fax (2)  68 19 01 
SVERIGE 
BTJ 
Box 200 
22100 Lund 
Tel. (046) 18 00 00 
Fax (046) 18 01  25 
SCHWEIZ I SUISSE I SVIZZERA 
OSEC 
StampfenbachstraBe 85 
8035 Zurich 
Tel. (01) 365 54 49 
Fax (01) 365 54 11 
CESKOSLOVENSKO 
NIS 
Havelkova 22 
13000 Praha 3 
Tel. (02) 235 84 46 
Fax 42-2-264775 
MAGYARORSzAG 
Agroinform 
Budapest I.  Kir. 
Attila ut 93 
1 012 Budapest 
Tel. (1)  56 8211 
Telex (22) 4717 AGINF H-61 
POLAND 
Business Foundation 
ul. Krucza 38142 
00-512 Warszawa 
Tel. (22) 21  99 93, 628-28-82 
International Fax&Phone 
(0-39) 12-00-77 
YUGOSLAVIA 
Privredni Vjesnik 
Bulevar Lenjina 171/XIV 
11 070 Beograd 
Tel. (11)  123 23 40 
CYPRUS 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Chamber Building 
38 Grivas Dhigenis Ave 
3  Deligiorgis Street 
PO Box 1455 
Nicosia 
Tel. (2)  4495001462312 
Fax (2)  458630 
TURKIYE 
Pres Gazete Kitap Dergi 
Pazarlama Dagitim Ticaret ve sanayi 
A$ 
Narlibahc;e Sokak N. 15 
lstanbui-Cagaloglu 
Tel. (1)  520 92 96- 528 55 66 
Fax 520 64 57 
Telex 23822 DSVO-TR 
AUTRES PAYS 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
ANDERE LANDER 
Office des publications officielles 
des Communautes europeennes 
2, rue Mercier 
2985 Luxembourg 
Tel. 49 92 81 
Telex PUBOF LU 1324 b 
Fax 48 85 73 
CC bancaire BIL 8-109160031700 
CANADA 
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd 
Mail orders - Head Office: 
1294 Algoma Road 
Ottawa, Ontario K1 B  3W8 
Tel. (613) 741  43 33 
Fax (613) 741  54 39 
Telex 0534  783 
Ottawa Store: 
61  Sparks Street 
Tel. (613) 238 89 85 
Toronto Store: 
211  Yonge Street 
Tel. (416) 363 31  71 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
UN  I PUB 
4611-F Assembly Drive 
Lanham, MD 20706-4391 
Tel. Toll Free (800) 274 4888 
Fax (301) 459 0056 
AUSTRALIA 
Hunter Publications 
58A Gipps Street 
Collingwood 
Victoria 3066 
JAPAN 
Kinokuniya Company Ltd 
17-7 Shinjuku 3-Chome 
Shinjuku-ku 
Tokyo 160-91 
Tel. (03) 3439-0121 
Journal Department 
PO Box 55 Chitose 
Tokyo 156 
Tel. (03) 3439-0124 
8/91 ~~~~~~  --~----
Price (excluding VAT)  in  Luxembourg: ECU  10 
ISBN  92-823-0328-4 
*  *  .:R•.  OFFICE FOR  OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
* Of)  *  OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
•  ==v= ... 
*•*  111111111111111111111111 
L-2985  Luxembourg  9  789282 303283 > 